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Acting as my Senior Honors Thesis in the departments of History, Political Science, and 
University Honors, this project, “The Acolyte of Being,” aims to present an aesthetic history 
of twentieth century German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s concept of “Da-sein:” the 
“thereness” of Being (or existence) itself.  Taking into account 2,500 years of Western 
metaphysics, my thesis begins by redefining one key philosophical term: transcendence, and 
in so doing revive four others as well: truth, beauty, freedom and the term metaphysics itself.  
As such, this work begins with a “Definition of Transcendence,” informing the following 
five chapters.  These chapters, in keeping with the historicity of Da-sein as an aesthetic one, 
each name great works of art, opening of the oblivions of Being to man.  Each of my chapters 
follow the guiding definition of “Transcendence” and correspond as well to one of five 
Wagnerian operas:  Das Rheingold, Die Walkyrie, Siegfried, Götterdämmerung and, finally, 
Parsifal.  This operatic chapter structure is linked as well to my the naming of my “Acolytes 
of Being:” Friedrich Nietzsche and his The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, 
Richard Wagner and his concept of the Gesamtkunstwerk, T.S. Eliot and The Waste Land, 
and, finally, National Socialism—as an aesthetic, poetic politics.  In constructing my 
argument in this manner, I am able to communicate that not only is history artistic, but that 
this aesthetic details the gradual return of metaphysics.  With National Socialism acting as 
the final “Acolyte of Being,” the distinction between the ontic (things as they appear) and the 
ontological (things in themselves) is defaced and Being as such returns with force to the 
dwelling of man.  With Heidegger himself offering up his ground breaking philosophy to the 
spiritual impetus of National Socialism we come before my chief question in this thesis: How 
did National Socialism pose the question of Being in the twentieth century?  Certainly a 
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This project, which has over the years come to be called “The Acolytes of Being,” is a work I 
began in the very early days of my freshman year at Appalachian State University, and now 
acts as my Senior Honors Thesis in the departments of both History and Political Science.  
Thought on this topic originally took shape during the weeks of my first trip to Berlin in 
October of 2009, when I was nineteen.  In the months and years following the realization of 
my interest in the Third Reich, my thought on the topic solidified into, truly, a distressing 
question.  It was only after my initial trip to Germany that I was introduced to Martin 
Heidegger’s thought and works by my long time mentor, Dr. Michael C. Behrent.  I have 
never found any other idea more moving than that of Heidegger.  
   With Heidegger I found the words I was searching for in an attempt to put my 
troubling question to academic form.  Reading Heidegger is an exercise in the most primal 
thinking and, truly, the most original poeticizing—but not only this.  Reading Heidegger 
requires an openness in the reader, a resoluteness to break forth into the unsaid in a creative, 
primeval and at times even violent way.  What I have found in reading Heidegger myself is 
that while I am “thinking,” this thinking becomes not simply a rigorous series of processes; 
rather, a truly artistic endeavor.  In the openness of thinking as a primal poeticizing, we find 
ourselves listening to the low thunder of the giants, calling to one another across the great 
abyss of Being. 
In this process of thinking as a paroxysmal poeticizing, much of my own work on 
Heidegger makes the attempt to “fetch back” concealed definitions of several key 
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metaphysical terms (including the term metaphysics itself).  One such term I attempt to 
recover in this work is “beauty,” by which I mean: the first sight of existence as such.  From 
this notion of the beautiful I make the effort to “fetch back” another term as well, which acts 
as the driving force of my argument.  From Heidegger’s writings during his Kehr [turn], a 
notion of “transcendence” can be unearthed in harmony with his notion of the “being beyond 
beings.”3   During the Kehr, Heidegger’s thinking of Being makes its return to the dwelling 
of man in an aesthetic, political landing.  As such, my question in this work is this: How did 
National Socialism pose the question of Being in the twentieth century?  Certainly a 
disquieting assertion we instinctively add: What can this mean? 
 Investigating National Socialism as an aesthetic, poetic politics bringing Being out of 
history into the world, each of my chapters corresponds to a different “great work of art” as 
well as an opera in Richard Wagner’s Der Ring des Nibelungens.  With this structure, I’d like 
to communicate that Being has a history, which has remained in the shadows of myth and 
legend at the periphery of metaphysics, scattered and divided in doubt.  The question my 
thesis grapples with details this return.  Opening up in the work of art, my chapter structure 
articulates the history of Being as the history of “the great work of art,” which allows man to 
glimpse “truth” in his given historical age.  As questioned by Dr. Richard Wolin: “If Being 
has a history, might it not also have a politics?”4  Making its resolute return in an aesthetic 
politics, I name National Socialism as (with the word Wagner used to describe his dramas, 
apart from any other) ein Gesamtkunstwerk—a total work of art, and the final “Acolyte of 
Being.”  As Heidegger wrote, “Only a God can save us.”5 
Thus, each chapter of this thesis tells of a different Acolyte on the way through 
Western history towards modern Germany.  These Acolytes—a Da-sein, who, through a 
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great work of art, open the world to the light of Being—act as the guardians of the truth of 
Being in each appointed age.  Beginning with Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy out 
of the Spirit of Music, on to Richard Wagner’s conception of the Gesamtkunstwerk itself in 
his own operas, and then to T.S. Eliot’s jarring modernist work The Waste Land, my thesis 
attempts to think Being in music and poetry—as the ontic within the ontological, teased out 
over time by, what Heidegger names “the coming preservers.”  To make my connection of 
German myth and legend as told by Der Ring des Nibelungens clearer to readers, I have 
added appendices, which contain summaries of the Wagner dramas as written by Jessie L. 
Weston—whose book T.S. Eliot claims his most important poem, The Waste Land, is based.  
In addition to the more literary elements of the structure of this work, I also want to 
make it clear to readers that the texts Heidegger used in this thesis are limited to “What is 
Metaphysics?,” “The Essence of Truth,” “The Origin of the Work of Art,” and “The 
Question Concerning Technology.”  I selected these works in an effort to elucidate 
Heidegger’s thought during his Kehr, a time when his concept of Dasein made the turn to 
Da-sein, and the thinker began to think Being in a manner synonymous with the 
metaphysical hopes he attributed to National Socialism’s rise—a “fetching back into its 
essence” of Germany, of truth and of the question, which first founds all history.  As an 
aesthetic, poetic, politics, National Socialism’s attempt to not only challenge modernity, but 
to dominate it signals, for Heidegger, Poiēsis reaching out to retake technē (art extending its 
hand to bring technology back under the primal sway of its Greek origin).  At this critical 
moment in Heidegger’s thought, the very essence of his concept of Da-sein makes room for 
the return of Being to the world of man.  It makes room for the appearance of a God.   
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For Heidegger, who hung all his metaphysical hopes on the “inner truth and 
greatness” of National Socialism’s potential, which threw itself against the bastion of the 
ontological difference.  In this way, Heidegger’s notion of the Seinsverlassenheit [the 
abandonment of Being] is always already contained within the notion of a 
Götterverlassenheit [the abandonment of man by the gods].6  With National Socialism 
corresponding to Wagner’s Götterdämmerung, we know from the legend that only one who 
foreswears all love can wield the power of the ring, and that only through love, the innocence 
of the gods can be restored.  Thus, is it with Da-sein’s comportment of “care” that we find 
ourselves waiting for Parsifal—a pure fool, enlightened by compassion on his way towards 
Monsalvat, where he must pose the original question anew in order to heal the advanced 
decay of the spirit itself.  
In addition to my own question: How did National Socialism pose the question of 
Being in the twentieth century?  I want to add this: If the greatest philosophical mind of the 
modern age can commit to the truth he saw reflected in National Socialism’s “great destiny” 
it is imperative that we not attempt to bury the thinker along with the truth of Being, but, 
today even more so than ever before, resolve to “think with” Heidegger. 
Finally, I wish to acknowledge that I did in no way arrive to this place alone.  As 
such, I want to thank my parents, Rachel and Jim Long, for their unwavering support.  In 
addition, I very much want to thank my academic mentors, Dr. Michael C. Behrent and Dr. 
Nancy S. Love, for their commitment to my thought and my academic hopes over the many 
years they have aided me in realizing this work.  I would also like to thank Dr. Alexandra 
Sterling-Hellenbrand, Dr. James Barnes, Dr. Andrew Koch, Professor Ralph Lenz, John 
Fowler, Regina James, Hannah Malcolm and Grayson Bodenheimer.
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Prelude:	  A	  Definition	  of	  Transcendence	  
	  
“To think is to confine yourself to a single thought that one days stands like a star in the 




“What is transcendence?”  The question awakens expectations of a discussion about 
transcendence.  This we will forgo.  Instead we will take up a particular transcendental 
question.  In this way it seems we will let ourselves be transposed directly into the 
transcendental.  Only in this way will we provide transcendence the proper occasion to 
introduce itself.2 
 From where we stand, the world is divided into three broad periods of thought.  Thus 
we can begin to think of our nearness to the concept of transcendence in two distinct ways: 
that of the dissemination of truth from God to man, and that of the assent to knowledge from 
man to Reason.  These two broad distinctions center on the occurrence of Enlightenment 
thought, belonging to thinkers such as Locke and Hobbes, in which man’s ascent to Reason 
is transcendence.  Pre-Enlightenment thought, or religious thought, took shape in the works 
of St. Thomas Aquinas and Augustus.  Here God’s dissemination of truth to man defines 
transcendence.  What is so different about these two broad periods of thought?  More so, 
where is the third? 
Two Broad Distinctions  
 It is apparent that there is an empty space in our modern definition of the term 
transcendence.  From god to man and man to reason, transcendence occurs in that knowledge 
or “truth” is disseminated.  What does truth mean here for each of our transcendental 
models?  How does truth happen? 
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As in all metaphysical inquiries, the whole of metaphysics must be addressed.  The 
same is then true for transcendence, since we are defining it here in consonance with the 
entire tradition of Western metaphysics.  Transcendence is a metaphysical concept.  Thus the 
entire historical path of transcendence must be brought into question at once with the 
questioners themselves.  The original metaphysical enquiry can only be posited as a whole, 
which brings existence [Dasein] into its essential mode.3  It is only with a preliminary sketch 
of both previous transcendental paths that we can seek to discover the lost definition 
belonging properly to Post-Enlightenment thought.   
When questioning is posited as a whole, we begin to call into question beings as a 
whole [Das Seiendes im Ganz].  Such inquiry has for the past 2,500 years been the domain of 
science.  “What happens when science becomes our passion?”4  
The scientific fields begin their inquiry into the nature of beings [Das Seiende] by 
way of weights and measures.  This is a proper investigation into the thingly characteristic of 
matter.  By naming color and size and frequency of occurrence, science names beings as 
matter-formed.  What is this “matter-formed”?  What role does it play in our knowledge of 
truth?  
When science analyses things as matter [hyle, ὕλη], the concept of form [morphē, 
µορφῇ] is already given.5  You can see here that we have begun to use Greek.  When science 
investigates beings as mere things it is speaking of formed matter.6  Form means here the 
particular arrangement of the material parts of a thing, as such, its thing-structure as it exists 
in a spatial location.7  Where this scientific structure becomes truly confusing is when it 
becomes clear that the shape of the form is not a posteriori vis-à-vis the matter that stands; 
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rather, the form determines the arrangement of the matter.8  These forms, existing after or 
above matter where it dwells, constitute the realm of ideas. 
In the course of this essay language will come to play a significant role.  The Pre-
Socratics spoke of Alētheia (ἀλήθεια) and the Sophists of Veritas. Veritas means: truth, 
sincerity, and integrity, with the added sense of “fact” and “correctness.”  Alētheia means: 
truth, sincerity, and integrity; however, it also means “unhiddenness.”  Roman thought, with 
truth dominated by sophistry, takes over the Greek word without any thought to the 
corresponding originality of Greek experience.9  This is no innocent mistake: “The 
rootlessness of Western thought begins with this translation.”10 
In Greek truth means “unhiddenness.”  In German “unhiddenness” or 
“unclosedness” is Entschlossenheit: resoluteness.11 
In much the same way that matter is in accord with its form, so too could one say is 
the truth of a statement in accord from subject to predicate.  Fortunately, we have at hand a 
very good example: “Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectūs.”12  From the Latin we take this 
to mean that truth [veritas] is the correspondence of matter [rei] to knowledge [intellectūs].13  
Here it is clear that veritas “conforms to,” and hence posits truth as correctness.14  In German 
correctness is Richtigkeit.  But to where have we strayed in our search for the lost definition 
of transcendence? 
Veritas, in its propositional statement “Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectūs,” 
stands as the usual formula for conceptions of knowledge as scientific truth back to its most 
recent origin in medieval times.15  Let us be quite clear that this does not merely imply the 
later transcendental conception of Kant—chiefly the basis of the subjectivity of man’s 
essence in so far as objects conform to man’s knowledge.16  We return now to matter and 
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hence to the Christian theological belief that matter conforms, that is, “is created” [ins 
creatum] and is as such in its conformity to the intellectus divinis, the mind of God.17  In this 
sense objects “measure up” to the idea (form) and only then are correct, thus, the truth.  “The 
theologically contrived order of creation is replaced by the capacity of all objects to be 
planned by means of worldly reason [Weltvernuft], which supplies the law for itself.”18 
 In this way it seems we have returned to our two previous distinctions of Western 
thought that posit definitions of transcendence: that of truth as disseminated from God to man 
and that of truth as ascent to Reason by man.  We have also approached the question of their 
difference and are now prepared briefly to answer it.   
In both Enlightenment and Pre-Enlightenment thought the metaphysical term 
transcendence is defined by the relationship between man and knowledge.  In Latin, the 
heretofore-reigning mode of thought, knowledge as truth is veritas.  Veritas brings matter 
under the yoke of the form; in formed-matter truth as the subject of “correctness” is in accord 
with the predicate idea of the form.   
The idea of creation in faith, and of the laws of reason, however, can lose their 
guiding power for knowledge of beings as a whole.19  When we define these periods as 
predominantly scientific, we can begin to see that our essential grounding in the sciences has 
atrophied.20  It is thus that we can say that the metaphysics of the modern age rests upon the 
form-matter structure of the Middle Ages, its thought only recalling the forlorn experience of 
hyle and morphē.21  Thus we have learned that when science investigates things by means of 
this matter-form relationship, be these investigations medieval or Kantian-transcendental, it 
merely serves to look into the thingness of things and to hold them at a distance from the 
dwelling of man. 
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This “holding at a distance” has for 2,500 years defined the work of metaphysics and 
the status of transcendence.  Veritas as correctness brings matter under the yoke of the form.  
In other words, thinking becomes scientific in the accordance [homoiōsis] of a statement 
[logos] with a matter [pragma].22   
Thus far in our line of questioning we have discovered that transcendence seeks the 
truth and that in the Western metaphysical tradition “truth” has come to mean “correctness in 
accordance with.”  This is the grammatical distance between God and man, between man and 
knowing.  Posed briefly to answer our first question concerning the two preliminary 
distinction of Western thought that posit definitions of transcendence, we have come to the 
point of being able to say: They are hardly different at all.  The metaphysical status of 
transcendence has, for 2,500 years, been held at bay, the phantasmic guardian of a great 
chasm… 
The Lost Truth 
 Did we not, however, name another word for truth?  In pre-Socratic thought 
something slumbers… We recall that Alētheia (ἀλήθεια) means “unconcealedness.” 
We must then ask: How is it with the “unconcealedness?”  
In seeking the lost definition of Post-Enlightenment transcendence we are looking to 
history.  By looking to history we are always already within the realm of metaphysics, be it 
Kantian-transcendental or Platonic.  As I suggested at the orient of this essay, transcendence 
is a metaphysical term.  It has a claim to metaphysics and vice versa.  Thus the entire 
historical path of transcendence must be brought into question along with the questioner.  
The original metaphysical inquiry can only be posited as a whole, which brings existence 
[Dasein] into its essential mode.   
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It is clear that we are traveling in a circle.  This is no mistake.  At this point in our 
search it has also becomes clear to that we must look into the essence of truth [Alētheia] as 
unconcealedness.  What is “essence?”  Moreover, who is this questioner of essence and why 
must he be brought into his essential mode in the original realm of metaphysics? 
We must now take up the particular transcendental question we spoke of in order to 
be ourselves transposed directly into metaphysics, as the transcendental.  In the Western 
intellectual tradition man—one being among others—has pursued science.23  In this pursuit 
man irrupts into beings as a whole.24  In this irruption into beings as a whole, beings break 
open, showing what and how they are in their particular mode of existing in a spatial 
location.  But not only this: “The irruption that breaks open helps beings to themselves.”25  
How is it with these beings that are helped to themselves in the irruption into beings as a 
whole?  Now we arrive at what is truly remarkable.  At the precise moment when scientific 
man leaps forward to secure what is properly his, he finds himself speaking of something 
entirely different.26 
What does scientific man investigate? He looks into the qualities and quantities of 
beings—and besides that, nothing. When matter is formed scientific man has the task of 
stretching it to reason—and besides that, nothing.  In his irruption into beings as a whole he 
investigates how it is with beings—and besides that, nothing.27  
To what odd end have we arrived in our strange circle?  What is all this talk about 
nothing?  In investigating beings, in irrupting into beings as a whole, the total aggregate of 
scientific knowledge has come to nothing.28 
We must now press resolutely onward and ask: “How is it with the nothing?”29 
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Several clues quickly and clearly present themselves.  It is clear that science does not 
investigate this nothing.  It is clear that the nothing is not simply the totality of beings.  But is 
this not how we arrived at the phantasm of the nothing in the first place?  It is clear that 
scientific man irrupts into beings as a whole.  What of this irruption?  For the time being, this 
mystery remains veiled. 
In its investigation of beings science gives up the nothing, as a void, as a phantom.  
Nevertheless we are resolved to coming before how it stands with the nothing; and yet, when 
this nothing is questioned the object is always already devoured by the subject.30  For 
example, when one begins by making a hypothesis about this nothing, which we wish to 
investigate in our inquiry, one begins with “the nothing is.”31  We are already lost in an 
inherent absurdity.32 
However, we must not be discouraged by our apparent inability to question the 
nothing.  Logic, whose methods we have thus far detailed, would suffice to say that the 
nothing is “not” this or that thing.  Thus we now have the idea of the nothing as: “It is not.”  
Subject and predicate persist, signaling only some negated matter, harking to the great 
distance of knowledge, we have sunk ourselves into investigating only to arrive at nothing.  
At this point in our argumentation I must boldly assert that the nothing is far more original 
than that.33   
Standing now as not simply a negated subjective matter, some nullity, a clearing 
arises.  If this nothing is not simply this or that, yet still not nothing, persistently more 
original than a negation, “We must be able to encounter it…”34 
In man’s irruption into beings as a whole he investigates all but nothing.  This is the 
realm of discovery, of pure exploration, of the quest.  Do we not know the nothing?  Is it not 
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something we rap our fingers on or breathe in silently in the night… a thin veil of morning 
fog?  The learned, familiar, taste of things, a word, a specter…  But are we not still dealing 
with beings?  With matter and things?  A rap of fingers, the morning fog?  Absolutely not.  
“For the nothing is the negation of the totality of beings; it is non-being pure and simple.”35  
Non-being.  This certainly signals a frightful turning back and fleeing from the gaping 
jaws of what is clearly a phantom in our midst.  How have we been drawn out into the realm 
of this empty, nihilating oblivion?  We have questioned beings as a whole, their qualities and 
quantities across the earth; we have had them formed correctly into matter.  And yet in 
standing before beings as a whole the nothing rushes up to meet us.  But from where has it 
taken its origin?  In the towering form of all matter pressing down on scientific man?  [Das 
Seiendes im Ganz].  Indeed.   
In the totality of beings’ matter all gathers round, and the power of the nothing grows.  
Instead of thinking of beings as things in accordance with their ideas, the nothingness of their 
lost essence presses forward most dangerously.  This is the profound anxiety.36    
It is in the comportment of our human emotion that we are brought before this 
nothing for the very first time.   
Let us make it clear that this original anxiety is not simply “fear for” or “fear in the 
face of” this or that particular thing.37  This “fear for,” however, remains in relation to the 
nothing.  In our investigation we have insisted that, when posing transcendence as a 
metaphysical question, it is a requirement (of metaphysics proper, which we aim to 
rediscover here as well) that the questioner himself be brought into question along with the 
whole of metaphysics itself.  Finally, who is this questioner?  What profound anxiety grips 
him in the face of the nothing, and brings him to tremble before it?   
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We have established that the nothing is the negation of the totality of beings.  It is 
nonbeing pure and simple.38  In all our lives we are always already within it, even if only in 
some shadowy way.  The nothing nihilates.39  In this original nihilation, negating the totality 
of beings in the astounding presence of the pressing whole, anxiety grips us and in this 
profound anxiety we are thrown out into a primeval encounter with the nothing itself.  
“Anxiety robs us of speech… in the face of anxiety all utterance of the ‘is’ falls silent.”40 
Standing out in the nihilating oblivion of the original openness of the nothing: “pure Da-sein 
is all that remains.”41 
In the original openness of this abyssal plain, the questioner, for the first time, comes 
forward into the totality of beings, and gazes long into the oblivion of existence itself.  This 
being—one being among others, gazing long into the abyss of Being—is Dasein.   
For Dasein, beings hide and show themselves, they glitter in the light they make and 
in the irruption of this unconcealing light, he sees them for the first time.  In the emotion of 
anxiety, he is thrown out into the open region of their Being.  In the emotion of love, he sees 
into the essence of beings, and in his comportment of care, he fears for them.  This “fear for” 
the essential essence of beings, as beings and not nothing, is not the profound anxiety which 
first propels man into the nothing proper, it is, however, an essential mode of Dasein 
nonetheless.  In the light of the open region Da-sein knows the original essence of matter and 
thing for the first time.  Here Da-sein knows too the last things—death and judgment.42  
Authentic Da-sein turns resolutely to gaze long into the blinding light of Being. 
“In the clear night of the nothing of anxiety the original openness of beings as such 
arises: that they are beings—and not nothing… The essence of the originally nihilating 
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nothing lies in this, that it brings Da-sein for the first time before beings as such”43 and he is 
“held out” into their Being as well as his own…  
Da-sein trembles on this precipice, breathless before the breaking of the world…  In 
German Das Da-sein means: the there-Being.  “Da-sein means: Being held out into the 
nothing.”44   
At this point in our search each of us, as Da-sein, has always already been brought 
before the primary occurrence of the truth of Alētheia.  This is the most original occurrence 
of beauty.  
Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a 
whole.  This being beyond beings we call ‘transcendence.’  If in the ground of its 
essence Dasein were not transcending, which now means, if it were not in advance 
holding itself out into the nothing, then it could never be related to beings nor even to 
itself.45 
 
“Without the original revelation of the nothing, no selfhood and no freedom.”46 
Freedom 
We have thus returned to our origin.  In being brought before the Being of beings 
[Das Seiende des Seiendes] we are held out into the nothing, the oblivion of Being itself.  
The primordial occurrence of this question, when man first seeks Being, was from the time of 
Plato and Aristotle originally called “philosophy,” and later “metaphysics.”47  Metaphysics 
must think Being.  Under the yoke of the form, in simple grammatical accordance with 
veritas, it has not.  The question: “What is metaphysics?” here too receives an answer, which 
has been denied to its essence for centuries.  Metaphysics means: transcendence.   
Have we not then answered our original question?  With regard to the first two broad 
distinctions of Western historical thought it has been said that transcendence was held at bay, 
safeguarding the bridge between man and the gods.  But what is the third distinction?  Is the 
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open region not the proper realm of the lost third distinction?  Here the nothing as such was 
there, and Dasein held out into it.  We have defined this moment of being beyond beings as 
transcendence—as authentic Da-sein holding itself out into the nothing. 
Our circle draws tightly around itself once again.  We have sought the questioner of 
essence and sent him resolutely on his heroic quest into the nihilating oblivion of Being.  Yet 
we are still left questioning.  In the abyss of the nothing we gazed into the essence of truth 
[Alētheia] as unconcealedness and the irruption of scientific man into beings as a whole [Das 
Seiendes im Ganz] throwing Da-sein out into the profound anxiety, where he loves and cares 
for the Being of beings in the open region of their glittering truth.  We know that this is 
transcendence.  
It has been said that without the original revelation of the nothing, as Da-sein 
transcends in his “being beyond beings:” “no selfhood and no freedom.”48  
It is clear that man is always already Dasein, briefly glimpsing beings who hide and 
show themselves in everyday light.  Is this Dasein’s selfhood?  Is Dasein free?  At this point 
in our search we are lead to ask: What is freedom? 
Being held out into the nothing, into the origin of metaphysics itself, and even the 
primeval resting place of something more original than that, transcendence reveals the 
blinding light of Being as such.  We are now aware that without this original realization, no 
selfhood, no freedom.  What of selfhood and freedom?  As products of transcendence, it can 
easily be assumed that the original essences of these concepts have been lost to the ages.  
When we speak of Dasein transcending, we find ourselves making a resolute turn to the 
occurrence of truth.  The thinking of Being, lost to the definition of metaphysics over the 
ages, seeks the truth of freedom. 
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When Dasein is transcending he is in the open region of truth as unconcealedness.  
This is the original glimpse of Alētheia’s veil, the atrium of the open region, where beings 
come to stand in the light of their Being. 
The pre-Socratics used the word Alētheia to mean truth, yet in this meaning of truth 
we also know that Alētheia means “unhiddenness.”  This original notion of Alētheia as 
unhiddenness speaks to the concealed purpose of metaphysics, when it once adhered, at the 
advent of Western historical thinking, in the strictest sense, to that which is.49   
Coming into the openness of Alētheia to stand in the light of the Being of beings is 
only possible once Dasein is free.  In the course of Western history, the essence of freedom 
has been mistaken and misconstrued in “negative” and “positive” freedom, in the equality of 
freedom, in freedom of speech and creed and taste and so on.50  For too long we have thought 
of freedom as the property, the right, of humanity.  At best, we will come to see, the opposite 
is true: “Freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive Da-sein, possesses man—so originally that only it 
secures for humanity that distinctive relatedness to beings as a whole as such which first 
founds all history.”51 
The ek-sistence of Da-sein, which means here “the ecstatic character of freedom 
standing outside of itself”52 is only set forth when the veil of Alētheia shimmers before him 
for the first time.  It is here, at the advent of history, that man asks: “What are beings?”53 
We come now to the breaking point, standing out in the nothingness of the original 
anxiety as ek-static Da-sein.  When we ask: “What are beings?” and seek the truth of their 
Being in the open field we are at the very same time looking into the essence of freedom.  To 
free oneself is only possible by being free towards the moment of unconcealedness housed in 
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Alētheia.  When asked: “What is freedom?”  We come now, through the circle, to our 
answer: “The essence of truth is freedom.”54 
When we speak of existence, of Being, Dasein’s existence becomes ek-static, 
meaning here that in the moment of unconcealedness—when Dasein is beyond beings as a 
whole—the ecstatic character of freedom is standing outside of itself.55  In this way too we 
recall that this being beyond beings we call “transcendence.” 
Standing resolutely outside of itself, in the original open region of the oblivion for the 
first time, Da-sein is ablaze in the dawning light of Being.  Da-sein is transcending.   
Da-sein is free. 
Freedom, standing now in its rightful place as the essence of truth, evokes the 
unhiddenness of beings as such when they come to stand in the light of Alētheia.  Out in the 
open region, we see that “Freedom now reveals itself as letting beings be.”56  This “letting 
be” is not simply some passive indifference.  Letting beings be, in fact, requires that Da-sein 
turn towards the unclosedness of the open region and gaze into beings as such, letting them 
be in their Being.57  In this way, historical Dasein takes up his fate and turns toward his 
destiny as “the coming preserver.” 
Who is this coming preserver?  Moreover, can he stand at all times held out into the 
nothing in daring?  In speaking of the essence of truth as freedom, freedom to stand in the 
open region and reveal, we discover the overgrown path to our answer.  If the essence of 
truth is revealing, and this is freedom, what then is the essence of untruth?  (We can feel the 
circle shifting its weight.)  Of the essence of untruth we must come to the conclusion that, 
when Da-sein “lets beings be,” there is at the same time a concealing that takes place.58  But 
was this “letting beings be” not proper to the unconcealed freedom that possesses Da-sein?  
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In the ek-sistent freedom of Da-sein beings show themselves and how it stands with their 
Being.  We recall that Da-sein knows beings as such, just as he knows the final things… 
Concealment deprives Alētheia of disclosure yet does not render it sterēsis 
[privation]; rather, concealment preserves what is most proper to Alētheia as its 
own… The concealment of beings as a whole, untruth proper, is older than every 
openness of this or that being.  It is already older than letting-be itself.  What 
conserves letting-be itself, which in disclosing already holds concealment?  This is 
nothing less than the mystery.59 
 
In Da-sein’s freedom to “let beings be” in their unconcealedness, they always already 
are slipping away, swallowed back up into the sheltering earth and held therein.  This is the 
forgotten mystery of Being, its essence proper to ecstatic Da-sein.  If the essence of truth is 
freedom, then the essence of non-truth is mystery.  Let us not be confused here in thinking 
that non-truth is something negative.  It is simply a “pre-essential essence.”60  Both remain 
proper to the power of the goddess Alētheia.   
Yet in this always already occurring concealment, Da-sein can become forgetful of 
the mystery he conserves all together; he sinks down into his own world, “…proposing and 
planning and creating standards…”61 In his forgetfulness of the concealing mystery of 
Alētheia’s veil, he takes himself as subject, as standard, and begins again to seek the weights 
and measures of the beings at hand.  When man takes up his standards and no longer gazes 
into the nothing that nihilates, humanity is turned away from the mystery of Being.  We call 
this inauthenticity. Turning away from the mystery is “erring.”62  In German erring [irren] 
means: “to stray.”63  
In Dasein’s forgetting of the mystery we find the essential counter-essence to the pre-
primordial essence of truth, not untruth, but erring as “straying.”  This erring however (as a 
most egregious form of inauthenticity) is, for Da-sein, a part of his world, for man knows the 
final things…   
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In the pre-primordial essence of truth, as untruth, there is concealment in which 
Dasein slips and always already strays off the path into erring.  
What must Da-sein do?    
When at the advent of metaphysics, when man first thinks Being, he is always already 
beyond beings as a whole, as ek-static Da-sein.  He is transcending.  He is free.  This is the 
liberation that grounds all history.64  Yet the primacy of this freedom as the essence of truth 
[Alētheia] takes its originality from the ever more primeval concealment of the mystery.  
Showing and concealing themselves, beings lead Dasein to the question of the Being of 
beings, out of errency to turn resolutely towards the mystery [Entschlossenheit zum 
Geheimnis].65  Here, authentic Da-sein resolutely holds himself out into the nothing.  We 
have said that in “letting beings be” historical Da-sein stands in the open region and that here 
he turns towards his fate and joins destiny—taking up his historical task as the coming 
preserver. 
Who is this coming preserver?  In the whole history of metaphysical thought, does he 
come into question in his appointed age?  It is clear that he arrives as ecstatic Da-sein in its 
unrepeatability.66  It is also clear that he stands resolutely in the open region, holding out into 
the nothing, that he lets being be.  The coming preserver shines a light out of history.   
In order to comprehend this coming preserver we have taken up a particular 
metaphysical question that has transposed us into the realm of metaphysics itself.  In our 
search we have encountered the whole of metaphysical inquiries, along with the questioner 
himself.  This questioner is Da-sein.  Out of the shadows cast by the unbroken distance 
between the essence of man and the essence of truth, historical Da-sein comes to stand in the 
blinding light of the Being of beings.  He is always already transcending.  
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As the coming preserver, historical Da-sein has turned towards his fate to join 
destiny, which gathers.  For 2,500 years metaphysics has been stretched to bridge the gap 
between man and truth while Being has slumbered in its origin, the dragon of the West.  
Origin and Essence 
In the course of this essay we have spoken time and again of origin.  It is time now 
for us to seek it.  Origin means here: “that from which and by which something is what it is 
as it is.”67  This already sounds strikingly similar to what we have heretofore called “essence” 
for Da-sein, as well as for truth and untruth.  In our quest for the origin it is now essential to 
give an example: “The artist is the origin of the work of art.”68 
We know that art, as a work of art, has a “thingly” character.  We mean, of course, 
that it is a being.  When we are faced with the great work of art (and such art is the only art 
under consideration here) we know that “there is something stony in the work of architecture, 
wooden in a carving, colored in a painting, spoken in a linguistic work, sonorous in a musical 
composition.”69  In this way, the work in its thingly character brings to light something else 
as well in its composition: “it is an allegory.”70 
But have we not once again become scientific in our use of metaphysics?  Not at all.  
With the fabled thread of Ariadne we are making our return. 
When Kant affected his Copernican revolution in philosophy his system named all the 
world, and even God himself, as a thing, more precisely, a “thing in itself” [Das Ding an 
sich].71  Knowledge of things in themselves was, for Kant, always impossible.  Things in 
themselves can never be known in themselves; rather, they are always mere things—from 
God himself to a stone in the Rhine.  Nowadays airplanes and radios are among the closest 
things to us and even more so do death and judgment remain the final things.72  We have said 
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that the work of art acts as an allegory of mere things, which are thus brought together with 
their Being [to bring together: symballein [συµβαλλειν].73  
On the whole here, as we have previously investigated, this word “thing” signifies 
what is not simply nothing, but a being.74  In our discussions of Kant, Plato and Aristotle we 
have investigated metaphysics from the Prussians to the Greeks.  In the expanse of this 
Western philosophical tradition it is only obvious that as soon as thinking sets about on its 
way to beings their mere thingness asserts itself time and again.75  As such: “The thingness of 
things has since dominated the course of Western thought.”76  At this point so much has 
already become quite clear.  In our quest for the lost definition of transcendence, we have 
arrived at the Being of beings and now seek a tactile method for being transposed directly 
into the open region. 
It is the great work of art that brings beings all the more to themselves in their Being.  
In the allegory of great art the darkness of the colors gazes out and we know that they want 
only to shine.77  This shining of the is is no talk of aesthetics; rather, it is what we now call 
the beautiful.  In the beauty of the great work of art Da-sein is brought before the open region 
and the work holds it open.  In this sense no less is clear than that: “Art is truth setting itself 
to work.”78 
If the origin of the work of art is the artist himself and in the work of art mere things 
come to stand in the light of their Being, Da-sein is then holding open the open region 
himself in the work. 
Standing there, the landing of art, with the artist (Da-sein) at its origin, holds its 
ground before man and god alike.  As a Greek temple stands in stony defiance on the rocky 
edifice, its columns make evident the sculpture of the god within in such a way that the 
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marble itself is the god as such, in all his presence and terrible glory.  In resolution he 
weathers all the ages and so first makes the storm that rages against his temple manifest in its 
violence.79   
In the great work of art, Da-sein makes manifest the oblivion of Being. 
Concealing and revealing, the great chasm of the open region undulates within the 
world of man, and Being as such was there, and is won.  In our thinking of Being at the 
origin of metaphysics, and over the long years of its life thereafter, we know that in Greek 
physis means that mere thing which sets himself forth.80  Not only this, but it names also the 
dwelling of man—his home in the earth.81  Earth means here: “that whence the arising brings 
back and shelters everything that arises as such.”82 
It is in the world that man dwells on this earth: “the world worlds.”83  By world we 
mean here that: “World is the ever-nonobjective to which we are subject as long as the paths 
of birth and death, blessing and curse, keep us transported into Being.”84 
Towering up within the earth, the world thunders the majesty of the storm. 
In the work of art, the artist as its origin sets up a world, which the work holds in 
force.  This “setting up a world” is the first essential feature of the work of art.  The second 
essential feature is this: “The work in its essence is a setting forth” [physis, φύσις] 
[Herstellung].85  Setting up and setting forth, the work of art opens up a world and grounds it 
in the earth.  It is in the world that historical man dwells on this earth. “The work lets the 
earth be an earth.”86   
As such, the work of art “…moves the earth itself into the open region and keeps it 
there.”87 In the open region, which we have now seen into before, we come face to face with 
the Being of beings, their oblivion and our own.  We have called this clearing the beautiful.  
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We have said that “art is truth setting itself to work.”88  And in the totality of our search we 
have found that “this being beyond beings we call ‘transcendence.’”89 
The work of art holds open the open region as the earth settles back into its essential 
self-seclusion and the world towers up within it.  One in the same, as is the Being of beings, 
world and earth are eternally at odds, which binds them together.90  As with the Being of 
beings—who time and again refuse themselves to us, the earth seeks to draw the world into 
itself and seclude it therein.91  This is the original strife [Der Kampf].  It is the realm of the 
mystery of concealment, at the same time as much on the precipice of the open region as it is 
always already beyond it.  “The essence of truth is, in itself, the primal strife in which the 
open center is won within which beings stand and from which they set themselves back into 
themselves.”92  As we have said: “the nothing itself nihilates.”93 
In our search for the lost definition of transcendence we have raised too the lost 
definition of metaphysics and found contained within it the forgotten essence of truth as 
Alētheia, of this truth as the essence of freedom and of the view of the open region as the 
beautiful. In coming to face all of these questions as a whole the questioner himself, too, 
came into question.  Winning his selfhood and freedom, historical Da-sein now resolutely 
holds open the open region as the coming preserver. 
How is it that truth as unhiddenness sets itself to work in the great work of art?  
Which now means to say: “How does truth happen in the instigation of strife between world 
and earth?  Is it only a curiosity or even the merely empty sophistry of a conceptual game, or 
is it—an abyss?”94  A revival of Greek philosophy here is neither necessary nor possible.  In 
the grand metaphysical tradition, beginning with the Greeks and working towards Kant, truth 
as Alētheia did not define the task of philosophy.95  In this way, “…the essence of truth that 
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is familiar to us—correctness in representation [veritas]—stands and falls with truth as 
unconcealment of beings.”96  Thus at this point in our questioning the circular motion of our 
thought, always already on its way to the open region out of the truth of history, is won:  
As the fundamental theme of philosophy Being is not a genus of beings; yet it 
pertains to every being. Its 'universality' must be sought in a higher sphere. Being and 
its structure transcend every being and every possible existent determination of a 
being. Being is the transcendens pure and simple. The transcendence of the being of 
Da-sein is a distinctive one since in it lies the possibility and necessity of the most 
radical individuation. Every disclosure of being as the transcendens is transcendental 
knowledge. Phenomenological truth (disclosedness of being) is veritas 
transcendentalis.97   
 
For the first time in 2,500 years of Western thought the third distinction wins for itself 
a definition of transcendence—as a holding open of the open region by the coming preservers 
who gaze long into the oblivion of the Being of beings and so too into themselves.  Out in the 
nihiliating nothing, Da-sein knows selfhood; Da-sein is free.   
But how long can he “hold out?” Contrary to our two previous periods of thought the 
realm of the third knows transcendence as being there. 
We know that just as beings hide and show themselves that the earth swallows up the 
world, which towers up within it, and that this is the essential strife, closely akin to the 
mystery.  What is so essential in the eternal strife of opposites, which are intimately crucial to 
one another?  “In essential strife… the opponents raise each other into the self-assertion of 
their essential natures.  In strife each opponent carries the other beyond itself.”98  Carried 
beyond itself in the essential strife, we find the open region held wide open, already 
transcending.  We have said that the two first essential features of the work of art are setting 
up a world and setting forth an earth.  This is the instigation of the primal strife in the work 
of art, as the open region is held open in unconcealment, where the truth of Being is won.99  
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Setting up, setting forth and preserving are all fundamental characteristics of the 
essence of truth as freedom setting itself to work in the work of art, bringing about the 
original experience of the beautiful.  Holding itself out into the nothing Da-sein, possessed 
by freedom, is “letting beings be.”  Yet we know that here there is also concealment.  
“Through Being there passes a veiled fatality that is ordained between the godly and the 
counter godly.”100 
What is this “veiled fatality?”  If we look back to the original strife in the world of 
Greek thought we could see that between Plato and Aristotle art’s philosophical status 
constituted a point of contrition.  For Plato, art was a representation of a representation and 
consequently worthless.  For the Greeks, who knew few things about works of art, the word, 
technē [τέχνη], was given to both craft and art.101  The Greek technē means not to create or to 
build but “to know.”  In Greek thought, the essence of this knowing that belongs to technē is 
held too in Alētheia.102  Which means that the knowing of the work is unhidden in the 
thinking of Being.  As Alētheia consists in the veil, the moment of transcendence, so does 
Technē consist of the “bringing forth” of beings out of concealment into unconcealment: 
together Alētheia and technē set up an earth and bring forth a world.103 
In our search for the lost definition of transcendence proper to the modern age we 
have posed a metaphysical question bringing into question the whole of metaphysics, along 
with the questioner himself.  If the Greek Physis [φύσις] (understood in accordance with 
metaphysics [µεταφυσική]) is understood as the arising of something from outside of itself, it 
is also a “bringing forth.”104  “Bringing forth” in Greek, however, is properly: Poiēsis 
[ποίησις]; it is something poetic.105   
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While Alētheia as truth was hidden in the shadow of truth as correctness [veritas] 
through the ages, technē gave its name to technology.  Against technē as a knowing proper to 
Poiēsis as a “bringing forth,” technology is based on modern physics as a calculable science.  
When science becomes our passion, the revealing that rules modern technology becomes not 
the artistic “bringing forth” proper to Poiēsis, but a challenging [Herausfordern].”106  In the 
technological age man is challenged forth into revealing in a particularly striking manner; a 
manner that brings the strife of world and earth before us in nothing less than the Battle of 
the Giants Concerning Being [].107 
Yet when the mystery persists, concealment and unconcealment as the original strife 
of world and earth remain proper to one another.  Contained in technē and Alētheia as 
property of Poiēsis: “The essential unfolding of technology harbors in itself the possible rise 
of the saving power.”108 
In Poiēsis, the proper poetic heart of “bringing forth” the Being of beings, there 
slumbers too a great destining.  We know that the essence of truth as Alētheia is freedom, 
open to the blinding light of the open region and for the first time transcending.  In the 
bringing forth of Poiēsis as also a destining, transcendence becomes the destiny of the 
coming preservers, that is, of an historical group of men.  This destining is also endangering, 
challenged forth in the modern age the destining of revealing hails the return of Being to Da-
sein in nothing less than the most extreme danger.109  
 In the modern age, as we quest for the lost definition of transcendence “Art and 
technology draw past each other like two stars in the course of the heavens—the stellar 
course of the mystery of their essences as the unveiling, i.e., of truth.”110 
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The violent one, the creative one who sets forth into the unsaid, who breaks into the 
unthought, who compels what has never happened and makes appear what is 
unseen—this violent one stands at all times in daring…thus the violence-doer knows 
no kindness, no appeasement and mollification… for such a one disaster is the 
deepest and broadest ‘yes’ to the overwhelming pallor… this constantly pressing 
ensnarement in the everyday of custom.... This decided setting out upon the way to 
the ‘Being of beings,’ moves humanity…111 
 
—Martin Heidegger
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A Review of the Literature 
“…there is no room for political philosophy in Heidegger’s work…the room in question is 




Posing the historical questioning of the compassionate Dasein in the twentieth century, the 
critical ontology of Martin Heidegger sought to facilitate the return of “Being” to a world 
thrown headlong into the chaos, struggle and cultural nihilism of modern Europe.  Spirited 
debates have since taken shape around not only the posing of Heidegger’s earth shattering 
question, but the manifestation of such a question, the question of first philosophy, that of 
“Being” itself, in its politics.  Such debates have grappled with the obvious rift between the 
undeniable beauty of Heidegger’s work and the violence of such a beautiful proposition in 
the anxious, aesthetic and fatefully ferocious “Metapolitics,” the katharsis unbound: National 
Socialism.   
It has been written that Heidegger was duped into following the flag, that he saw an 
opportunity to seize power …den Führer führen… and ascend to the status of “philosopher 
king…” Or that he was simply an unrepentant Nazi, and little more—his truly 
“transcendental” philosophy banished to the trash heap of history.  The scramble to “place” 
Heidegger here or there has come to form across the Western world.  Recent scholarship, 
however, edges closer to answers concerning what Richard Wolin aptly names “The Politics 
of Being,” as thinkers from Pierre Bourdieu to Slavoj Žižek turn to gaze long into the abyss 
of Heidegger’s philosophical commitment to the spiritual impetus of National Socialism.  
Arguably the greatest philosophical mind of the modern age, Heidegger shatters 2500 years 
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of Western metaphysics in a resolute turn to the most reviled political movement in history.  
The thread has been woven, and stitched into an historical destiny.  What must we do?  In the 
days and years after the fall of the Third Reich, burned in its own hot flame, the great 
philosopher of Being faded into a mystical Gelassenheit, and was never again political.  In 
the resounding words of his infamous Der Spiegel interview, telltale of a Wagnerian 
leitmotif, the secret king of thought lifted his leveling gaze: “Only a god can save us now.”2 
The question of Heidegger’s Nazism sent shivers across the intellectual world almost 
immediately postwar.  In France, in Germany, and even in the United States the troubling 
question of Heidegger and National Socialism made waves—those willing to offer the 
philosopher up to the fires of Nazism and those struggling to shield him from such an 
irredeemable fate went to battle in public forums, newspapers, and academic journals alike.  
In readying the way for a discussion of Heidegger and a discussion of his National Socialism, 
it is truly a German perspective that is vital to the first account of such a perplexing and 
precarious history.  The occurrence of the Historikerstreit situates the debate over what must 
be done regarding the “Past that will not Pass”3 of National Socialism in its German context, 
bringing with it the age old question: Was ist Deutsch?  
Carried out in German newspapers, the Historikerstreit spanned the course of the 
1980s, as German historians, philosophers and thinkers of caliber began to grapple with the 
question—the horror—of their National Socialist past.  In the words of German historian and 
philosopher Ernst Nolte, a student of Heidegger himself, this is truly, “The Past that will not 
Pass.”  Taking strong stances, the Germans split definitively into two camps.  On the one 
hand the “revisionist,” with Ernst Nolte at the helm and thinkers in the vein of Stürmer, Fest, 
and Hildebrand at his side, wrote for the Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung.  On the left, 
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thinkers, chiefly Jürgen Habermas, wrote in Die Zeit.  Oddly, those on the right leaned 
heavily on arguments of totalitarianism when seeking to place Nazism while those on the left 
split looked to the ever-controversial Sonderweg thesis.  In this thesis, I intend to return these 
sadly confused positions to their rightful owners.  With this historical and ideological 
confusion the question of “What is to be done with Martin Heidegger?” comes to the 
forefront, especially for giants Nolte and Habermas.  Heralded as a critical theorist, 
sociologist and philosopher in his own right, Jürgen Habermas addressed the Heidegger 
question in the context of the Historikerstreit in his 1989 essay “Work and Weltanschauung: 
The Heidegger Controversy from a German Perspective.”   
The solemn, almost reverent tone taken by Habermas in his questioning of Heidegger 
should be mentioned and commended.  Though deeply troubled in the face of the “Politics of 
Being” (the forward to the essay collection The New Conservatism by the eminent Richard 
Wolin), Habermas ventured to write (even in light of Heidegger’s Nazism) that “From 
today’s standpoint, Heidegger’s new beginning still presents probably the most profound 
turning point in German philosophy since Hegel.”4  He insists that, “Illumination of the 
political conduct of Martin Heidegger cannot and should not serve the purpose of a global 
depreciation of his thought.”5  What is the interest in Heidegger’s political/philosophical past 
(from a German perspective) today?  What does Heidegger’s Nazism say about the 
questioning question Was ist Deutsch?  In Habermas’s view, Heidegger remained convinced 
of the world-historical importance of the metaphysical meaning of Nazism to the bitter 
end6—a fate from which it seems unlikely that Habermas (or anyone) is capable of saving 
him.  And yet, for Habermas (as for so many great thinkers), Heidegger’s monumental 
thought cannot be forsaken.  
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Habermas points to Heidegger’s trouble with the technologization of totalitarianism, a 
trouble that deeply informs not only the struggle of National Socialism with “bourgeois 
nihilism,” pointed out by a number of authors including Pierre Bourdieu, Emmanuel Faye 
and Slavoj Žižek, but also the impending encounter between modern man and technology—
the metaphysical troubles that this thesis will address.  As Habermas writes of Heidegger’s 
National Socialism, it is “Only in the final phase of working through his disillusionment does 
the concept of the history of Being take on a fatalistic form.”7   
The stage of the Götterdämmerung has been set… For Heidegger, the victors of the 
Second World War were American and Russian, “alike in their essence”—thus nothing 
critical concerning the return of Being had been decided after all.  As Habermas (and others, 
namely Richard Wolin) point out, Heidegger’s turn in the 1930’s was not a true change in 
standpoint from Being and Time (a troubling claim for many).  It becomes apparent at the 
end of the long 19th century, Dasein, in resolution, is gathering.  Talk of a German Dasein 
insists that one turn towards his fate [Das Schicksal], to join the greater destiny.  It is here 
that Dasein must “chose its hero.”8  In Heidegger’s thought, it is in the “middle realm of 
demi-gods” that the creative leaders are poets and thinkers… he describes Hitler’s 
withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations as: “The highest free decision (Die 
Entscheidung) of all… whether the entire Volk wants its Dasein or not.”9 
 On the 6th of June 1986, German historian Ernst Nolte, a chief defender of Heidegger 
and a “revisionist” scholar in the context of the Historikerstreit, penned his infamous “The 
Past that will not Pass: A Speech that Could be Written but not Delivered.”  In keeping with 
a discussion of Heidegger’s commitment to the “Metapolitical” cause of National Socialism, 
it is pertinent to compare these positions from Nolte, and Heidegger himself, on the topic of 
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this “Past that will not Pass.”  Of German guilt, Nolte writes, “The talk about ‘the guilt of the 
Germans’ all too blithely overlooks the similarity to the talk about ‘the guilt of the Jews,’ 
which was a main argument of the National Socialists.”10  Returning to meditations posited 
on the topic by Habermas in the same debate, it is noted that Heidegger too falls on this side.  
On the question of his position with regard to the Nazi mass crimes, Heidegger never, 
then or later, gave any answer… He would only reply in abstract essentialization… 
Under the leveling gaze of the philosopher of Being even the extermination of the 
Jews seems merely an event equivalent to many others… Annihilation of the Jews, 
expulsion of the Germans—they amount to the same.11 
 
On the topic, Nolte continues, insisting that “To intentionally ignore truths may have moral 
reasons, but it also violates the ethos of the discipline [history].”12  As someone embracing a 
“revisionist” stance, Nolte and others such as Fest, Stürmer, and Hildebrand, hope to see 
Germany recovering from the blow of defeat and the shock of the Holocaust.  Habermas, 
writing to bring Nazi history to a swift trial, even concedes that, “Heidegger’s entanglement 
with National Socialism is one thing, which we can safely leave to the morally sober 
historical judgment of later generations…”13 Yet he does go on to puzzle over Heidegger’s 
refusal to leave Nazism’s graveside. “Quite another is Heidegger’s apologetic conduct after 
the war, his retouching’s and manipulations, his refusal to detach himself from the regime to 
which he had publically adhered.”14 For Germany, as well as for its philosopher of Being, it 
holds true that, “Hedging the authority of the great thinker—only he who thinks greatly can 
err greatly—can only serve to inhibit the critical approach of his arguments in favor of 
merely socializing people into an unclarified language game.”15  The language game here 
acts as a thin veneer veiling deep-seated fear of a terrible truth. Such a game, in the case of 
Heidegger’s transcendental philosophy, has been played out of fear of his National Socialism 
for far too long.  What does it say when arguably the greatest mind of the modern age 
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promised his beautiful truth to the most reviled political movement in world history?  Here 
we will play these language games no more. 
The German Heidegger Debate, as I have tacitly approached it in the broader context 
of the Historikerstreit—as to elucidate the interweaving of such talk of Heidegger together 
with his Nazism—can be safely classified as an entirely different “field” than the occurrence 
of The French Heidegger Debate.  Subsisting on Heidegger’s 1947 “Letter on Humanism” 
for well over a decade, Germany’s western neighbors were somehow shocked by news of 
Heidegger’s undying commitment to the invading power.  Almost immediately, spirited 
debates broke out in Parisian coffee shops and intellectual brawls saw seven books on the 
sizzling topic in under a year.  Setting the tone in many ways for The French Heidegger 
Debate was the 1987 book of Chilean scholar Victor Farías, Heidegger et le Nazisme.  Based 
on the 1962 Guido Schneeberger texts Farías’ thesis reads as follows:  
When Heidegger decided to join the NSDAP, he was following an already prepared 
path whose beginnings we will find in the Austrian movement of Christian socialism, 
with its conservatism and anti-Semitism, and in the attitudes of his native region... By 
considering the historical context and the texts he wrote in his youth, we can see the 
progressive connections in a thought process nourished in traditions of 
authoritarianism, anti-Semitism and ultra-nationalism that sanctified the homeland in 
its most local sense.  The sacralizing tendency was closely tied to a radical populism 
and carried strong religious connotations.  From a systemic point of view this 
development is linked to Heidegger’s reflections in Sein und Zeit—on historicity, 
‘authenticity,’ being-in-community, and his links with the people, the hero, and the 
struggle—and his own rejection of democratic forms of social life… Heidegger’s 
decision to join the NSDAP was in no way the result of unexpected opportunism or 
tactical considerations.16 
 
A disgruntled one-time student of Heidegger, Farías mostly highlights his own communist 
political affiliations in his ragged critique of the great philosopher of Being.  In later years, 
the eminent Richard Wolin will call the book “rather prosecutorial”17 and levels the critique 
that such claims about Heidegger’s Nazism are so stereotypical and over inclusive that they 
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amount to anti-Europeanism and certainly anti-Germanism.  The Farías book, however, 
sparked a flood of French proliferation on the topic of Heidegger—who until that time had 
taken the place of Sartre in the French philosophical pantheon.  Postmodern philosopher 
Jacques Derrida, a great French disciple of Heidegger’s, positioned himself against the 
argument of Farías, yet conceded that Heidegger’s Nazi proclivities can perhaps be attributed 
to his continued attachment to metaphysics!18 (This struggle, for Heidegger, is almost 
certainly tied to critiques of Nazism’s inability to overcome its own ‘bourgeois nihilism’). 
 Love for Heidegger in France was deeply shaken by the revelation of his unwavering 
political commitments.  French philosopher Emmanuel Faye points out that (much like the 
German Historikerstreit) French positions on Heidegger fall on the side of either “necessary” 
or “contingent,” highlighting, again, a sharp divide.19  Many still unpersuaded French 
defenders of Heidegger, for example Jean Beaufret—to whom the “Letter on Humanism” 
was addressed—paled in the face of Heidegger’s politics, denying the Holocaust and 
curiously turning to refuge in the extreme right, specifically branches of the Action 
Française—posited by German historian Ernst Nolte as the home of the European fascist 
“thesis” in his landmark text Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, 
National Socialism (1990).  
 Yet such a love for Heidegger is certainly not universal, not even in France.  In his 
2005 text, Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in light of the 
Unpublished Seminars of 1933-1934, Faye calls for little less than the banning of 
Heidegger’s dangerous, politically motivated philosophy, (harking to the Nazi book burnings 
of 1933).  Situating itself as the “final word” on the Heidegger debate in France, Faye’s book 
boasts an omniglot perspective, far more capable than others of extracting the true racist core 
	   39	  
of Heidegger’s thought.  His thesis reads as follows: “From very early in his career, before he 
wrote Being and Time, Heidegger was committed to principles in the air at the time, 
principles that were also basic to then nascent Nazism.”20  The fervor of Faye’s argument 
quickly trails off and becomes little more than a Nazi hunt.  He angrily bandies about the 
“absolute disrespect for the human individual” and the “evacuating of any hint of the 
possibility of morality” while willfully ignores his nation’s quick conversion to collaboration, 
calling for watchful eyes to remember that the intellectual war is still on. 
Situating his book in conversation with the texts of Hugo Ott, Richard Wolin and 
even Viktor Farías, Faye details his investigation of the Gesamtausgabe, a collection of 
Heidegger’s hitherto unpublished lectures and seminars from 1933-1934.  (Interestingly, 
Thomas Rockmore, author of the forward to Faye’s book, wrote the forward to Victor Farías’ 
book as well.  Such a position was originally to be held by the aforementioned text of Jürgen 
Habermas published as part of the Historikerstreit, but, curiously, this did not come to pass).  
Pointing a finger to the biologism and “racism of the Geist” that taints Heidegger’s 
philosophical project, Faye insists that such primary documents (reminiscent of the 1962 
Guido Schneeberger texts on which Farías builds his poorly executed critique) are the 
“smoking gun” needed to eternally banish Heidegger’s truth.  (A sentiment not at all far 
removed from the reaction of many to the heavily anti-Semitic contents of Heidegger’s 
recently released Schwarze Hefte).  Dropping the axe, Faye writes: 
Not only do the classes and seminars of these years confirm the radical nature of his 
allegiance to Hitler, they reveal the degree to which the ‘philosophical’ and the 
‘political’ become one in his mind and the fact that it is at the heart of the 
‘philosophical’ that Heidegger situates the political, understood in its most radically 
Nazi sense.21   
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Den Führer führen indeed…  Faye, however, is not the only one who feels this way or who 
confronts the housing of the political at the heart of the philosophical to launch an assault on 
German thinking, German society, and even German history. 
 Over a decade prior to the book of Emmanuel Faye, French sociologist and 
anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) writes of the “politics of Being” in his The 
Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger (1991) that, “A philosophical strategy is at one and 
the same time a political strategy at the heart of the philosophical field.”22  Born to a poor 
postal worker and his wife in Denguin, Bourdieu rose through French academia to study at 
the École Normale Supérieure alongside such titans as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida.  
A brilliant and very powerful thinker in his own right, Bourdieu will launch a stratified and 
culturally relative assault on the thinker he once called his first philosophical love.   
 Claiming to bring an end to The French Heidegger Debate, Faye in many ways builds 
on the sociological framework of Bourdieu.  In his system, Bourdieu sketches a stratification 
of not only social class but also the walls of academia.  His core concepts of “habitus,” the 
“field” and “frames” place the interdisciplinary, to say the least, at serious odds with 
thinking.  In Bourdieu’s thought the human “habitus” (social lifestyle values and disposition) 
is cultivated in the “field” of current discourse (as water to a fish tank).  Within the “field” 
(in this instance academia) frames exist as epistemes in solitude.  When working with 
Heidegger’s thought, Bourdieu crafts his condemning argument by accusing Heidegger of 
taking the “tools” of politics to the “frames” of academia within the “field” of the late 1920’s 
German university—convinced (along with the rest of German society) of some dark 
impending struggle clouding the horizon.23   
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Compounding his academic assault with threats of “aristocratism,” Bourdieu accuses 
Heidegger and National Socialism both of being guilty of the very “bourgeois nihilism” they 
struggled to overcome—a most debilitating blow. Coming at Heidegger’s philosophical 
politics from both social and scholarly angles, Bourdieu is clearly intent on taking Heidegger 
down with everything he has.  At the close of his first chapter, “Pure Philosophy and the 
Zeitgeist,” Bourdieu lowers his maiming blow: “There is a clear line running from the 
repressed aristocratism of Sein und Zeit to the philosophical assimilation of Nazism, which 
becomes as it were banalized in terms of a paroxysmal manifestation of one stage in the 
development of the essence of technology.”24  A damning critique, this is an assault launched 
on Heidegger’s fateful commitment to the dashed hopes of Nazism by numerous scholars—
especially those closest to Heidegger’s crippling truth (most notably Richard Wolin and 
Slavoj Žižek).  Bourdieu lowers the ax on Heidegger’s ontological dream of a National 
Socialist confrontation with “the Being of beings” as he continues,  
Nazi nihilism, being a heroic attempt to overcome limits, in Jüngerian fashion, and 
overcome the very nihilism of which is the most extreme form, constitutes the 
ultimate affirmation of the ontological difference: all that is left is to resolve to 
confront the separation, this insuperable dualism which lies between Being itself and 
the actual entities from which it is forever separated.25   
 
National Socialism’s fateful struggle with the encounter between global technology and 
modern man was indeed betrayed by Western capitalism (understood as “bourgeois 
nihilism”).  This failure to assault the ontological difference constructs a powerful critique of 
the “Metapolitical” heart of Nazism that Heidegger once wistfully referred to as the 
movements “inner truth and greatness” as Being and time are ripped helplessly out of 
balance.  However, Bourdieu, like many in the French Heidegger debate (Faye included) 
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attempts to trap German history, society, art, politics, poetry and thinking in frames that 
never stood in Mitteleuropa.   
 Thus, Bourdieu’s critique of Heidegger cannot stand.  This flattening reproach of 
Heidegger’s philosophy for opening the history of Being to the history of the German people, 
in a fluid German way towards the twentieth century, cannot be confined to French 
Enlightenment fetters.  The Kultur of the Volk, by its very definition, stands in sharp contrast 
to the Zivilisation of the bourgeoisie, the citoyen.  Wir sind das Volk.  The Volk is high art, in 
language and poetry, literature, music and painting, opera, politics and philosophy, at the 
heart of one another, welled up from the mythic memory of the Geist—breaking all bonds.  It 
is precisely at the moment that Bourdieu attempts to tame the German spirit with his French 
system that a claim to any shared history of Being slips through his fingers.  Seemingly 
thinking on his first love, however, Bourdieu writes, “…The academic and political 
reverberations of Heidegger’s pure thought were never muted, whether in the philosophical 
field or beyond it…”26  
 Turning now beyond the philosophical “field,” it is necessary to recall that these 
German histories are indeed wound together, by force of destiny.  As the Historikerstreit 
grapples with reflections on Heidegger’s Nazism (as seen in Habermas and Nolte’s work in 
the great debate) so too must such debates struggle with the political and philosophical 
history of National Socialism itself.  A glance at ideology as mythical aesthetic reveals the 
eventuality of National Socialism as fascism, as German ideology—as “the barbarians of the 
twentieth century.”27   
Several books are of key importance to the interplay between Heidegger’s first 
philosophy and the roots of the German fascist synthesis.  Addressing Völkisch ideology, the 
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aesthetic and historical peculiarities of fascist culture, and the dialectical process of European 
fascism, three texts are clearly exemplary.  A staple of German history, George L. Mosse’s 
The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (1964) stands head 
and shoulders above all others.  On the merits of this text, as well as his The Fascist 
Revolution: Towards a General Theory of Fascism (1999), Mosse takes his place in my own 
personal pantheon.  His Sonderweg-style argument in The Crisis of German Ideology deeply 
investigates the Volk and its Geist in a way that leads myth, language and culture towards, 
what he deems, the “virtue of ferociousness,”28 on its way to the becoming of National 
Socialism, struggling violently with industrialized modernity.  Paired with The Fascist 
Revolution, a collection of intellectually creative essays concerning the more romantic 
peculiarities of fascist culture, Mosse’s work on the topic is entirely indispensable.   
Alongside Mosse’s texts, we situate the 1963 text of Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of 
Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism.  Building a dialectic 
process of fascist consciousness, Nolte investigates the political, ideological, social and 
phenomenological coming to be of fascism as it learns itself in a traditional abstract-
negative-concrete model.  Nolte’s book carries on throughout its argument a discussion of 
both “immanence” and “transcendence,” positing Nazism as resistance to “practical 
transcendence,” or modernity, and a struggle with “theoretical transcendence,” loosely 
understood as “ultimate reality.”  Coupled with Mosse’s discussion of the German Geist of 
the late nineteenth century, National Socialism’s struggle with modernity, the encounter 
between modern man and global technology, (and the shredding of the fabric of Being and 
Time itself) can indeed be understood as resistance to “practical transcendence” in this way.  
Offering National Socialism a philosophical status, Nolte suggests that this struggle with 
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theoretical transcendence, “ultimate reality,” was a philosophical confrontation addressed by 
National Socialism itself29—perhaps independent of its thoughts on Heidegger’s lofty hopes 
for metaphysic’s radical yet fundamental extremes.  
 In his 1990 book, The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger, 
distinguished historian Richard Wolin provides a most searing account of Heidegger’s 
philosophical intoxication with the spiritual impetus of National Socialism.  Written, even so, 
as “the philosophical complement to the book of Bourdieu,”30 Wolin’s study arrives at the 
heart of the matter concerning Heidegger’s existentialist politics.  Though certainly no longer 
a Heideggerian himself, Wolin expertly assesses the situation.  Leveling his own critique of 
Bourdieu (and Victor Farías as well), Wolin insists that so many critiques of Heidegger could 
be directed at the whole of German conservative thinkers (Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, 
Oswald Spengler and Moeller van den Bruck included).31  In the same vain as Bourdieu, 
Wolin writes that Heidegger’s weakest point is the grounding of his philosophy in the basis 
of Überwindung and his radical breaking with “tradition” in academic, systemic and 
philosophical thought.  (Seemingly a critique of the very power of Heidegger’s heralding in 
of the return of the question of Being…) Yet, contrary to Bourdieu, Wolin points to the 
depths of Heidegger’s own thought for his answers.  Having shielded Heidegger from the 
fires of National Socialism until his encounter with the Der Spiegel interview of 1986, Wolin 
launches a full-scale investigation of the secret king of thought. 
 From the standpoint of the Rector’s Address of 1933, Wolin argues that Heidegger’s 
pristine first philosophy underwent a formidable transformation to Weltanschauung.  The 
turn in Heidegger’s thought, beginning arguably as early as 1930, poses questions for many 
about the connection of Heidegger’s more Nazi-oriented work to his magnum opus, Sein und 
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Zeit.  Wolin forges the schism with ease, asserting “For Heidegger the fact that Being comes 
to presence over time means that Being has a history.”32  Such a history and “becoming of 
Being,” Wolin suggests, causes a “partial eclipse” of Sein und Zeit, and authentic Dasein is 
increasingly a result of some surreptitious “fate” [Seinsgeschick] that has been decreed by 
Being itself.   Wolin asks, “If Being has a history, according to Heidegger, might it not also 
have a politics?”33  Such politics is not a politics of man; “Humanism,” for Heidegger, is not 
a humanism of things, but must be turned resolutely towards the service of Being, and 
measured by man’s nearness to Being.  “Could it be…” writes Wolin “…that the existential 
framework of Being and Time may have provided a type of ‘transcendental grounding’ for 
Heidegger’s political conduct in the 1930s?”34 Already it becomes clear that in the turn of the 
early 30s, Heidegger’s thought, as directed by Being itself, was ready to “chose it’s hero.”35 
 In his own words “the philosophical complement to the book of Bourdieu” Wolin’s 
argument chafes against the French position profoundly.  Thinking with Heidegger and the 
Germans (despite his ultimate moral afflictions), Wolin writes, “One of the keys to 
understanding the historical determinacy of Heidegger’s early work is the entrenched 
antimodernism of the German intelligentsia—manifesting in a diehard ‘apoliticism.’”36 Once 
again, the fields and frames of Bourdieu begin to tremble.  Asserting a heavily Sonderweg 
style argument (perhaps despite himself—and in the leftist vein of thinkers such as Habermas 
who cling to the Sonderweg theory as a smoking gun for National Socialism—but in 
incredible keeping with Heidegger’s own thought), Wolin continues, “This ‘apoliticism’ is a 
product of German national development and the power of the Reichs over the lands—this is 
highlighted by the contrast between Kultur and Zivilisation.”37  This Kultur/Zivilisation 
distinction is truly vital not only to an overcoming of Bourdieu’s French fetters, but to the 
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understanding, through this overcoming, of our readiness to pose the question: “What is 
Deutsch?” Of the Kultur/Zivilisation distinction, Wolin writes, “…the former connotes the 
sublimity of spiritual cultivation and the latter signifies the superficial materialism of the 
decadent, capitalist (industrialized and modernized) West.”38  Sketching the stark distinction 
between Germany and Western Enlightenment thought (soon to be followed by industrialized 
modernity), Wolin insists that “With the Napoleonic conquests, Zivilisation became 
permanently associated in the German mind with France, and those ‘outward trappings of 
social refinement;’ whereas Kultur ‘signified the profound spiritual superiority of German 
Innerlichkeit (inwardness).’”39   As Jena falls and Hegel looks out upon “that world-soul,” 
modern Germany is born.  In Sturm und Drang against the cultural imperialism of the 
Enlightenment, Germany lives.  “This rejection of the ethos of Zivilisation rapidly translated 
into a dismissal of the Western Political values: liberalism, individualism and democracy 
were all dismissed as alien to the German spirit—they were essentially ‘undeutsch.’”40 As 
such, we must pose the question of Being along with the question of “What is Deutsch?” In 
the face of a hard apoliticism resisting modernity and the outwards trappings of the West, 
what can now be said for Being that has a history, a people and a politics?  What is this 
“apolitical politics” thrown into the world by National Socialism?  
 In the wake of World War I, Heidegger and the Nazis turned resolutely towards a 
mysterious fate—dictated by Being itself.  On the dead plains of the wasteland, the 
ontological difference trembled before the “coming preservers.”  Wolin writes:  
Being and Time effectively communicated to a wide public something of the new 
spirit that had engulfed philosophy as a result of the convulsions of World War I.  
More than any other, this event seems like a Nietzschean prophecy come to pass: the 
conformation of his thesis concerning the disqualification of all inherent Western 
values and the final triumph of nihilism.  Being and Time is a study in ‘fundamental 
ontology, ‘hermeneutical phenomenology,’ ‘existentialist philosophy’ and so on, but 
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it is also emphatically something else: an attempt, based on a re-posing of the 
‘Question of Being’ to suggest a path of deliverance from the contemporary cultural 
crisis—The Decline of the West.41  
 
The “politics of Being,” now, can be understood as a timely struggle for the triumph of 
Kultur—a battle to stave off the gathering dark of the Götterverlassenheit.  
 Early in his text, Wolin nods to the words of German philosopher Leo Strauss, who 
warns “…there is no room for political philosophy in Heidegger’s work…the room in 
question is occupied by the gods…”42  Slowly, it becomes apparent that the 
Seinsverlassenheit (abandonment of Being) simultaneously signifies the 
Götterverlassenheit—the abandonment of man by the gods.  Of this abandonment Wolin 
writes, “‘Forsakenness’ has become the distinguishing feature of the modern age: an age that 
is irredeemably suspended in the no man’s land between ‘the no-longer’ of the gods that have 
fled and the ‘not-yet’ of the god to come.”43  Thus a humanistic political reflection on what 
would constitute the best “polity” pales before the severity of the Götterverlassenheit.  In 
turn, the die-hard “apoliticism” and deeply entrenched scorn of Zivilisation in the German 
people must turn resolutely towards a paroxysmal confrontation with the modern world.  
Welded together by the firebrand of Being itself, the Da-sein that has a history, becomes not 
only a German Dasein, but a European Dasein.  Out of the land in the middle, “Total 
mobilization is an exercise in active nihilism” heralding the return of Being itself… as 
Dasein is “on the move.”44 
 More recent scholarship on the topic of Martin Heidegger’s commitment to Nazism is 
once again on fire.  In an article published in 2007, Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek 
(1949-present) takes a radical approach to the still burning political question of the great 
philosopher of Being.  In immediate condemnation, Žižek writes  
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There is something profoundly symptomatic in the compulsion of many liberal-
democratic critics of Heidegger to demonstrate that Heidegger’s Nazi engagement 
was not a mere temporary blunder, but in consonance with the very fundamentals of 
his thought: it is as if this consonance allows us to dismiss Heidegger as theoretically 
irrelevant and thus to avoid the effort to think with and through Heidegger, to 
confront the uneasy questions he raised…”45   
At once an assertion that liberal-democratic thinkers make the relatively easy step of 
ontologically connecting Heidegger’s work with the spiritual impetus of National Socialism, 
such a statement also insists that this is not at all enough.  We must endeavor to think through 
what this uneasy connection between the greatest mind of the modern age and the most 
reviled political movement in history can truly mean—a daunting task that has yet to be 
taken up in any way—a task I intend to take responsibility for in this thesis.  Žižek daringly 
asserts, “The difficult truth to admit is that Heidegger is ‘great’ not in spite of but because of 
his Nazi engagement.”46 A haunting echo, must we now endeavor not only to “think with” 
Heidegger, but also to “think with” National Socialism?  
Žižek proposes the breaching of such a schism in an interesting way:  
Though one does not discuss the ‘Really-Existing fascism’ as one might discuss the 
‘Really-Existing Socialism’ …Heidegger is nonetheless a philosopher who did 
engage in a kind of critique of ‘Really-Existing Nazism” on behalf of its true 
potentials (its ‘inner truth and greatness’) betrayed by its racist-technological 
nihilistic reality.47 
 
 It is true that National Socialism did not live up to the great philosopher’s expectations of 
ushering in a new age of Being.  However, his engagement with the movement as, as Žižek 
deftly puts it “Really-Existing Nazism,” is still there.  As aloof as Nietzsche’s Blonde Beast, 
National Socialism did not in fact care for the return of the question of Being and may in fact 
have fallen prey to ‘bourgeois nihilism’ and an ontic racism.  However, was the abyss of 
Being as such not truly there?  And did National Socialism not indeed “hold out” into it?  
Throwing the modern Europe, and the world, into the oblivion of Being Heidegger himself 
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was of the opinion that: “National Socialism was the proper course for Germany; it only had 
to ‘hold out’ long enough.’”48 
Even in his radical assertion that we must think with Heidegger in the profundity of 
his commitment to National Socialism, Žižek will keep with many of the standing 
philosophical critiques of the movement, and pose his own.  As such, he points to the 
position of Hannah Arendt, Heidegger’s near life-long love, who reflects that “The true 
problem of Nazism is not that it went ‘too far’ in its subjectivistic-nihilistic hubris of exerting 
total power, but that it did not go far enough…”49 A radical position: what does “did not go 
far enough,” mean?  In keeping with the critique of National Socialism as incapable of 
extracting itself from petty “bourgeois nihilism,” Žižek is ready to bring the critiques of 
Bourdieu, Faye and Wolin towards National Socialism’s confrontation with the ontological 
difference.  This is what Žižek calls “Heidegger’s Ontological Violence,” in the profound 
close of his article.  Standing out above and beyond all critiques and assaults, Žižek boldly 
states, “…Heidegger—in his Nazi engagement, was not ‘totally wrong’—the tragedy is that 
he was almost right…”50 
Following the long gaze of the philosopher of Being, Žižek turns to look back to the 
Greeks.  Heraclitus once wrote: “War is both father of all and king of all: it reveals the gods 
on one hand and the humans on the other, makes slaves on one hand and the free on the 
other.”51  In Germany, Carl Schmitt writes: “War, the readiness for death of fighting men, the 
physical annihilation of the other men who stand on the side of the enemy, all that has no 
normative, only existential meaning.”52  Derrida chides Heidegger for his continued 
attachment to metaphysics, Bourdieu rebukes National Socialism, for its inability to 
surmount “bourgeois nihilism.”  Hoping to bring National Socialism to swift trial in 
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Germany, yet reluctant to bring the ax down on Heidegger, Habermas writes of the secret 
king of thoughts fateful commitment: “World historical tragedy alone sounds the hour for the 
overcoming of metaphysics.”53  
 As Dasein is “on the move” in twentieth century Europe, Heraclitus’ prophetic, 
metaphysical claim rings true.  Violence alone will break all bonds.  Of the relation between 
ontic and ontological violence Žižek asserts:  
This is an inversion of the religious vision of the universe.  God or Zeus is replaced 
with kampf—it is now not a hierarchic whole but struggle (as unhiddenness [Alētheia, 
ἀλήθεια]) as ultimate reality—the process out of which all entities (and their 
temporality) occur.  Thus othering… and the confrontation with the ‘other’ 
unveils…54 
 
Buried deep in the mythical past, the Wagnerian bellow of the king of the gods can be heard, 
as the titans collide—Being and time, ripped miserably out of sacred balance…  Finally 
elucidating the discord of this difference, understood as the eternal separation of Being and 
the entities to which it belongs.  Žižek writes, “But what if there is a fundamental discord 
between ontological and ontic, so that, as Heidegger put it, those who reach ontological truth 
have to err in the ontic? What if, if we are to see with the ontological eye, our ontic eye has 
to be blinded?”55 In the twilight of the Gods, we must hold ourselves out, resolutely into the 
abyss of a blind ontic violence, reminiscent of the King of the gods, Wotan—his eye traded a 
drink from Mímir’s well, the waters of unfathomable knowledge.  It is thus “… where 
Heidegger erred most (in his Nazi engagement), he came closest to Truth.”56  Accomplished 
by poets, thinkers and statesmen... such violence occurs in the realm of the demi-gods…   
Žižek writes that, for Heidegger, “An apology, even, would publically diminish the 
radicality of his thought and constrain him to the petty humanitarian political concerns he so 
bitterly despised.”57  When thinking with Heidegger (when thinking with National 
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Socialism), the fetters of frames, the gathering dark of Zivilisation, gripping National 
Socialism in “bourgeois nihilism” must not be forgotten and dismissed as damning critiques 
but taken most seriously. 
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Das	  Rheingold	  
“Only image formed keeps the vision.  Yet image formed rests in the poem”1  
-Martin Heidegger 
 
When attempting to conceive of the rise and fall of nations, empires, or legacies, the spirit of 
a process of historical world consciousness, it is not nearly enough to rely only upon the 
rationality of the factual.  Reading between the lines of the age, reaching towards the more 
irrational tendencies of the human condition over time and space, offers a new perspective on 
the process of doing history.  Here literature and legend arise from the thick fog of myth to 
encounter the philosophy of Being. 
 Thus far we have taken the breadth and depth of the Western metaphysical tradition 
and brought it before what science has heretofore offered up as “nothing,” which we now 
properly name Being.  In our definition of transcendence, we spoke of a great German 
destiny turning towards the oblivion of Being as it makes its return in the twentieth century.  
We have asserted that Being has a history, and that historical Da-sein makes a resolute turn 
towards its renewal.  The thick fog of myth and legend lurking in Germany history secures 
the destiny of Being.   
 So too, one could say, does this fog gather, darker even in recent days, around 
Heidegger.  But we have now, as Da-sein, been brought before the dawning light of Being, 
and found it beautiful.  We know that when we gaze long into the oblivion of Being that we 
see also into the essence of the Being of beings—and so too into ourselves.  We know that in 
this moment of Being beyond beings that Da-sein is transcending: we know that we are free.   
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To this primeval place we have followed Heidegger’s legendary thread. For 2,500 
years the veil of Alētheia has remained in shadow, and in doubt. We now turn to gaze back 
into the mist to begin our quest for the Acolytes.  Who are those we now readily name “the 
Acolytes?”  Surely some veiled phantoms, lurking surreptitiously in the murky twilight.  As 
suggested in our search for the lost definition of transcendence, we must first turn to art for a 
clue, which, like the fabled thread of Ariadne, will descend through the mist of a mythical 
past—a place where ontic and ontological eye alike keep wary watch in the primordial haze.    
We have made the decision to turn towards art in the thick fog of the primordial 
myth.  In this ancient place the gods still walk tall among man.  So too in our quest thus far 
has it been mentioned that there is in fact no need to affect a revival of Greek thought, for the 
Greeks cared little for the light of Alētheia, and knew less still of great works of art.2  And 
yet deep in the West their temple stands for the first time in the ek-static violence of the 
storm, when man kneels before the god made manifest within its walls and thinks the 
question that first grounds all history…   
A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing.  It simply stands there in the middle of 
the rock-cleft valley.  The building encloses the figure of a god, and in this 
concealment lets it stand out into the holy precinct through the open portico.  By 
means of the temple, the god is present in the temple.  This presence of the god is in 
itself the extension and delimitation of the precinct as a holy precinct… 
…Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground.  This resting of the work 
draws up out of the rock the obscurity of the rocks bulky yet spontaneous support.  
Standing there, the building holds its ground against the storm that rages above it and 
so first makes the storm itself manifest in its violence.  The luster and gleam of the 
stone, though itself apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, first brings to 
radiance the light of the day, the breadth of the sky, the darkness of the night.  The 
temple’s firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air.  The steadfastness of 
the work contrasts with the surge of surf, and its own repose brings out the raging of 
the sea.3 
 
Make no mistake: in this place we seek the gods.  If in our previous quest for a 
definition of transcendence—which led us to an abyss—we achieved such a blinding sight 
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for the first time by thinking in a circular motion, can we not apply this same process to our 
search in this place?  Indeed.  For here there is no other way to travel.   
As we fold history over on itself, in a dialectical process of world historical 
consciousness, several critical points come into view out of the fog: We are once again 
working in a circle, for this is the only way to travel here.  In accordance with what we have 
learned about the great work of art, we are now propelling that circle by way of struggle—
which brings world and earth into a setting-forth [Herstellung] of their essential essences 
standing outside of themselves.  For ek-static Da-sein, freedom is standing outside of itself, 
always already transcendental, originally possessing man.  This is truly the first sight of the 
spirit of Being.  In German we think the idea of “spirit” as der Geist (a truly untranslatable 
term corresponding roughly to “ghost,” “mind-spirit”).  The great nineteenth century German 
philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel also followed this dynamic thread into the past 
and found himself at the orient of all the world.  From this static orient, his system of thought 
(named properly phenomenology: the study of the process of consciousness), the spirit that 
moves world history came to roost in Ancient Greece.4   
This we already know.  Yet we have said that the Greeks knew nothing of great 
works of art, and art is what we seek.  Is this then some mistake in our process?  No.  Have 
we then been led to the advent of metaphysics to ground all art in what we will henceforth 
hail as its most genuine origin?  Yes. 
When coming before the Being of beings and being “held out,” transcending beyond 
them, we reached to the great work of art to bridge the gap between the abyssal plane of the 
nothing—nihiliating into space and time in the world of the gods—and the dwelling of man 
on this earth.  At the outset, we set up a world with three distinctions, placing God and reason 
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at a distance from man and explaining that this distance had once been called 
“transcendence.”  As art bridges the gap between Being and beings, we come face to face 
with the primal strife set up in the work.  Though Heidegger keeps his comments on art fairly 
focused on what we can easily imagine is his most beloved painting (Vincent Van Gogh’s 
1886 oil A Pair of Shoes by Vincent Van Gogh) his chief artistic interest leads him to the 
linguistic work, poetry.  Hailing the work of Friedrich Hölderlin, Heidegger writes “all art is 
in essence poetry… as long as we mean that those arts are varieties of the art of 
language…[for] language alone brings beings as beings into the open for the first time.”5  By 
naming beings, language puts to form the tones of their essence.   
What is this putting to form of tones?  It is as irrational as a soul.  After all, Being 
takes its shape in Da-sein; Being “towers up” within Da-sein, and sings the unconcealing 
truth through the human instrument.  Are we not here in danger of losing the metaphysics 
we’ve worked to restore?  Not at all.  In his critical essay The Origin of the Work of Art, 
Heidegger writes of the Greek dramatic genre tragedy: “In tragedy nothing is staged or 
displayed theatrically, but the battle of the new gods against the old is being fought.”6  
Nothing less than the rare Dionysiac twilight of this teleological battle is what we seek. 
In this way it seems we have made our return to ancient Greece and discovered a 
particular “great work of art” to investigate in more detail.  As in the origin of our quest, we 
know still that language is critical—indeed, indispensable, to our task.  As such the 
phenomenon of tragedy can initially be conceived by contemplating the use of the word itself 
in contemporary language.  The word tragedy, most would agree, is reserved for situations of 
great suffering and calamity.7  To call something a “tragedy” is to imply mourning, the 
revealing of some “veiled fatality.”   
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When we have previously spoken of this “veiled fatality,” we have spoken too of the 
original strife [der Kampf] between world and earth as beings hide and show themselves 
(most notably in the great work of art).  Scholars suggest that we must usually distinguish 
between the ordinary use of the word “tragedy” and the name of the dramatic art form,8 
though for our ontological purposes we know that the strife occurring in art brings about a 
veiled fatality as proper to the final things as it is to the openness of Being.  Here the Battle 
of the Giants Concerning Being [Gigantomachia peri tes ousia]9 plays out and takes the form 
of the battle of the old gods against the rising order of the new, throwing Being into the 
world of Dasein. 
Already, a forming of the ancient dramas properly referred to as tragedy comes to 
stand in the light of its Being.  Once again, however, we think of the importance of language 
and halt at the use of “form.”  As has been discussed, the primal strife of the origins of 
metaphysics in ancient Greece occurred between teacher and student, Plato and Aristotle.  In 
another great work of art this original metaphysical strife brings to bear its beautiful 
conflagration.  Raphael’s famous 1509 fresco The School of Athens towers up on the walls of 
the Vatican in Rome, setting up and bringing forth the original strife of world and earth in a 
way more original than any other work of its kind.  This strife first grounds the impending 
disaster of all metaphysics in the origin an alienating dualism.  
There is no need to make any sort of return to a discussion of Plato’s theory of forms.   
We know that since the master raised his hand to the heavens, indicating the realm of ideas 
(or forms) that matter has been in predicate accord with the form after or above it and that 
this distance defined transcendence.  Yet in ancient Greece, we are certainly in no position to 
close the gap.  This, however, is no mistake—no tragedy.   
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 Famously at philosophical odds, Plato and Aristotle differ greatly on the 
philosophical status of art and the “art form” tragedy comes to the fore.  As a philosopher of 
essences, Plato is dismissive of art on a grand scale.  Famously, Plato contends that all art is a 
representation of a representation, thus of little consequence—a simple imitation of physical 
reality, which is itself always already simply lurking in the shadows of the cave, impervious 
to the light of Being.10   
 Holding his hand firmly out over the earth, Aristotle believes that tragedy brings to 
light general truths and becomes even more philosophical than history.  (Recalling the course 
of our path to this point, we know that the original strife of art throws the question of Being 
into the world of man and so grounds in the earth all history).11  Furthermore, Aristotle goes 
as far as to claim a philosophical status for tragedy in flagrant opposition to Plato.  What is 
this philosophical status offered to tragedy that transcends the severity of history?  More so, 
that grounds history in the question?  In his Poetics, Aristotle claims that tragedy affects a 
great “Katharsis [κάθαρσις]” in the spectator—a sensation of “wringing out” in the polis.12 
 A dance of struggle and sublimation between the passionate emotions of the 
Dionysian impetus pressed into artistic form by the rigidity and structure of the Apollonian 
force, proper tragedy provides form to the irrational truths of the human condition.  Between 
Dionysus, the god of wine and the oppressed, lord of the dithyramb, and Apollo, god of the 
sun and the state, a secret lies.  A secret only whispered through the musical rhythm of an art 
“formed.”  Caught in the profound intimacy of opposites, Apollo and Dionysus raise one 
another to the self-assertion of their essential essences.  Crashing down through the 
mountains as thunder rolling across the theater, this original strife bridges the gap between 
man and the gods.13  As such, we name tragedy as an art form, the first “Acolyte of Being.”   
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 Yet have we not said that such a bridge was hopelessly forlorn in the ancient world? 
Yes and no.  What is this pervasive, halting, power of the Acolyte?  Traditionally, an Acolyte 
is an aid in a holy procession, as such, a guardian of some irrational truth.  History itself is, in 
many ways, such a procession. 
We have said that we will continue to employ a circular method of questioning in 
order to arrive at the answers we seek.  This circle takes on a necessarily dialectical form 
when moving backwards through history, turning back Hegel’s phenomenological wheel.  
Following the trail of the Geist, Hegel writes that from the Greek world, the spirit rushes 
onward into the Latin one and its centrifugal moment of Roman thought.  Thus we have 
moved rather quickly from thesis to antithesis.   
 To give a brief example, we already know that the translation of Greek to Latin, with 
no thought given to the original Greek experience of words, first marks the rootlessness of all 
Western thought.14  We first experienced this malicious translation in our previous talk of 
Alētheia and Veritas, consequently, the goddesses of Truth in Greek and Roman thought 
respectively.  We know that Alētheia means truth as unhiddenness or “unclosedness” and we 
have said that in German, this unclosedness is Entschlossenheit: resoluteness.  Thus we have 
followed the language of truth through a dialectical process in the traditional abstract-
negative-concrete model—or, in Hegelian terms—thesis, antithesis, synthesis.   
 It can be seen that we have broadened our gaze to a widening view of the grand 
historical tradition of the hiding and showing of gathering essences as “spirit” on their way 
through the world.  At this point a brief examination of this grand process becomes helpful.   
Hegel says that the orient of the world lost its essence as the Geist shifted its weigh to 
ancient Greece.  A thesis acts as the proposition of the idea, which as it learns is negated 
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through the antithesis and only then comes to know itself, through struggle or strife, in the 
form of the synthesis.15  This we all know.  Where such a rewriting is necessary is to the 
folding over of twin histories by way of a dialectic process—the essences of a gathering 
spirit that we see into in the great work of art.  We are speaking, of course, of The Birth of 
Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music.  
 The first (and by our definition most “beautiful”) text of Friedrich Nietzsche, The 
Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music was first published in 1872 when the young 
philologist was only 27.  Detailing the transcendental genius of the art form tragedy, 
Nietzsche’s premier text sought a philosophical status for tragedy in much the same manner 
as Aristotle.  (Here, Aristotle would say that the “transcendental genius” of tragedy is owed 
to his concept of “katharsis”). For Nietzsche, the authors of tragedy must be “poets in their 
souls,”16 and in their dramas must remain true to the delicate balance between the Dionysian 
and Apollonian elements, which in the manner of strife between world and earth, offers 
tragedy its titanic philosophical status.  
 Like Aristotle, Nietzsche agrees that tragedy affects a katharsis in the spectator, 
wringing out the soul of the polis.  In the great work of art we have said that in setting up a 
world and setting forth an earth the original strife occurs—and that this is the most extreme 
danger.  Indeed, the danger.17  In Greek tragedy, we come to see that in the manner of the 
tempest manifest in its violence against the temple of a god, Apollo and Dionysus drive one 
another to self-assertion beyond themselves, sublimating in the open region as the first 
understanding presents itself to the spectator—a kathartic abyss. In this way it must have 
already become clear that by katharsis we mean transcendence.  
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 But have we not already insisted that this bridge between man and the gods has not 
been forged in the ancient world?  This confusion persists.  When we spoke of transcendence 
the distance between man and the gods wrote the prevailing status of the transcendental until 
reason made an appearance in the early eighteenth century.  How then are the bonds being 
broken?  In the nihilating abyss of the most extreme danger what katharsis wrings out the 
soul of man and sets it forth?  
 Nietzsche writes that tragedy was initially the celebration of the god Dionysus and 
that this celebration took the form of a dancing and singing procession—the dithyramb.  This 
procession of dancing and singing was the origin of all drama.  And yet the dithyramb 
progresses in a somber and even chant—quite the opposite of any Dionysian drunkenness! In 
the somber rhythms of the Dionysus’ songs the sublimation of the Dionysian and Apollonian 
in tragedy was revealed: the chorus is an interpretation of Being that plays with 
appearances—it is, an Acolyte.     
 Much in the way we have discussed the holding open of the open region that occurs 
in the origin of the work of art, music too puts irrationality to form and we are transposed 
into beings as they are, feeling the silky texture of their essences.  The chanting of the 
Dionysian chorus, put to somber Apollonian rhythm, acts in much the same way.18  Thus the 
chorus acts as a critical balancing point between the Apollonian and Dionysian, opening the 
soul to an abyss of understanding that propels him into the now almost tactile experience of 
truth.  But what has happened here?  We have seen “put to form” at work.  But isn’t it the 
other way around?  Have we not said that matter comes under the yoke of the form when 
Plato lifts his gaze to the realm of ideas in banishment?  Here quite the opposite is at work.  
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Through the sublimating spirit of the beauty of music the gods descend to the dwelling of 
man. 
 In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche asks: why did tragedy disappear so quickly?  
Affecting a katharsis and “wringing out” of the polis, tragedy must have occurred at an 
historical moment of terrible strife.  Thus the need for civic cleansing of the soul by pure 
tragedy, generally held to have died at the end of the fifth century, coincides with the Persian 
Wars (490-480 BC).  Written initially to propose an answer to the enigma of the birth of 
Greek tragedy (specifically the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides), Nietzsche 
finds its death already upon him.  Beginning sometime in the sixth century, pure tragedy has 
“died by suicide”19 before the end of the fifth and we as spectator are left wondering over the 
relationship between ontological and ontic strife. 
 But what do we mean by “pure tragedy?”  Those who know their ancient history will 
be ready to assert that tragedy continued well into the early Hellenistic period.  Nietzsche 
disagrees and offers an answer: it lost the music.  The chorus became obscured.  The 
katharsis was lost.  For Nietzsche, tragedy lost its point.  In the wake of the Persian wars the 
gathering of the chorus was broken down and transformed into a dialogue-like individuation, 
disrupting the essential essence of the original oneness.   
 Who is guilty for the murder of Dionysus?  Throughout Greek history, Dionysus 
comes and goes, the only god to die and be reborn… In ancient mythology Dionysus enters 
the city with wine in times of strife, only to be chased out again when his irrational 
drunkenness is no longer needed to console the polis… The proverb “nothing to do with 
Dionysus” results, suggesting that in later times the plays called tragedies had little or 
nothing to do with the god at all. 
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 According to Nietzsche, the murderer is none other than Euripides.20  Writing his 
tragedies in flagrant violation of the oneness of the Dionysian chorus sublimated into 
Apollonian meter, Euripides is responsible.  The death of tragedy and Nietzsche’s quarrel 
with Euripides results from this end.  Of the destruction of the poetic heart of pure tragedy, 
Nietzsche despairs: “Once it was no longer begotten by music, in the mysterious Dionysiac 
twilight, what form could drama conceivably take?”21  In a rage, Nietzsche turns on 
Euripides furiously: “Euripides’ basic intention now becomes clear as day to us: it is to 
eliminate from tragedy the primitive and pervasive Dionysiac element, and to rebuild the 
drama on a foundation of non-Dionysiac art, custom and philosophy.”22  The tragedy of 
Euripides builds on reason and rationality in the vacancy of the beautiful. This is nothing less 
than a turn to the Socratic world.23 
 Here our original purpose returns.  When we spoke of the shift from Greek to Roman 
thought we named the Pre-Socratics and the Sophists as champions of Alētheia and veritas 
respectively.  This is The Essence of Truth, which, in many ways, has its landing in The 
Origin of the Work of Art.  No longer begotten by the music, tragedy loses its point as 
Dionysus is chased from the city, leaving only Apollo to rule.  In the absence of truth as 
Alētheia, understood here as the Dionysian impetus, truth as veritas reigns, understood in 
tragedy as the structuring power of the god Apollo.  In the death of tragedy we have 
experienced first-hand the scientific turning away from the open region of Alētheia, of  
Da-sein’s forgetting.  
 In many ways we see this death of Dionysus in fifth century Greece as the primary 
occurrence of the Götterverlassenheit [the abandonment of man by the gods], which, we 
have said, corresponds to the Seinsverlassenheit [The abandonment of man by Being].   
	   63	  
As militarism and nationalist fever (Apollonian sentiments) are on the rise in the face 
of the Persian war, so too is a grave cultural crisis, gathering man before the precipice of the 
most extreme danger.  As Persian autocracy clashes with the Athenian notion of the polis, 
these opposites rise to meet one another in strife, as warring gods in the course of the 
cosmos.  Gathering in the sunset of this cultural strife, a Greek collective consciousness is 
reflected in the oneness of the chorus.  The dichotomy of visceral responses to such pressure 
brings about in the polis, as we have said, a need for a transcendental remedy for the ailments 
of the soul.  This is the kathartic resolve of pure tragedy.  Of the effects of the Persian 
invasions it can be said that the development of democracy and the defeat of Persia were 
contemporaneous events.   
 At the end of the Persian wars, when this oneness began to subside in its wake, pure 
tragedy, no longer a necessary remedy (like Dionysus himself), fell apart in the hands of 
Euripides.  Nietzsche laments the death, writing, “Greek tragedy perished in a manner quite 
different from the older sister arts: it died by suicide, in consequence of an insoluble conflict, 
while the others died serene natural deaths at advanced stages.”24  Committing suicide, 
Nietzsche acknowledges that it was killed from within, by Euripides.  And yet this death was 
self-selected and self-inflicted by the genre… as if it knew its moment had come and gone… 
Dionysus, the god who dies and is reborn, is once again chased from the city… 
 As we have said, Nietzsche makes the claim that Euripides brings about the suicide of 
pure tragedy by individualizing the chorus and wreaking havoc on the irrational truths 
sublimated by the original strife of its collective chants.  We can imagine Odysseus bound to 
the mast of his ship, struggling to be free towards the incandescent song of the Sirens, and, 
what would be his impending death.  In his Hippolytus (429 BC) and even in The Bacchae 
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(405 BC) (generally considered his least egregious offense to the genre), Euripides departs 
from the traditionally collective chorus.  Opting for two choruses in conversation with one 
another, a “Leader of the Chorus” and single members stepping forward to speak as 
characters enter into the dialogue.25 
Poetically, Nietzsche writes: “the mystery doctrine of tragedy: the fundamental 
knowledge of the oneness of everything existent, the conception of individuation as the 
primal cause of evil, and of art as the joyous hope that the spell of individuation may be 
broken in augury of a restored oneness.”26  For Heidegger, far away on a single star in the 
unified Germany of the future, this moment marks nothing less than the Kehr in his 
thought—as Dasein turns towards his fate to join with the historical destiny of the West—
which is gathering in the darkness of a saving power and is now named Da-sein. 
In his radical individuation of the chorus in his tragedies, Euripides poisons the genre 
from within—affecting its young suicide.  Apollo and Dionysus, bound together by the fire-
brand of metaphysical truth in the work of art, fall out of their self-asserting struggle into 
silence.  Here we have come to the original occurrence of the Götterverlassenheit, truly the 
Seinsverlassenheit, in Western history.  Admonishing Euripides, Nietzsche writes, “And even 
as myth, music too died under your hands; though you plundered greedily all gardens of 
music, you could achieve no more than a counterfeit.”27  Delivering his leveling blow, he 
continues: “And because you had deserted Dionysus, you were in turn deserted by Apollo.”28 
Widely recognized as the god of light and the god of the sun, Apollo is also heralded 
as the god the state.  However, Apollo can be interpreted (and has been by Nietzsche) to also 
embody reason and individualism.  The last god to be accepted onto Mt. Olympus, Dionysus, 
on the other hand, is taken by Nietzsche to embody passion and the intensity of emotion in 
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the fearless loss of the self in the “other.”  As Nietzsche aggressively charges Euripides with 
the murder of Dionysus he asserts that the tragedian has put the task of the thinker above the 
task of the poet.29  As such, paradoxical thoughts replace Apollonian contemplation, bringing 
rhetorical sophistry to dominate over care.  Of such a betrayal, Nietzsche writes that this is 
“The conception of individuation as the primal cause of evil, and art as the joyous hope that 
the spell of individuation maybe broke in augury of a restored oneness.”30  By this oneness, 
Nietzsche means nothing less than “the fundamental knowledge of the oneness of everything 
existent…” Such is, in our talk, the profound anxiety affecting Dasein when he is brought 
before beings as a whole. 
In the dialectic process of world historical consciousness, belonging properly to 
Hegel, we have begun to fold twin histories over onto one another.  Who are these fateful 
twins?  Is it not already clear as day?   
It is none other than the tragedian Aeschylus (525/524 BC-455/456 BC), writing 
during the Ripe Archaic period, who will bring Dionysus and Apollo together in the 
struggling sublimation of the chorus during what Nietzsche calls the “Tragic Age.”  Though 
scholars continue to debate the exact years of Aeschylus’s work (480-410 roughly), our 
reasoning here is quite simple: before the dramatic choruses of Aeschylus we have no 
complete tragic chorus at all.31  Born in 480 BC, the tragedies of Euripides follow the law of 
Socratism, which, according to Nietzsche, reads: “whatever is beautiful must also be 
sensible.”32  In this way we can once again see the long limb of our circle as the young 
German philologist parallels Euripides and Socrates with the pitfall of rationality in his 
sights.  This turn towards the Socratic maxim spells the death of tragedy in the same manner 
as Euripides’s individuation of the chorus.    
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The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music famously establishes the twinning 
parallel we have heretofore sought.  As the Persian Wars raged in fifth century Greece, 
affecting a dramatic “othering” Nietzsche wrote The Birth of Tragedy in 1872, as war with 
the French brings the loosely collected German lands to their feet.  History folds over as the 
world towers up within the earth: it becomes clear that we seek the German Aeschylus.  
Tragedy transforms the human condition as the songs and dances of the chorus reveal 
the cruelty of Being, affecting the Katharsis.  As in Aristotle’s theory of tragedy the spectator 
does not fall into the shadow and doubt of suffering, but is purified.  Dionysus towers up 
within the Apollonian structure of the chorus, and we are first brought before the fearful 
experience of the most extreme danger—and see that it is indeed the truly beautiful.   
The hero, and through him the spectator, is compelled to experience the true nature of 
the cosmos, which is terrible yet joyful: will, blind energy, everything in flux but at 
the bottom indestructible.  Here at the precipice of this insight man trembles, he is in 
danger of being petrified by the vision of the primordial conflict.33 
 
Aristotle suggests that this is a fundamental experience of pity and fear.  We understand this 
“fear for” or “fear in the face of” as related to the profound anxiety in a way that brings 
Dasein’s comportment of care to the fore.  
In this misty twilight we draw around again, tracing our historical progression in a 
romantic key.  Our path has taken us on a mysterious journey through both the metaphysical, 
artistic and musical past of what we are now well aware is a German twin history.  Returning 
in our circle to the answer, posited by Nietzsche in the first few pages of his text, The Birth of 
Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music is dedicated to none other than the romantic composer, the 
German Aeschylus, Richard Wagner: 
… I imagine the moment when you, my honored friend, will receive this essay.  How 
you, perhaps after an evening stroll in the winter snow, will consider the Prometheus 
Unbound on the title page, read my name, and be immediately convinced that, 
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whatever this book may contain, the author has something serious and urgent to say, 
and also that he was communicating with you as the ideas came to him, as if you were 
a real presence, and was only able to write what was appropriate to your presence… 
anyone who thought that this book reflected the contrast between patriotic excitement 
and aesthetic indulgence, between courageous seriousness and cheerful play, would 
be mistaken: were they really to read this essay, they would be astonished to discover 
the seriously German problem that we are dealing with, a vortex and a turning point 
at the very center of German hopes… if they can see art as nothing more than an 
entertaining irrelevance, an easily dispensable tinkling of bells next to the 
‘seriousness of life:’ as if no one was aware that this contrast with the ‘seriousness of 
life’ amounted to.  Let these serious people know that I am convinced that art is the 
supreme task and the truly metaphysical activity of this life in the sense of that man, 
my noble champion on that path, to whom I dedicate this book.34 
 
It is in the land of the Germans that we will seek our second acolyte of Being.  Having named 
tragedy the first, we know that the Acolyte, as work of art, holds open the open region.  We 
also know that in this holding open of the open region Da-sein sees into the essence of 
beings, and so to into himself.  He is transcending.  He is free.  Aeschylus, whom we hardly 
spoke of, collected the Greek chorus and first set Dionysus free to tower up violently within 
Apollo in self-assertion.  The putting to form of tones occurs in a linguistic work, as with the 
collective chanting of the chorus.  This chanting of the human instrument is music in its most 
basic, “beautiful,” sense.  Thus we travel onward to meet with Richard Wagner.  









At the conclusion of our previous discussion, it became quite clear where our talk of the 
ancient Greek art form tragedy was leading.  Out of what we called a “primordial haze,” 
where the gods walked among men, we came into the light of the open region, a clearing, to 
put tone to form and met with the German Aeschylus: Richard Wagner.   
In the manner of both Nietzsche and Aristotle we have claimed a philosophic status 
for tragedy as an “art formed”—but only as an art so formed by wonderful hands.  In the 
hands of Euripides, the gardens of music perish and Dionysus lies dead in the yellow coils of 
their wilting enclosure.  With Aeschylus he had risen to assert his godhood on Mt. Olympus, 
brought to his most essential essence together in strife with Apollo.  We thus named tragedy 
as the first Acolyte of Being.  Art is the weapon of strife, this much is clear.  But can a man 
be an Acolyte?  For now this question, posed for the first time, remains in shadow…   
Yet we have followed the young Nietzsche through his quarrel with Euripides, and 
have been brought before Richard Wagner, our German Aeschylus.  Whatever might not be 
clear about these Acolytes, be they men or masterpieces, we can perhaps make clear by way 
of a different sort of inquiry for the time being. 
We have wandered through the mist of a primordial place, and now tread north before 
the dawn, past the shores of the Bodensee onto the soft banks of the Rhine.  We have in no 
way, however, passed from the land of myth and music.  On the contrary, we have entered 
into the most magical of forests.   
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I need to take a moment here to make very clear that our quest for the lost definition 
of transcendence does not part in any way from a physical or geographic quest—selfhood 
and freedom grow deep roots.  With two feet now we are treading the line between ontic and 
ontological. In the fertile ground we drag the thread of our circle. 
As for geography meeting with myth and music to take up a transcendental question, 
no, a transcendental quest, we have arrived at the edge of the legendary Odenwald.  
Out of ancient Greece we have traveled to the eastern bank of the river Rhine and 
have come to stand before the mighty darkness of a most cosmic place.  Time is all a blur.  
The land is waking as the sun’s soft morning light draws back the veil of night and, stretched 
out tight across the sky, lets beings come to stand in the light of their Being. 
Should we scan the trees for any sight of a Roman standard?  None seem to stand any 
longer.  If we remember the dialectic process we spoke of when founding ancient Greece at 
the thesis of Western thought we recall that the Geist moved antithetically through ancient 
Rome and out into the far reaches of her empire.  I will not grip too firmly the softened 
binding of the Germania.  Though her words are beautiful and her thoughts are pure, those 
weathered pages bring to light only that which is antithetical by nature.  
In his text from 98AD, Tacitus credits the German tribes with primitive but 
wholesome virtues: they are tall and they are handsome, chaste, vigorous, warlike, and 
keenly jealous of liberty.2  As an ethnographic work, the Germania details the Germanic 
tribes existing outside the empire and begins with descriptions of the lands and customs of 
the Germans followed by a description of individual tribes (from the Ingeavenes to the 
Herminones and the Istaevones), from those closest to Rome herself to those at the furthest 
reaches of the empire in the Baltic regions.3  It has been duly noted that Tacitus himself never 
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traveled in the land of the Germans or beheld their fabled and primitive beauty for himself.  
Though this fact has been held up decade upon decade, it carries little weight for our 
purposes here; for, as we have said, what is most critical about this text is its antithetical 
quality, its place as “negative” between the abstract and the concrete.  For Tacitus, these 
beautiful and virtuous Germans stood in negative power against the vain luxury of the 
Roman aristocracy, having atrophied and fallen into an empty repose.   
Tacitus describes German governments as merit-based, with punishments carried out 
by priests.4  He even details a “[v]folk assembly” called together for decision making.5  
Holding up German purity and morality, Tacitus gives the examples of chivalry and 
monogamy (adultery was exceptionally rare) accentuating the similarity of German and 
Roman virtues while lambasting the Roman elite for their debauchery and excess.  Though 
Tacitus notes that the Germans drink too much and that for Baltic Germans (Scandinavians), 
women are in almost all regards held up as the ruling sex, his text makes many attempts at 
painting the Germans as everything Romans once were.6 
Throughout Tacitus’s writing, he is preoccupied with Senatorial power in Rome and 
the tyranny of the Emperors.7  Often hailed as writing a “psychology of political power,” 
Tacitus regards his own approach to history in the first pages his Annals (AD 14-68): “My 
purpose is to relate… without either anger or zeal, motives from which I am far removed.”8  
Hardly hiding his hatred of Nero, Tacitus is well known for a hatred of tyranny, yet believes 
the Senators to have squandered their cultural inheritance, and fears Rome will collapse in 
the absence of virtue and virility.        
Though Germania is later misinterpreted, coveted and even treated as a talisman of 
sorts, its status as a marker of the stark differences between Germans and Romans aids our 
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dialectic process. The transformation of this fabled history (which we all know only too well) 
harks to the essential feel of a certain antique texture—which we seek when thinking the 
history of Being, of Da-sein.   
Returning to the dynamic drive of our dialectic process, we must know that this 
method of thinking phenomenologically calls for, in Hegel’s thought, a reconciliation of 
reason and faith in addition to a presupposed notion of human consciousness—provided by 
God.  Early on we made it clear that the first two transcendental distinctions we named (that 
of God to man and man to Reason) were in fact not different at all from one another with 
regard to the status of transcendence as it is “held at bay.”  With Hegel, however, a 
reconciliation of reason and faith is achieved in his dialectic system and the spell of Kant’s 
inseparable dualism is bent by the augury of some restored oneness.  The spell Nietzsche said 
tragedy was responsible for breaking in its own time.   
Mediated by the thought of Ludwig Feuerbach and the young Hegelians, Marx crafts 
a dynamic dialectic process on the phenomenal side of Kant’s dualistic system.  Built on base 
and super structure and propelled by the flow of capital, Marx’s dialectic asserts that 
consciousness is achieved by human activity.  Seemingly at irredeemable odds with Hegel’s 
noumenal (metaphysical) system, Marx’s process crosses an unexpected boundary.  With 
Kant Das Ding an sich could never be known—for this knowledge was too far out in the 
noumenal realm.  Marx, however, approaches “essences” from within the phenomenal world.  
Between Hegel and Marx, tugging at each end of Kant’s dualistic system, we experience a 
struggle, what Heidegger might call “strife” in the work of art, which results in an opening, 
and a setting-forth.   
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Stepping out into the noumenal and phenomenal in strife, these dynamic systems 
merge out two transcendental paths, and ground them.  Thus the ontic holds the ontological, 
and keeps it there.  What do we mean here by ground?  We are speaking, of course, of the 
earth.9 
When thinking phenomenologically in the land of the Germans we are setting up a 
world on this earth.  Hegel’s phenomenology effects the reconciliation of opposites, as the 
opening of truth in the work of art requires the strife occurring between world and earth to 
hold open the open region.10  Language, we have noted, is one way we can see into this 
powerful sublimation.  Here it is no different.  We have said that the word we need, and will 
always need in the land of the Germans, is Der Geist.  Synchronously, another word we 
cannot go on without in this outpouring landscape is Das Volk.  
Even as students, Hegel and the poet Hölderlin dreamed of a new popular religion or 
Volks-religion, crafted for the new age of freedom.11  Hölderlin, Heidegger’s most beloved 
poetic mind and a close personal friend of Hegel’s, knew that only poetry could heal the rift 
between reason and faith.  With a profound knowledge of the Greeks, Hegel and Hölderlin 
sought to heal Kant’s splitting of the truth, thus overcoming the Enlightenment.  As school, 
friends Hegel and Hölderlin shared the motto: “Monotheism of reason and heart, polytheism 
of imagination and art.”12 
Famously, Heinrich Heine would write of Kant’s critical philosophy, “Our German 
philosophy was nothing but the dream of the French Revolution… Kant was our 
Robespierre.”13  In essence, Hegel would ultimately intellectualize Romanticism, just as he 
would spiritualize the Enlightenment.  Belonging to a generation of German romantics, the 
path from classic Enlightenment rationalism to German post-Enlightenment Romanticism 
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can be traced in Napoleon’s rise and fall.  For these German romantics, the Volk, as it had 
been with the Greek polis, was a kind of religion, and the basis of all spiritual commitments. 
The rift affected by the Enlightenment was one that, for the romantics, only poetry could 
heal.  
Grounding the reconciliation of reason and faith, the land, the earth, itself is imbued 
with some holy gift and begins, once again, to world.  “The world worlds.”14  It is in this way 
that ontic and ontological belong to one another, in the intimacy of opposites.  
In the history we have heretofore amassed (the previously named periods of man’s 
assent to knowledge or “truth” where he is, as such, transcending—be they by way of gods 
dissemination of truth to man or man’s assent to knowledge by way of reason) man, both in 
society and in himself, has been left alienated, “held at bay.”  In the thought of intellectuals 
ranging from Alexis de Tocqueville to Karl Marx, man finds himself everywhere in the 
chains described by Jean Jacques Rousseau.  Herded into the crowd in his stupefying 
bewilderment, man is “held at a distance” from his essence.  He is “held at bay,” left to his 
own devices to calculate and plan and create standards. Thus the human condition was left 
with a cursed and inseparable dualism, and man forgets.  Only in his participation in society, 
as he prepares and enforces his standards, could man, in his dwelling on this earth, find some 
“universal identity”—a higher reality which was once called “transcendence.”  
But what about in the land of the Germans?  It is clear here that we are speaking of 
Enlightenment thought and man’s “transcendence” (as it was so called) into society by way 
of contracts asserting the assumption of free will as property, no, right, of man.  Everyone 
knows that in their lands and principalities, medieval Germans participated in religious ideas 
of transcendence.  But we think, then of Martin Luther—his Ninety-Five Theses brazenly 
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assaulting this insurmountable distance, and we are brought before a rather uncomfortable 
question. 
Are we suggesting, then, that Germany was impervious to the Enlightenment?  It is 
absolutely not as simple as this.  Then again, neither is the true outcome of the French 
Revolution.  In their standard shape such arguments have taken, our ontic standards begin to 
outweigh our ontological commitments.  Yet have we not said that we travel here with both 
feet on the ground, in a geographic place where ontic and ontological come to meet one 
another in an historical landscape?  Yes.  Thus, with an eye to the ontic we may proceed 
ontologically, with language in mind.   
On the fourteenth of October 1806, during the wars of liberation, Napoleon made 
twin assaults on the German towns Jena and Auerstädt, and Hegel’s Geist first spread its 
wings, alight in the struggle.  Finishing the final pages of his famous Phenomenology of 
Spirit [Phänomenologie des Geistes] as Napoleon’s armies bore down on the city, Hegel 
ensured his manuscript to a young messenger, who rode through the lines in the night—the 
winged spirit of Germany in his safe keeping.  In the face of a decisive French victory, it was 
at the battle of Jena-Auerstädt, on the plateau west of the river Saale, that Prussia set out on 
its way towards modern statehood, which would be achieved almost seventy years later in 
1871.  As such, the land of the Germans is “on its way,” thrown headlong towards 
nationhood by the explosion of the French Enlightenment.    
I am aware that it must be mentioned, here and elsewhere, that the concept of Geist is 
being used in a most fluid sense.  Previously it was noted that the German Der Geist is a 
nearly untranslatable term, having no true equivalent in the English language.  We can go a 
long way towards rendering its meaning by saying “ghost, mind-spirit,” which carries both 
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mystical and cosmological connotations as well as phenomenological ones.  Another way to 
understand this word, however, is as the “living force.” 
As the Enlightenment bears down on the land of the Germans we recall this notion of 
Geist, its first ride through Napoleon’s lines and its metaphysical powers of affecting a 
reconciliation of reason and faith.  It is only in the pantheistic perspective of the German 
romantics that a “living force” is sought—a direct, individual, connection to the eternity of 
the cosmos.   
We turn now to yet another historical group of men.  In our definition of 
transcendence we spoke of an historical group of men as “the coming preservers.”  
Contemporary of thinkers such as Hegel, we name these historical men Schiller, Goethe, 
Fichte and Herder.  In consonance with Der Geist we spoke of Das Volk.  More translatable 
than Geist, Das Volk means: the people.  But did Heidegger not detail these coming 
preservers as preservers of the great work of art?  Yes.  For they hold open the open region. 
At the hands of men such as Fichte and Herder, the Volk is conceived of in romantic, 
indeed heroic, terms.  With the Volk, reason and faith, man and society, indeed Apollo and 
Dionysus, are returned to one another and set up a world, which is grounded in the earth.  
Setting up an earth and setting forth a world is the ontological vocation of the great work of 
art.   
When we first spoke of this Volk, we did so as a word we say in German that is 
intimately related to the word Geist, which we have, to the best of our linguistic abilities, 
defined.  But we have not spoken directly about their relation.  In order to reach some clarity, 
we now seek a definition for the word Volk: 
Idealized and transcendent, the Volk symbolized the desired unity beyond 
contemporary reality.  It was lifted out of the actual conditions in Europe onto a level 
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where both individuality and the larger unity of belonging were given scope.  The 
Volk provided a more tangible vessel for the life force that flowed from the cosmos; 
it furnished a more satisfying unity to which man could relate functionally while 
being in tune with the universe.  Völkisch thought made the Volk the intermediary 
between man and the “higher reality.15”  
 
For the Volk, the landscape [Landschaft] was filled with this “life force” by way of which the 
German became, for lack of any more beautiful word, “transcendent.”  Such a landscape was 
native, known to the senses and passion in Sturm und Drang, as well as to history.  Here, the 
Volk would find a self-expression of his innermost individuality.  By way of the landscape, 
the Volk was tied directly to the cosmos, to a “universal identity.”  Here, in the land of the 
Germans, the Volk cultivated a transcendent soul.16   
In this transcendental landscape the woods which stood forth from the trees sheltered 
the whisper of the wind, who brought to human ears the crispness of rushing water, the 
sweetness of birdsong and the rhythm of the changing seasons therein, the Volk cultivated its 
essence, its Geist.  It was in the age of the “New Romanticism” that Eugene Diederichs 
would style the Geist as “the longing of the soul towards unity,”17 an idea which took its 
origin from fifteenth and sixteenth century German humanists, such as Dürer and Paracelsus, 
who first set German “mysticism” on its way to fruition,18 as a gathering, a grounding.   
In all this talk of the land of the Germans, their landscape, language and their origin, 
we have come to several points, which are critical for our task—indeed our quest for the 
Acolytes of Being.  We know that within the ontic there is the ontological, and it is held 
therein.  We know that the coming preservers are an historical group of men and that they 
hold open the open region of the great work of art.  In detailing the procession of the history 
of Being we have sought a grounding, which is coming to fruition in a landing.   
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In Greek tragedy we saw first-hand the interplay of gods and men on the stage as well 
as their onticly occurring synthesis as reflected in the oneness of the chorus.  So too now can 
we see such a relation between the romantic Volk and its Geist.  In search of German legend, 
we once again turn back to myth, to the world of the gods.  From the most beloved 
Nibelungenlied back through the Thiedrik-Sage and the Volsung-Sage we find ourselves 
gazing long into the past of the gods.  
We have been promised a meeting with Richard Wagner, our German Aeschylus.  
Responsible for the augury of restored oneness in the tragic chorus, Aeschylus brought 
Dionysus to Apollo, and kept him there, holding open the open region in this original, 
beautiful, strife.  It was only on the basis of German music, then, that the young Nietzsche 
began any discussion of a “German spirit,” as if it were only beginning to stand in the light of 
its Being for the first time under the spellbinding sway of these romantic tones.  In 
Germany’s romantic struggle…  
…I have learned to think hopelessly and mercilessly enough about that ‘German 
spirit,’ and likewise about contemporary German music, which is romantic through 
and through, and the most un-Greek of all possible art forms… —And yet—apart, of 
course, from all impetuous hopes and applications to contemporary issues with which 
I spoiled my first book, the great Dionysiac question mark remains, also as regards 
music: how would a music be that was not romantic in origin, as German music is—
but Dionysiac?19  
 
At this point we are coming towards the point where we must engage in our own struggle 
with Nietzsche.  (Let me be quite clear; I have no interest—at any moment in this text—in 
taking “responsibility” for Nietzsche.  It is entirely possible to both love and hate Nietzsche 
at once.  As such, the Nietzsche I take responsibility for in this text will always already have 
been brought under some sort of control by either Wagner or Heidegger.)  Frustrated with 
contemporary German music in all its romantic fervor, Nietzsche will soon attempt an assault 
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on his most “honored friend.”20  Slandering (he thinks) contemporary German music as “the 
most un-Greek of all possible art forms,”21 Nietzsche’s own definition of the “Dionysiac,” in 
relation to his remarks about the romantic origins of German music, makes his assault on 
Christian morality as constituting a…  
Hatred of the ‘world,’ the condemnation of the emotions, the fear of beauty and 
sensuality, a transcendental world invented the better to slander this one, basically a 
yearning for non-existence… So then, with this questionable book [The Birth of 
Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music], my instinct, an affirmative instinct for life, turned 
against morality and invented a fundamentally opposite doctrine and valuation of life, 
purely artistic and anti-Christian… —with the name of a Greek god: I call it the 
Dionysiac.22 
 
We must ask ourselves, are these frustrated assaults of any real merit here?  Yes and no.  
Moreover, are they in fact Christian at all?  Perhaps this is another question for another time, 
however, it must at least be raised.  But if Dionysus stands in utter opposition to everything 
he deems Christian, then does it not hold true that Apollo must stand in utter opposition to all 
that is pagan?  And because you abandoned Apollo, Dionysus died to under your hand… 
though you plundered all the gardens of poetry, you received only a counterfeit… It is thus 
that Nietzsche turns his back on Wagner.   
In speaking of great works of art, we have already said that a return to Greek thinking 
is neither necessary nor possible.  It passes for a well-known fact that Nietzsche’s first book 
was written less for Aeschylus and the Greeks than for Wagner and “the seriously German 
problem that we are dealing with, a vortex and a turning point at the very center of German 
hopes…”23  
Near the end of his sane life, in 1888, he [Nietzsche] wrote in Ecce Home: ‘I offer all 
my other human relationships cheap; but at no price would I relinquish from my life 
the Tribschen days, those days of mutual confidence, of cheerfulness, of sublime 
incidents—of profound moments… I do not know what others may have experienced 
with Wagner: over our sky no cloud ever passed.’  What he felt he had found in 
Wagner—and what he later vehemently denied was there to be found—was a 
	   79	  
reincarnation of the genius of Greek tragedy… However strong, independently of 
Wagner, Nietzsche’s interest in Greek tragedy, its rise and decline, may have been, it 
was impossible for a person of his cast of mind to see the matter as one of purely 
historical investigation.  It follows that the whole idea of the book [The Birth of 
Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music] must always have been permeated by Wagnerian 
influences, even if he wrote earlier versions of it—as he did—in which Wagner is not 
directly involved.24 
 
In tandem with Wagner, Nietzsche sought a kathartic remedy for German anxiety, 
challenged forth by Napoleon, “that world soul.”  First performed in 1876 at the Bayreuth 
Festspielhaus, Richard Wagner’s Der Ring des Nibelungen brought German myth to the 
stage in song.  Six years later, in 1882, Wagner would see the premier of his final work, the 
Bühnenweihfestspiel [A Festival Play for the Consecration of the Stage], Parsifal.  Heralded 
as “the great Christian opera,” it is Parsifal, which affects the original rift between Nietzsche 
and his German Aeschylus.  
Thus, it is in the romantic world of the nineteenth century where the origin of our 
ancient answers takes root.  Sharply characterized by the advent of modernity (as brought 
about by the industrial revolution) and the artistic age of romanticism (a disillusionment with 
Enlightenment values and eighteenth century rationality) the nineteenth century becomes 
nothing less than an ontological battleground. Both Nietzsche and Wagner hoped to sink into 
the mythic past in order to bring an artistic and philosophical rejuvenation to the present, 
under grave threat.  Seeking a transcendental remedy, we can name this spiritual, dynamic 
force now as both Katharsis and Geist.  Coming in waves, this shadowy past—standing out 
beyond the veil—is both near and distant, both ontic and ontological.   
 For Richard Wagner, this past is the very past that lies in the soil under his feet.  As 
we have mentioned, Völkisch thought or Völkisch Ideology is born in the nineteenth century 
from a rural and spiritual connection of the individual to his native landscape—imbibed with 
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the Geist.  For the Volk, the ontic holds the ontological, not only this, but the ontological 
Geist, is cultivated by Da-sein. 
 Written in Mittelhochdeutsch in the thirteenth century, the original story of Parsifal in 
Germany was told by the German poet, knight and Meistersinger Wolfram von Eschenbach 
in his romantic poem, Parzival.  A Völkisch work in many ways, Eschenbach’s poem 
Parzival tells the story of the Arthurian knight Parzival who seeks the Holy Grail [heilige 
Gral].  A sixteen-book poem, each book is composed of sections containing thirteen line 
stanzas written in rhyming couplets—a helplessly classical style.25   
 First written in France during the latter part of the twelfth century as Percival from 
Chrétien de Troyes, the work, styled as part of the Arthurian legends, was left unfinished. 
Born in Germany as a poem, Parzival becomes far and away the most beloved work of 
Wolfram von Eschenbach and endures well into the eighteenth and nineteenth century as a 
Volkslied [literally a “folk song” or “people’s poem”].  Carrying in its pages the story of the 
grail, the poem also harbors within its folds a more secret, veiled, message enclosed in its 
language and literary style (Apollonian elements).  
 It was in the nineteenth century that beloved poems like Parzival and the 
Nibelungenlied, under cultural pressure, were in dire need of being decked out anew.    
Parzival’s Dionysian transformation from Volkslied to Gesamtkunstwerk [literally “total 
work of art”—a term specific to Wagner’s operatic works] by way of Wagner’s libretto as 
poetry put to the irrational beauty of music, connects nineteenth century German hopes to an 
artistic impetus.  Through Dionysus, and only him, Wagner brings Parsifal to the music.  
 In order to approach the “inner truth” of this romantic, indeed, Dionysiac, 
transformation from Volkslied to Gesamtkunstwerk, it is first necessary to take yet another 
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step back into the past in search of illuminating clues.  Here our circle begins to learn the 
steps to a dance.   
 Beginning in Italy in the seventeenth century with Jacopo Peri’s Dafne, the art form 
of opera collected drama, poetry, myth and music into truly a “total work of art.”  The Italian 
word “opera” derives from the Latin “opera,” which means “work” in both the sense of 
“labor done” and the “work of art” resulting—(linguistics being truly vital to the artistic 
status of the genre opera).   
 The first opera, Dafne, was nothing less than an attempts to revive classical Greek 
drama and the art form tragedy, as we now understand it, gifts its essence to opera.  Members 
of the Camerata considered that the chorus of Greek tragedy was originally sung (a 
Dionysian Dithyramb), putting irrationality to form.  Thus, opera was originally conceived as 
a way of restoring this situation through language (Apollo) put to music (Dionysus).  In the 
nineteenth century, both Italy and France saw a “golden age” of opera, characterized by 
enduring works from La Bohème to Carmen.  Yet this “golden age” would be dominated not 
by French or Italian composers, but by a new comer to the stage—our German Aeschylus, 
Richard Wagner.  
 As the “golden age” of opera dawned in nineteenth century Europe, Wagner irrupted 
onto the scene with an overpowering fervor.  His early opera’s included Der Fliegende 
Höllander, Tannhäuser (in which Wolfram von Eschenbach himself appears as a character) 
and Lohengrin (heralded as the precursor to his final opera Parsifal).  Even in Germany, 
French and Italian had linguistically dominated the genre, with composers such as Mozart 
writing music for an Italian libretto set to a French plot—such as in his The Marriage of 
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Figaro [Le Nozze di Figaro].  Here, however, Apollo and Dionysus still remain out of touch.  
But why? 
 The first “German” opera, Die Dafne composed by Heinrich Schültz in1627 was 
styled as a revival of Jacopo Peri’s Dafne.  Much like the original Dafne, the musical score 
was lost but the libretto, by the poet Martin Opitz, survived—and was written, not in Italian, 
but in German.  The majority of German composers writing opera (be it in the fifteenth of the 
nineteenth century), however, chose to write their libretti in Italian and not their native 
German.  (Mozart is, once again, a prime example).  Our German Aeschylus was among the 
first and the few who, in the nineteenth century, chose to write his libretti in his native 
German—but not only this. 
 In contrast to Italian and French opera, which was composed by and large for the 
aristocratic classes, Wagner consecrated German opera as decidedly not aristocratic or 
bourgeois.  This new German opera was composed for the Volk. 
 Beginning his study of opera under the influence of the German composers Weber 
and Meyerbeer, Wagner gradually evolved a new conception of opera, which departed from 
all others.  The idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk—a fusion of music, poetry, drama myth and 
legend belongs solely to Wagner.  Though, almost by definition, all opera is 
Gesamtkunstwerk, Wagner’s cultivation of this term as applied to his own work departs in 
that from the beginning the composer decidedly wrote his own libretti in intimate connection 
to the writing of the musical scores, sometimes even working on both side by side and 
weaving music and poetry together.  
 In fact, Wagner was among the very few composers to write his own poetic libretti at 
all.  As such, Wagner brought a new, ontological, dimension to opera, which opened up in 
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his work in a most original way.  Based on German and Arthurian legend (which, we will 
learn, bleed into one another) the Gesamtkunstwerk is decidedly a Völkisch work.  Bringing 
together language in his own poetic libretti with powerful musical scores rooted in Völkisch 
myth, the young Wagner was already on his way to revitalizing spirituality and romanticism 
in the young, backwards looking nineteenth century Germany—seeking the grail itself. 
 In the course of our backwards-looking romantic endeavor the lost grail has been 
traced through young Germany, into its spiritual roots, all the way back to ancient Athens by 
way of the art form tragedy, which Wagner’s opera frenetically seek to revive in the 
gathering dark of the nineteenth century.  Until this point, we have engaged Nietzsche, 
Hegel, Herder, Eschenbach, Wagner and even the Geist of the German Volk itself.  Between 
these figures, these attendants of Being, we have spun the story of a Geist, a katharsis and a 
grail.   
We have suggested that the katharsis and the Geist are one in the same.  How can this 
be?  Moreover, we have seemingly set out on our way on a grail quest, which terrorizes all 
rational thoughts and peoples.     
This question will be addressed, at present, by poetry as the linguistic work of art put 
to music.  Those who read Wagner’s libretti today can hardly succeed in separating the verse 
rhythm from the accompanying musical rhythm.  Sitting there, within the violence of the 
orchestra, the fabricated texture and weight of the intangible manifests in velvety leitmotifs.  
In Wagner’s operatic works the poetic text of the libretti was imbibed with the Geist of each 
Völkisch character’s romantic song, a restored oneness.   
On the nature of Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk as largely a work of poetry, we can 
understand that since musical rhythms are by their very nature quantitative as well as 
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accentual it is entirely possible to describe them in poetic terms and vice versa.  In Greek 
tragedy lyrical structure was written as strophe, which was followed by antistrophe and 
epode.  As John Milton wrote in the preface to Samson Agonistes, “strophe, antistrophe and 
epode were a kind of stanza framed only for the music.”26   
As our dialectic will insist, Greek lyrical rhythms gave way to Roman verse (a 
domination of Apollonian structure and sophist argumentation).  Recalling that opera itself 
was originally conceived as a means of restoring the Greek chorus in tragedy, “There are 
some resemblances between typical Greek lyrical rhythms and Wagner’s musical rhythms 
(experienced in his prolific use of leitmotif) that produce similar effect to those produced by 
Aeschylus (particularly in his famous trilogy of Greek tragedies Oresteia).”27  Oresteia, 
however, was not a trilogy and actually contained four pieces, similarly to Wagner’s Der 
Ring des Nibelungens.  The final play, however, was lost.  It is truly in his use of leitmotif 
that Wagner makes the most unique revival of the katharsis of Greek tragedy in his Völkisch 
operas—not only the legend, but the language itself, was decked out anew.    
Other Greek lyrical rhythms used by Wagner are iambic in nature (—/u—/u—), 
making a nod to more contemporary poetry as well as Roman verse.  These rhythms only 
come to light when the poetry of the libretto is sewn into the conflicting orchestral rhythms 
of the music—effecting what is truly an Apollonian and Dionysian struggle between world 
and earth as a singular totality.   
Wagner himself, in much the same vein as Heidegger, claims that language has 
indeed lost its original metaphysical roots.  Consequently, language begins to atrophy, taking 
with it our ontic experience of reality—hence the vitality of music into young Germany’s 
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romantic expression.  Of this vital importance of language to the music, which escapes from 
poetry’s lips, Wagner writes in his 1861 letter entitled “Zukunftsmusik:” 
The metaphysical necessity of the discovery of this entirely new means of 
communication precisely in our own time seems to me to lie in the ever more 
conventional forms taken by modern verbal languages.  When we look more closely 
at the developmental history of these languages we hit, in the so-called roots of 
words, even today on a primal origin that clearly reveals how the formation of the 
concept of an object corresponds in the first beginnings almost completely to the 
subjective feeling engendered by it; and the assumption that the first speech of human 
beings must have had a likeness to song may not appear entirely ludicrous.  From 
what was in any case an entirely sensuous, subjectively felt meaning of words human 
language became ever more abstract, so that in the end only a conventional meaning 
of words remained, and thus all share in understanding has withdrawn from 
feelings.28 
 
For Wagner the poet could select to continue in one of two ways, toward “an inner fusion 
with music,” or further into “the field of the abstract.”  It was only an inner fusion with the 
music that would satisfy Wagner artistically and metaphysically.  For the poet who chose the 
latter path abandoned Apollo, and so too was deserted by Dionysus.  
For Wagner “the lost paradise of primal poeticizing”29 was of constant concern.  In an 
essay on Beethoven, he writes of music’s duty to poetry: “language, which was until then 
taking shape, as if it were alive, in a steady process of crystallization; the poetic art becomes 
the art of decking out the old myths, now no longer to be invented anew, and ends at rhetoric 
and dialectic.”30  Reaching back into the linguistic, poetic origin of the work of art, Wagner 
hits upon a clue, as a note or syllable, an irrational elixir, which he draws forth and presses 
into the shape of its history, by means of the German language itself. 
For Nietzsche, Wagner had “forced language back into a primal state, where it hardly 
thinks in terms of concepts, where language is itself poetry, image, feeling… Anyone else 
would have failed, for our language seems almost too old and worn out for such a demand.”31  
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In our search to this point we have named an historical group of men, and continue to 
seek the “coming preservers.”  A coming preserver is one who preserves the truth that is 
happening in the work—who holds open the open region brought before us by the work of 
art.  In his Wille zur Macht als Kunst Nietzsche touches on similar ideas, but, for Heidegger, 
falls short.  For Nietzsche, as we have seen in his definition of the Dionysiac, art is expected 
to happen as stimulating and resulting from lived experience.  This “lived experience” for 
Nietzsche is a form of ek-static authenticity in Heidegger.  Standing outside of itself, ek-
static authenticity is ek-static freedom.  As such, art has an ontological vocation; it holds 
open the open region and sets freedom on its way.  For Heidegger, Da-sein is authentic when 
he turns to gaze into the open region.  Art is authentic when it affects an encounter with the 
Being of beings.32  That is, art is authentic when Da-sein is transcending.  
Both Nietzsche and Heidegger share a similar hatred of modern art.  Nietzsche, with 
his diabolical whit, famously refers to modern art as: “L’art pour l’art, the virtuoso croaking 
of shivering frogs, despairing in their swamp.”33  Weber too gives a classic and disparaging 
definition of modern art as “aesthetic modernity,” which accuses modern art of encouraging 
the pitifully privatized, inward, lewd, and fearful. Heidegger too sees such art as promoting 
nothing less than an “enfeebled cult of inferiority.”34  More than this, however, Heidegger 
sees modern art as destructive and dangerous for man’s relation to Being.  “Preserving the 
work does not reduce people to their private experiences, but brings them into affiliation with 
the truth that is happening in the work.”35  Im gegenteil to Nietzsche’s thought of true art as a 
willing, Heidegger asserts that, on the contrary, it is a “knowing” which brings man to stand 
in the open region of the work.  “Preserving the work, as a knowing, is a sober standing-
within the awesomeness of the truth that is happening in the work.”36
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Siegfried 
 
“It is said by many men, that on his tomb there are written these words: Here lies Arthur, 
The once and future King”1 
   -T.H. White 
 
At this point, we have made our way through the centuries; detailing the ontic and the 
ontological, we have remembered that the earth draws the world to it, and holds it tightly 
therein.  So it is with our German Geist.  Let us not forget, that in this process of unveiling 
the history of Being in the West that we carry with us the lost definition of transcendence, 
belonging properly to the Post-Enlightenment world.  Open to the open region of Alētheia, 
we know that the great work of art sets up a world on this earth and that at its origin is Da-
sein, who, by holding open, keeps us transposed into the mystery of metaphysics—keeps us 
held out and transcending.  In strife, the world towers up within the earth, the ontological 
within the ontic. 
 It is thus the great work of art that we have sought on our quest for the “truth” of 
metaphysics as the transcendental.  We have named these great works of art as the Acolytes 
of Being.  Out of the orient, into ancient Greece, we named tragedy as the sublimation of the 
Dionysian and the Apollonian in the dithyramb and, sailing up the river Rhine, found our 
German Aeschylus, his music reviving the primal poeticizing of language.   
It seems, however, we are continuously making a return to the Greeks, when we have 
already said that this return is neither necessary nor possible.  If art is what we seek, our 
Acolyte, then this is certainly a serious mistake, for the Greeks knew very little about great 
works of art.  We have said that in each of these works, tragedy and its real renewal in 
Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk, irrationality is put to form as Dionysus wedded to Apollo.  Is 
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this not a Greek notion?  If it is it had been long forgotten and taken up only in the German 
world under Wagner’s sway.  In German, art is Kunst.  In Greek, the word technē [τέχνη] 
once belonged to both art and craft.2  Technē, however, means neither creation nor work, but 
“to know” [wissen].    
 In Greek thought, the essence of this knowing, which is held in technē belongs too to 
Alētheia, the forlorn truth whose essential essence we have sought in the preserving power of 
our Acolytes. As Da-sein sees into the Being of beings where they come to stand in the open 
of Alētheia, he lets them be.  Letting beings be preserves the mystery of Being.  Preserving 
the mystery of Being is part of Da-sein’s task, yet in inauthenticity Da-sein forgets, turning 
away from the mystery of existence, which is granted [gewähren] to his keeping.  In simply 
letting beings be, it is difficult for Da-sein to “hold out.”   
Held also within Alētheia, however, is the knowing of technē, which acts as a 
“bringing forth.”  If the Greek Physis [φύσις] (understood in accordance with metaphysics 
[µεταφυσική]) is understood originally as the arising of something from outside of itself, it is 
also a “bringing forth.”    
 We now have metaphysics as a “bringing forth,” proper to the original experiences of 
Alētheia and technē.  Together, Alētheia and technē bring forth a world.  In the history of 
metaphysics, which we have detailed artistically as the hidden history of Being in the world, 
we have said that metaphysics means transcendence.  Setting up an earth and setting forth a 
world occurs in the great work of art, which has at its deepest and most essential origin in 
authentic Da-sein. Da-sein affects the “bringing forth” [technē] of Being, which occurs in the 
great work of art.  Here beings stand in Alētheia.    
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 It has now become very plain that our Acolytes of Being, as great works of art, are in 
their essential essences always already Da-sein.  Here it is critical to remind ourselves that 
Da-sein, as Heidegger writes it during his Kehr, does not simply mean “human being” or 
even “the there being” but, more than this means: the thereness of Being.  Ontologically 
towering up within ontic Da-sein—who is thrown towards destiny—Being is pressed into the 
shape of its history.3 
At their Greek origin, both physis and technē meant “bringing-forth” as proper to 
Alētheia, and were taken over by Roman translation, without any corresponding originality.  
Technē as “bringing forth” in Greek was also proper to another word.  This word is Poiēsis 
[ποίησις].  We can say nothing more beautiful or true than that, this “bringing forth” is 
something poetic.4   
However, while Alētheia was hidden in the shadow of veritas through the ages, 
technē gave its name to technology.  As with the translation of Alētheia to veritas, this 
translation marks the rootlessness of Western thought.  Against technē as a knowing proper 
to Poiēsis that “brings forth” something essentially poetic, technology was based on modern 
physics as a calculable science.5  When science becomes our passion, the revealing that rules 
modern technology becomes not the artistic “bringing forth” proper to technē’s Poiēsis, but a 
challenging [Herausfordern].”6 
In this challenging Da-sein is in the most extreme danger. 
Similarly to Alētheia, Technē has for the past 2,500 years remained in erring [irren]: a 
means to an end, a human activity, something “intelligently in the hand” of man.7  
Dominated by the calculable sciences in the domain of veritas, we have said that scientific 
man irrupts into being as a whole [Das Seiendes im Ganz] and that precisely at the moment 
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he leaps forward to secure what is properly his he is speaking of something else entirely.  The 
nihilating nothing, of which he wishes to know absolutely nothing.  As such, “The irruption 
belonging to “bringing forth” [Her-vor-bringen] occurs only in the authentic artist.8  This 
irruption is thus the proper task of Poiēsis, of the poet.    
Yet modern technology comes to presence as disturbingly not any sort of poetry or 
craftsmanship.  As an exact science, modern technology “challenges-forth” and this 
challenging gathers man into ordering so that he sets to work preparing guidelines and raising 
standards.  Man is thus made subordinate to this orderability that challenges forth,9 he is 
indeed building an iron cage for himself.  It is in this way that man ceases to unconceal, for 
unconcealment as it unfolds in the challenging of scientific technology is never human 
handiwork any more than it is in the realm man traverses every time he as a subject related 
predicatively to an object in his linear progression.10   
With technology, Dasein turns his back on the mystery, enslaved by the progressive 
“will to will” of a bourgeois nihilism.  All the world retreats into the earth, locked therein.  
And beauty, as we have called it, falls into a cold and dreamless sleep. 
Thus: The hydroelectric plant is set into the current of the Rhine.  It sets the Rhine to 
supplying its hydraulic pressure, which then sets the turbines turning.  This turning 
sets those machines in motion whose thrusts sets going the electric current for which 
the long-distance power station and its network of cables are set up to dispatch 
electricity.  In the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly 
disposition of electrical energy, even the Rhine itself appears to be something at our 
command.  The hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine River as the wooden 
bridge that joined bank with bank for hundreds of years.  Rather, the river is dammed 
up into the power plant.  What the river is now, namely, a water-power supplier, 
derives from the essence of the power station.  In order that we may even remotely 
consider the monstrousness that reigns here, let us ponder for a moment the contrast 
that is spoken by the two titles: “The Rhine,” as dammed up into the power works, 
and “The Rhine,” as uttered by the art-work, in Hölderlin’s hymn by that name.  But, 
it will be replied, the Rhine is still a river in the landscape, is it not?  Perhaps.  But 
how?  In no other way than as an object on call for inspection by a tour group ordered 
there by the vacation industry.11 
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We recall from across the centuries our Greek temple, and the god, which had come to 
presence therein.  His holy precinct was once delimited by the standing of the stone as it 
rested in the rock, which held him there to reign.  And in his manifestation, too, the surge of 
the surf against the rocks below thundered all the clearer. 
He sits now in an empty repose, behind a roped off section of the hall.  And the waves 
below are muffled, by the hurry. We have borne witnessed the Götterverlassenheit. 
 In the power of Poiēsis as something poetic, the proper home to the “bringing forth” 
of technē, our modern scientific world has wrought a challenging.  Stolen from technē when 
Alētheia was forgotten by sophistry and the traditions of logic, the essence of modern 
technology lies now in enframing [Gestell]12.  Enframing is what happens when the 
hydroelectric plant comes to dominate the essence of the Rhine, and Dasein forgets.   
Dir mag auf heißem Pfade unter Tannen oder 
Im Dunkel des Eichwalds gehüllt 
In Stahl, mein Sinklair! Gott erscheinen oder 
In Wolken, du kennst ihn, da du kennst jungendlich, 
Des Guten Kraft, und nimmer ist dir 
Verborgen das Lächeln des Herrschers 
Bei Tage, wenn 
Es fieberhaft und angekettet das 
Lebendige scheinet oder auch 
Bei Nacht, wenn alles gemischt 
Ist ordnungslos und wiederkehrt 
Uralte Verwirrung. 
 
     *** 
 
[To you in the heat of a path under fir-trees or 
Within the oak forest’s half light, wrapped 
In steel, my Sinclair, God may appear, or 
In clouds, you’ll know him, since, youthfully, you know 
The good God’s power, and never from you 
The smile of the Ruler is hidden 
By day, when all 
That lives seems febrile 
And fettered, or also 
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By night, when all is mingled 
Chaotically and back again comes] 
Primaeval Confusion.13  
For Heidegger, enframing blocks the shining forth and holding sway of truth, instead, it 
challenges.  It is thus that where enframing “challenges forth” that there is danger in the 
upmost sense.14  The enframed essence of the Rhine is ordered, regulated and secured: as 
“standing-reserve” [Bestand].  The Rhine is “intelligently in the hand” of man; its essence is 
“dammed up.”  
As with the water’s pressure, challenged forth to turn the turbines, so too does Being 
tower up within the same apparatus and it becomes difficult to ignore the fury of its energy, 
gathering in standing reserve.  In the last lines from Hölderlin’s hymn, “The Rhine,” we 
return chaotically “and back again comes primaeval confusion.”15      
In Heidegger’ words, “Freedom is that which conceals in a way that opens to light, in 
whose clearing shimmers a veil that hides the essential occurrence of all truth and lets that 
veil appear as what veils.”16  This is the realm of the mystery, properly under Da-sein’s 
protective power.  Yet we know at this point that we have lost what is most proper to its 
protection, these Greek thoughts taken over without corresponding originality have slipped 
away into an erring.  In our search for the Acolytes we turn to the great work of art for the 
very reason that Poiēsis, as a “bringing forth” of something poetic, is also a destining.17 
Since the turn from technē to technology the bringing forth of Poiēsis has been in 
eclipse.  With the advent of modernity, essences have been “challenged forth” and are 
“dammed up” in standing reserve. “It remains true nonetheless that man in the technological 
age is, in a particularly striking way, challenged forth into revealing.”18  In 1914, the damn 
breaks. 
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At the turn of the century, World War I presented high-minded, increasingly liberal 
European society with a deep cultural and historical crisis.  As young nation-states tore the 
modern world asunder, European civilization was brought to the brink of complete collapse.  
Early twentieth century Europe was no doubt, a wasteland.  For the German Volk, who 
cultivated their extra-modern relationship with “ultimate reality” ontically in the landscape, 
modernity and its implications (industrialization, modernization, rationalization) immediately 
threatened the people’s community [Völksgemeinschaft].  Migrant workers arrived from 
distant lands with no hope of cultivating a relationship with the Geist.  The introduction of 
these workers, deemed the “true proletariat,” (described in Völkisch terms as hopelessly 
“nervous” and “rootless”) posed a grave threat to Germans souls, thus culminating in “the 
true proletariat being an ‘unfortunate product of modernization.’”19  
This threat of the “true proletariat” to the Völksgemeinschaft is directly related to their 
spiritual connection to the soil, which the Volk believed to be imbibed with the Geist.  Of this 
aggressive rejection of eighteenth century rationality, characterized by modernity and 
actualized by the “true proletariat,” it becomes dangerously clear that “This group, identified 
as the ‘true proletariat,’ consisted of the totally disinherited… Consequently, it was futile to 
extend them a saving hand.  On the contrary, the proletariat was the enemy to be 
vanquished.”20   
In connection to this disinherited group of migratory workers, lacking a homeland 
and thus a natural and spiritual connection to the Geist is the idea of the critical importance 
of the Geist to not only the community of the Volk but, more than this, the very hope of 
cultivating a human soul.  Of the importance of the Geist, “Only through roots anchored in 
the Volk could the German find a release for his religious dynamic—a force subsumed in the 
	   94	  
Geist.”21  For the Volk “rootedness” in the community as well as the natural landscape 
cultivated the soul and propelled the collective towards transcendence.  “Rootedness,” for the 
Volk thus breaks open the ontological difference, the delimitation of ontic and ontological.  
Cultivated in the earth, the world of the Volk towers up and, as a work of art itself, is held 
open by the people.  Resistant to the enframing of modernity, as it sets its standards and 
plans, the Volk is indeed “challenged forth.”   
In nineteenth century Völkisch literature and art there comes about a “virtue of 
ferociousness,” apparent in famous texts such as Der Werwolf by Christian Morgenstern.  
This virtue of ferociousness is also strikingly present in Wagner’s renewal of German 
mythology, most potently his adaptation of the Nibelungenlied in his famous Der Ring des 
Nibelungen.  In each of these Volk-tales, violence is virtue—necessary to protecting the 
tender growth of some mysterious saving power.  Cultivating its ontological essence 
ontically in the landscape, the violence of the Volk is at once ontic and ontological. 
 From 1806 to 1829, Goethe crafted what can arguably be hailed as his most famous 
work, the tragedy Faust.  A chilling tale, Faust has been written and rewritten across Europe 
with versions of the story penned by authors from Christopher Marlowe to Thomas Mann.  
Jaded by his life as a scholar and a doctor, Faust attempts to take his own life and in so doing 
calls upon the devil, Mephistopheles.  In exchange for his immortal soul, Mephistopheles 
grants Faust both magic and wisdom; however, when the time comes that the deal is up, 
Faust will be dragged to hell and damned for all eternity.   
 In Marlowe’s play from 1602, The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus, Faust is 
damned to hell.22  So too goes the story in the 1947 telling of Mann, Doktor Faustus: Das 
Leben des deutschen Tonsetzers Adrian Leverkühn, erzählt von einem Freunde ("Doctor 
	   95	  
Faustus: The Life of the German Composer Adrian Leverkühn, Told by a Friend").  Knowing 
that he is doomed to descend into madness, Leverkühn, a struggling composer, makes a pact 
with the devil: his immortal soul in exchange for the most beautiful music of all time. After 
rising to fame, Leverkühn too is damned, and dragged to hell by Mephistopheles.23   
 It is only in Goethe’s Faust that damnation is forestalled when Faust’s Gretchen, 
whom he used his powers to seduce, pleads with God to save his soul.  Enlightened by 
compassion, innocence is restored and the angels intervene, carrying Faust out of the “eternal 
empty” to heaven.24  
For Heidegger, when we think of “to save” we mean nothing less than to “fetch 
something back into its essence.”25  Lost to us first was Alētheia, and with it technē, both 
proper to Poiēsis.  If we have sought the lost definition of transcendence, and hunted for its 
Acolytes through and through the history of the West, our task has been nothing less than to 
fetch back these heretofore forlorn essences—and bring them to stand in the blinding light of 
their Being.  We are bolstering the ontological ferociousness of the saving power. 
Thus, we have no other choice than to look with clear eyes into not just any danger, 
but the danger.26  This is no passive act.  We stand now in resolution.  For: “in the realm of 
thinking, a painstaking effort to think through still more primally what is primally thought is 
not the absurd wish to revive what is past, but rather the sober readiness to be astounded 
before the coming of the dawn.”27 
In all the history of the West, we have wandered, keeper of essences, we have come 
finally to the greatest precipice.  With our ontological eye trained on the horizon, we make a 
resolute turn towards fate as it gathers into a great destining.  Thus we are able to say that 
from this vantage point there may be no more wondrous idea in the world than that of 
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twentieth century Europe.  Home to traditions of high art and literature, philosophy and 
science, Europe struggled with the advent of the modern world to the tune of two world 
wars—crying out for some kathartic resolve.  As a long-standing emblem of culture and 
tradition tore itself asunder to the alarm of the watching world, Europe came to the abyssal 
plane of its grave historical crisis. 
By way of a study of poetry, philosophy, myth, music and language the grave 
historical crisis of twentieth century Europe—the clash of nation-state romanticism with 
modernism, industrialization and technologization—can be brought through history back to 
its origin and combatted.  
There is no question at this point in our quest that combat is what we seek.  And we 
recall now that the forlorn unclosedness of Alētheia is echoed in German as Entschlossenheit: 
resoluteness.  We have traveled on an ontological path, seeking the ontic keepers of 
essence—those who have cultivated an unveiling truth.  We have called these keepers the 
Acolytes. Truth as Alētheia is what happens in the great work of art.  At the origin of the 
great work of art is Dasein.28   
We have called Dasein the “there being,” who in his emotive comportments fears and 
cares for the Being of beings when he sees them standing in the light.  But under the reigning 
sway of sophistry and science, Dasein forgets—for Dasein is human.  In art, Dasein gazes 
out into the forgotten mystery of Being.  In the strife occurring between world and earth in 
the great work of art Da-sein ushers in the thereness of Being.  In strife, Da-sein holds open 
the open region, as the coming preserver, and the light of the Being of beings burns into 
oblivion. 
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Our tale of the Acolytes has detailed great works of art.  From tragedy to opera and 
now to poetry.  But was poetry not always at the very center of all ontological hopes?  Yes 
and no.  The art of language takes Dionysus to Apollo, and seeks to hold him therein—as the 
earth cradles the world.  In tragedy as in opera, language, which had fallen into everydayness 
and out of its original song, desperately needed a revival.  This revival was the music, the 
lifeblood of language.     
For Dionysus, as with the Christ, we know that gods die and are reborn—a renewal 
that is achieved only through the shedding of blood… 
April is the cruelest month, breeding 
Lilacs out of dead land, mixing 
Memory and desire, stirring 
Dull roots with spring rain.29   
 
Deemed the most important poem of the twentieth century, T.S. Eliot’s The Waste 
Land pairs a culturally traumatized post World War I Europe with King Arthur’s wasteland 
of a kingdom, devoid of the grail.  Tying itself mystically with a Pan-European romance, this 
poetic work of art affects a cultural gathering.  In this great work of art, the monumental 
historical task of the twentieth century is “brought to light.”  Such a “bringing to light” 
insists, as we have said, that close attention be paid not only to the cultural void of the 
twentieth century but also to the traditions of language, myth and music offered to the 
historical destiny of European society by way of our search for the historical Acolytes.  Only 
one who knows no fear can wrest love from the claws of sin, and restore the innocence of the 
gods.  
 Standing amidst the ruin of European culture, we turn to T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land 
as another work of art shining a light on our way.  It is in the accompanying endnotes to the 
difficult poem that the skeleton key to its secret is discovered in the form of a very brief and 
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controversial text, Jessie L. Weston’s From Ritual to Romance.  In his endnotes, Eliot 
himself asserts, “Indeed, so deeply am I indebted, Miss. Weston’s book will elucidate the 
difficulties of this poem much better than my notes can do; and I recommend it (apart from 
the great interest of the book itself) to any who think such elucidation of the poem worth the 
trouble.”30  
From The Waste Land’s assertion of a deep cultural crisis in twentieth century 
Europe, Eliot’s reference to Weston’s critical text roots his concerns for modern European 
society in a mythical history.  We are speaking, of course, of the “Once and Future King.”  
Named Arthur, Amfortas or the Fisher King in various legends, his lands wither and 
perish, devoid of the life force of the grail. In other words, without the mystical life force of 
the grail, which has been lost to sin, the lands become infertile, culturally void and rootless. 
In nineteenth century Germany, Völkisch Ideology grappled with a strikingly similar struggle 
in the face of modernity.  For Heidegger, inauthenticity, or forgetfulness of Being, plagues 
modern society in direct connection to the rise of technology and rationalism—these being 
defining qualities of modernity that the Volk resists.  For the Volk, the “virtue of 
ferociousness”31 begins to manifest most violently as it becomes clear that the Geist itself is 
in danger.     
 It seems that we are certainly making a blind, stupid leap of faith here at the advent of 
the twentieth century, with the destiny of Being hinging merely on the idea of some 
“mystical body” brought into the modern age from Arthurian legend by the difficult and 
stubborn particularities of a very Sonderweg style argument.  However, this is not simple the 
case.  At the end of her introductory chapter to From Ritual to Romance (the words of which, 
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we recall, T.S. Eliot asserts that The Waste Land is founded upon) Weston writes of the 
reconciliation of the Arthurian grail legends with European mythologies:  
In the process of our investigation we must retrace our steps and turn back to the early 
traditions of our Aryan forefathers, and see whether we cannot… lay our hand upon a 
clue, which, like the fabled thread of Ariadne, shall serve as a guide through the 
mazes of a varying, yet curiously persistent tradition.32 
 
From Weston’s radical assertion, it becomes quite clear that a reconciliation of mythical 
histories is called for from the depths of Eliot’s poetry.   
Such a tradition, a rooted and spiritual conception of man’s “essence” so too, his Da-
sein, as creative fertility bound to the “mystical body” is brought before the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries by Völkisch Ideology.  This peculiar development carries in its heart the 
old stories, from Arthur to Siegfried and seeks to tell them anew, not only with brave and 
fierce new qualities but, for Germany’s Siegfried and Parsifal, with music.  Seeking to match 
technologization’s augmented speed, myth too gathers, challenged forth by the great danger, 
enframed by the music—violence standing in reserve.  
 Myth and music have gathered in the twilight, towering up within the Volk.  All eyes 
are on the hero; an outmoded ideal—shattered by the shells and drowned by the gasses of the 
First World War.  As the lights go out across Europe, however, music and meter fall silent. 
 First published in the October 1922 issue of The Criterion at a massive four hundred 
and thirty-four lines long, T.S. Eliot’s most critical work, The Waste Land, has since been 
heralded by scholars as “the most important poem of the twentieth century.”  Divided into 
five section, “The Burial of the Dead,” “A Game of Chess,” “The Fire Sermon,” Death by 
Water,” and finally “What the Thunder Said,” The Waste Land presents a formidable 
intellectual task.  As we have hinted, the great poem loosely follows the legend of the grail, 
as laid out in a mythic pan-European context by Weston.   
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Combined with vignettes of the contemporary conditions in Britain only three short 
years after the end of World War One, the great poem shifts between satire and prophecy, 
defining logical definition at first glance.  Abrupt and unannounced changes in speaker, 
location, time and (importantly) meter, make the work jarring, even uncomfortable to read.   
The behemoth of a poem is indeed well known for its disjointed structure, indicative 
of literary modernism: a reflection on the fragmented, obliterated, modern metropolis.  
 Originating in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century seemingly in response to 
the crisis leading to and following the First World War, literary modernism is characterized 
by a self-conscious break with traditional verse.  Driven by an overarching consciousness, 
the modernist style was propelled by a desire to combat the horrors of the present in search of 
a renewed oneness. The jarring and ugly sounds produced by the poem signal crisis and 
despair in the face of a world whose jagged images are reflected in the poem’s meter.33  In 
much the same way, we can intimately understand that Eliot’s use of modernist style in 
crafting The Waste Land suggests that not only is Dionysus missing, but Apollo too has fled.   
 Completing the behemoth poem in 1922, The Waste Land (originally entitled “He Do 
the Police in Different Voices”—a nod to Dickens’ Our Mutual Friend), was originally 
almost twice its present length.34  Rushing straight to Paris with the manuscript, Eliot 
presented the poem to one of his closest friends and confidants, the fascist poet Ezra Pound.  
It was Pound, in fact, who first suggested to Eliot that the masterwork be called The Waste 
Land, in order to mirror Weston’s text.  Consequentially, the work is dedicated to Pound 
directly under the infamous epigraph with the added “il miglior fabbro” [the greatest 
locksmith].35   
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Deeply affected by the horrors of World War One, Ezra Pound renounced his 
American citizenship and garnered support for Mussolini and Hitler.  After the Second World 
War, he would be captured by American troops in Italy and tried for treason.  Pound, 
however, would never stand trial.  Confined to a steel cage, in the manner of a big cat, the 
poet suffered a mental collapse.  His memory inspires my own sordid image of Eliot’s 
infamous epigraph.  
Nam Sibyllam quidem Cumis ego ipse oculis meis vidi in ampulla pendere, et cum illi pueri 




With my own eyes I saw the Sibyl of Cumae hanging in a cage, and when the boys said to 
her: ‘Sibyl, what do you want?’ She replied: ‘I want to die.’36 
 
If we remember our Greek mythology, we know that “Sibyl” here is not so much a person 
but an idea of “man,” a collective, prophetic voice under the influence of the gods.  In Eliot’s 
powerful epigraph she is seen locked in a cage, wishing only for death, for she foresees 
nothing but decay.  Sibyl’s proclamation mirrors Eliot’s own pessimistic views of 
contemporary society, sitting in a “cage” built by the modern world.  For Eliot, Europe has 
lost its unifying narrative and art, mythology, ideology and religion all decay in the grip of 
modernism.37  Living in a culture that has decayed but will not die, Sibyl’s remarks recall to 
us the plight of the grail king. 
 The tone of The Waste Land is prophetic and satiric all at once, giving the poem a 
drunken, heavy, sullen sense of resignation to death on this path of decay.  An expatriate and 
arch-conservative himself, Eliot was very much concerned with protection of the guardians 
of culture and tradition, as made abundantly clear in his book Christianity and Culture: The 
	   102	  
Idea of a Christian Society and Notes Towards the Definition of Culture.  As such, his turn to 
literary modernism, then, leads us to an overwhelming question.   
Oh, do not ask, ‘What is it?’ 
Let us go and make out visit.38 
 
From Eliot’s telltale epigraph, it becomes clear that his modernist style in the poem is a grim 
reflection of some lost hope for the augury of restored oneness.  There is no katharsis to 
wring out the polis, no serif Geist to enfold the soul in its embrace. Turning to Weston, our 
skeleton key, we come to the realization that this thwarted hope seeks the grail—which is lost 
to the ages, and the Kings lands decay.  From a reflection on Eliot’s pessimistic modernist 
style what can be said for the future of this wasteland of a kingdom? 
 There is, however, a more secretive dimension to Eliot’s epigraph.  Written in a total 
of seven languages—English, French, German, Italian, Latin Greek and Sanskrit—The Waste 
Land plays a deceptive metaphysical language game with its audience.39 
 As seen in the epigraph, the narration is written in Latin while the actual dialogue is 
written in Greek.  This malicious transition, remember, signals for Heidegger the rootlessness 
of all Western thought and the original forgetfulness of Being—a message Eliot is certainly 
paralleling.  In each section of The Waste Land, and at times even within them, Eliot’s style 
shift and changes in abrupt confusion.  From classical meter to drunken song resisting any 
poetic treatment, Eliot’s style searches for a defining pattern and finds none.40   
Taken directly from the grail legends, the famous title of Eliot’s poem is a specific 
reference to the Arthurian myth of the Fisher King, sometimes known as the “Wounded 
King.”  The last keeper of the grail, the king suffers from a fatal wound as his kingdom 
perishes around him, as if its fate is tied to his mystical body.  Knights travel from faraway 
lands to bring remedies in an attempt to heal the king, but all fail.    
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Of the ontological nature of the work of art, Heidegger writes: “In the work of art 
something other is brought together with the thing that is being made.  To bring together in 
Greek is sumballein [συµβαλλειν].  The work is a symbol.”41    
 A reference to the decaying lands of the Fisher King, Eliot’s The Waste Land signals 
the degradedness of modern culture.  The first vignette to the opening section of the poem, 
“The Burial of the Dead” begins with a reference to the Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, April 
being the month when the land regenerates after the winter.  In the modern wasteland, this 
dream of regeneration is a cruel one.  The remembrance of spring only recalls the dead, and 
modern Europe prefers the numbness, the forgetfulness, of a long winter.  Memory would 
insist on a confrontation of the present with the past.42  In a city of graves, everyone has 
someone to mourn.  “With the, death itself departed from tradition and also became 
irrational…”43  
 As the totality of beings gathers round, the nothing rushes up to meet us.  The second 
vignette opens on an abyss, “a heap of broken images” constituting nothing—“I can show 
you fear in a handful of dust.”44  Reason has abandoned us and the Christ fails.  Signaling 
again the lost grail, “And the dry stone no sound of water.”45  The speaker recalls a lost love, 
the hyacinths in her wet hair, but finds the memory too painful.  “…I could not speak, and 
my eyes failed, I was neither living nor dead, and I knew nothing, looking into the heart of 
light, the silence, Oed’ und leer das Meer.”46  Filtered through imagery and quotations from 
Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde, the Liebestod connects with Arthurian tales of love and loss.  
Remembering, too, the origins of the Tristan Chord, there is no resolve, no katharsis.  The 
vibrancy of the memory of love lost leads the speaker to the brutal realization of the 
nothingness he’s confronted with. 
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 Disenchanted with the promise of rationality and science, the speaker goes for a tarot 
reading.  But even in this safe haven of mythology the deck is scattered and divided, some 
cards don’t even belong.  The speaker’s card is the drowned Phoenician Sailor—a card that 
doesn’t even exist in tarot decks.47  The most unclear section of the poem, Eliot appears to be 
merging the Christina four suite deck with the Pagan tarot deck.  The title of the poem too 
signals this merging, as Eliot uses a dialectic structure in his four-part poem and a trinity in 
his title.  The card of the drowned Phoenician Sailor signals the second the last section of the 
poem: “Death by Water,” and Madame Sosostris, the tarot reader, warns: “Fear death by 
Water.”48 
 The shortest section of the poem, “Death by Water” is also the most classical.  A 
short, ten line stanza written in rhyming couplets, the section can be seen as juxtaposing the 
way different languages express rhythm (Being).  In ancient Greek and Latin, rhythm was 
created through the alteration of long and short syllables.  The Phoenicians dead body 
floating along in the sea speaks to the outmoded morality of drowned out antiquity.  In 
English, as in German, rhythm is created through stress. 
In the fourth vignette, of the opening section “The Burial of the Dead,” Eliot 
introduces the modern wasteland—London.  This episode of the poem is quite surreal.  As 
the speaker wanders through London streets, populated only by ghosts of the dead, he 
comments “Unreal City,”49 (a reference to Baudelaire) as he moves, like a ghost himself, 
along the dead streets—a clear allusion to Dante’s hell.  The theme of death and decay 
almost consumes the entirety of the poem.  The motif of the modern wasteland returns once 
again in this third section of the poem, “The Fire Sermon,” an allusion to a sermon given by 
the Buddha, in which he encourages his followers to give up earthly pleasures in favor of 
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following the true Dharma. The scene opens on a desolate riverbank: rats and garbage 
surround the speaker who is musing over “the king my brothers wreck”50 among the filth.  A 
chorus of voices sings softly in mournful harmony, recalling and grieving the lost oneness, 
which once existed between the speakers. 
 “Sweet Thames, run softly until I end my song…”51  
It’s in the fifth and final section of the poem that Eliot refers directly to the Fisher 
King.  Portrayed as a wounded and dying god, his pitiful presence signals a nihilistic climax.  
In his final moments he recalls the perpetual rise and fall of Athens, Alexandria, Vienna and 
London, who are destroyed and rebuilt over the centuries.  Revisited most ominously near the 
end of the work, the Fisher King himself reflects on the misery and disaster of the modern 
world, and capitulates. 
As the King emotionlessly regales the spectators he foregrounds a decaying chapel, 
suggesting the grail legend once again.  Rain pours down across the chapel, across the lands, 
across the Fisher King and the desolate coast; but no rejuvenation, no katharsis will come… 
for no hero stands to claim it. The Fisher King, wounded and tired, begins to prepare his 
lands as the poem closes, indicating his coming death. 
	   In the European grail legends as described by Weston in her text, the pure fool, 
Percival, arrives just in time to save the King and heal the wasteland, though, in Eliot’s 
apocalyptic poem… the hero never comes.  In order to heal the King, Percival must only ask 
a simple question.  Though the question itself varies from version to version of the retelling 
of the tale, the fact remains:  It is the asking of the question, which brings the rain… healing 
the wasteland…  
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 “There was a time when the bringing-forth of the true into the beautiful was called 
technē.  The Poiēsis of the fine arts was also called technē.”52  As a revealing that brought 
forth and make present we are seeking too a revival.  If technē is proper to Poiēsis, in the 
most original linguistic sense, then it must be revived in the linguistic work.  Yet, as with 
modern technology, enframing has challenged forth and blocked the power of Poiēsis.  In our 
search for the Acolytes, language has lost and found its music.  Language harbors in itself the 
music.  So too “the essential unfolding of technology harbors in itself what we least expect, 
the possible rise of the saving power.”53 
Human achievement alone can never directly counter this danger.  Human 
achievement alone can never banish it.  But human reflection can ponder the fact that 
all saving power must be of a higher essence than that what is endangered, thought at 
the same time must be kindred to it.54 
 
In this most extreme danger, we begin to make out, deep in the abyss, the shinning light of 
the saving power.  We have said, “to save” means to “fetch something home into it’s 
essence.”55  At the outset of our quest we made a play to “save” the heretofore forgotten, 
deluded and misremembered definition of transcendence and defined it in consonance with 
the entire tradition of western metaphysics.  So too did we say that in the original realm of 
metaphysics as the transcendental that that moment of Being beyond beings defined 
transcendence.  Thus was the term, along with metaphysics proper, fetched back into its 
essence.  From the primaeval place we made our advance, as a hooded traveler, preserving 
Being in the allegory of art. 
 How have we made this path?  By calling into question beings as a whole?  Yes.  But 
more than this, by posing the original metaphysical inquiry, which calls into question the 
entire tradition of Western metaphysics along with the questioner himself. Da-sein is on the 
move.56 
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 At the outset of the destiny of the West this presencing of art and technology, drawing 
past each other like two comets in the course of the cosmos, illuminates the presence of the 
gods… 
Nah ist 
Und schwer zu fassen der Gott.  
Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst 





And difficult to understand is God 
Where danger is, grows 
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Götterdämmerung	  
	  
“Da-sein means: being held out into the nothing.”1 
-Martin Heidegger 
 
To this great horizon we have arrived, questioner of essences.  Having taken our origin from 
deep in the West, we posed anew the first question: “what are Beings?”2  We have said that 
this is the question that first grounds all history. 
 Yet with the traditions of sophistry and logic, and onward too to the calculable 
sciences, we have fallen into repose—and the greatest mystery has been forgotten.3  
Following the gaze of the Angelus Novus, we were able to hit upon a clue, the “so called root 
of the word.”  Thus was the goddess Alētheia restored to her rightful power, and when we 
saw her standing in the light for the first time we knew of no other idea in all the world that 
could ever have been appropriate to beauty. 
 Having pledged loyalty to the beauty of Alētheia, we have scoured the globe for her 
Acolytes.  At our own origin, which we took from Greece, but also from an even more 
primaeval place than that, we threw ourselves headlong into the open region.  Here we have 
remained, on a shadow march through the history of the West.   
When we threw ourselves out originally, we sought the salvation of three concepts: 
metaphysics, truth, and transcendence.  We have said that when posing the original 
metaphysical inquiry that the whole of metaphysics must be brought into question, at once 
with the questioner himself.  In turn, we have posed the question of transcendence in the 
same way.  At the very center of all our hopes, we have sought to “save” these terms, to 
“fetch them back into their essences.”4   
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In all the history we have amassed, we have come to know that between scientific 
thought and religious thought there is hardly any distinction: man is “held at bay” from his 
essence.  In our search for the Acolytes, subversive to persistent scientific alienation, we 
have named great works of art.  At the origin of the work of art, we know that there is a 
caring Da-sein, for whom beings hide and show themselves.  When Da-sein gazes long into 
the abyss of Being, beyond the veil of Alētheia, open as such in the original realm of 
metaphysics, he is transcending.  We have said that in this “Being beyond beings,” Da-sein 
is free.5       
But how?  To this point material truth has signified the equation of something 
intelligently in hand with its “rational” concept.6  Thus we have been laboring under the 
impression that this concept of the “truth” has nothing to do with the Being of beings—thus 
is not “transcending.”   
Yet across the world, scientific man has investigated the qualities and quantities of 
beings, has had them formed correctly into matter and stretched them to reason.  As scientific 
man leaps forward to investigate beings as a whole where he once came to nothing, he has 
now come to technology, which he believes to be properly his.  From technē proper to 
Poiēsis under the original power of Alētheia, technē once meant: “to know” as well as “to 
bring forth.”  Yet in the shadow of the forgotten mystery, technē has come to be named 
technology, which challenges.7         
Long ago, technē was also the name given to the craftsmen and handworkers of 
ancient Greece.  Art is Da-sein’s handiwork.  It is in this way that “art and technology draw 
past each other like two stars in the course of the heavens—the stellar course of the mystery 
of their essences as the unveiling, i.e., of truth.”8  Thus in the modern wasteland the mystery 
	   110	  
of these essences and their unveiling brings about the primary occurrence of truth in the 
epochal encounter between Being and beings. 
Standing now before an ontic—abyssal—plane, the world of the European wasteland 
of the twentieth century towers up in two distinct ways: as art and as technology—eternal 
opposites welded together by strife, which assert one another to their essential essences, the 
unveiling, i.e., of truth, which, only in this conflict, returns to its poetic origin.  In the open 
region of Alētheia, the realm of the veil, beings come to stand in the light of their Being.  We 
have also said:  
Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a 
whole.  This being beyond beings we call “transcendence.”  If in the ground of its 
essence Dasein were not transcending, which now means, if it were not in advance 
holding itself out into the nothing, then it could never be related to beings nor even to 
itself.9 
 
Here it is clear that Da-sein is transcending, that Da-sein is free.  It is thus that we know: 
“The essence of truth is freedom.”10  
 In the history of metaphysics we have detailed, and as such attempted to “fetch back 
into its essence” with regards to both technē and Alētheia, we have boldly asserted that 
metaphysics means transcendence and is as such the history of human freedom, in shadow 
and in doubt.  Yet, “Metaphysics regards such truth as the imperishable and the eternal, 
which can never be founded on the transitoriness and fragility that belonged to man’s 
essence… How then can the essence of truth still have its substances and grounds in human 
freedom?”11   
 Once again we think back to the history we have detailed, that of logic, religion and 
the calculable sciences, all of whose essences are housed in a “holding at bay,” which we can 
come to think of as “enframing” and “standing reserve,” now, in the age of modern 
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technology, wrought into a “challenging.”  In the Enlightenment tradition (one amongst those 
named), we have experienced first-hand that “Resistance to the proposition that the essence 
of truth is freedom is based on preconceptions, the most obstinate of which is that freedom is 
a property of man.”12 
 Here in the twentieth century, however, under the sway of the intimate opposition 
between art and technology, the unveiling of the mystery of these lost essences brings about 
the primary occurrence of truth.  The planets align, as in the myths of old, and the open 
region breaks into the unsaid.  “Ek-sistence,” when written this way, expresses “the ecstatic 
character of freedom, standing outside of itself.”13  Here, at the breaking of the world, Da-
sein gathers as the thereness of Being itself, thrown headlong into the world as a great 
destining.  Standing there, before the blinding light of the open region, ek-sistent Da-sein is 
ek-static and disclosive.14  “Ek-sistence, rooted in truth as freedom, is exposure to the 
disclosedness of beings as such.”15 
 The question we first posed, “What is ‘transcendence’” (in intimate relation to “What 
is Metaphysics?”) now marks an ek-static moment of ek-sistent Da-sein, which first founds 
all history and to which we have made a resolute return. If art and technology, drawing past 
one another in the course of the cosmos, bring about the unveiling, i.e. of truth, and we have 
said that the essence of truth is freedom, then there is one thing I insist that everyone who 
reads this essay in reflection on the greatest work of art of the twentieth century know: 
Man does not possess freedom as a property.  At best, the converse holds: freedom, 
ek-static, disclosive Da-sein, possesses man—so originally that only it secures for 
humanity that distinctive relatedness to beings as a whole…Therefore man is in the 
manner of ek-sistence.16 
 
It is here, in the wasteland, that the thinking of Being acts as the most profound 
liberation in all history, founding, once again, all history.  This liberation that renews history 
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is as such put into words and grounded so that man, as ek-sistent disclosive Da-sein, is 
moved.  “How many have ears for these words matters not.”17  Those who can hear them are 
the bearers of truth, ranging with poets and thinkers, as demi-gods.18  We have called these 
great historical men “the coming preservers.”  We have come to know them as the Acolytes 
of Being, great Da-sein, whose destiny is decreed by Being itself. 
In our search for these Acolytes we have looked to history and, by looking to history, 
we have always already been within the realm of metaphysics, as the transcendental.  We 
have said that transcendence, in contrast to its negative meanings tied to religion and science, 
means “being beyond beings.”  We have come through history to this wasteland, where 
technē has been wrought into the challenging of technology.  Now, too, a new definition of 
transcendence arises, which is bound to our own in the intimacy of strife, to take these 
essences back to their origin, and beyond.19   
In the modern age “transcendence” has become synonymous with modernity.  A 
‘Metapolitical’ force, transcendence has been broken down into two categories: practical 
transcendence, and theoretical transcendence.  We take practical transcendence to mean: that 
which, “manifests in material progress, technological change, political equality and social 
advancement.”20  On the other hand, theoretical transcendence means: “Striving to go beyond 
what exists in the world towards a new future—eliminating traditional fetters imposed on the 
human mind by poverty, ignorance and class.”21 
Split from within, these definitions of transcendence crafted for the modern age both 
stand im gegenteil to our original definition of the term: “being beyond beings.”22  These 
definitions, however, are political ones.  In all our travel to this point, we have detailed great 
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works of art.  Great works of art at the origin of which is great Da-sein, but great works of art 
for whom?  For the people, for the polis or the Volk.   
It is here that we make our great landing.  As Da-sein turns towards fate, so too does 
Da-sein gather, to face destiny in resolution—to gaze with clear eyes into the most extreme 
danger.  This danger has been called the “nothing,” which nihilates—devouring.  Yet within 
the nihilating nothing, in the original realization that there are beings and not “nothing,” Da-
sein falls through the circle, he transcends, and is free.  In all the philosophical systems we 
have detailed thus far it is Hegel’s dynamic dialectic we return to in order to ground this new 
idea we have of politics as related to these modern, technological, definitions of 
transcendence.   
In the grand process of Hegel’s dialectic, the spirit that moves world history takes its 
orient in the east and flies to Greece.  Learning antithetically through Rome, the Geist takes 
root in the land of the Germans.  Seeking a reconciliation of reason and faith, Hegel and the 
Romantic tradition (of which he is indeed and integral member) stand Zivilisation in stark 
opposition to Kultur.  Reconciling reason and faith while remaining deep within a tradition 
that pits German Kultur against (French) Zivilisation, leads to the realization of a deeply anti-
democratic predisposition rooted in the German Volk.23  For Hegel, the culmination of all 
these spiritual hopes comes to synthesis in the Prussian constitution, which opens the way to 
a gathering.  “Thus Germany comes into the ‘modern’ nation in a great lashing out against 
Napoleon and the tyranny of Western ‘Zivilisation.’”24  In the wake of 1871, the 
“Kulturreligion” of the unspoiled Volk embraced nationalism and rushed towards 
“expression” in the First World War.25  “By the end of the 1920s the Germans were 
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convinced that they were living through a profound crisis, a ‘crisis of culture,’ of ‘learning’ 
of ‘values’—or of the ‘spirit’ itself.”26 
In the context of this crisis, we find ourselves speaking of the people, and of the 
founding of a modern political state, itself, a work of art.  Chiefly understood as a resistance 
to bourgeois French culture, the term Zivilisation harks to Enlightenment humanism, the 
tenants of 1789 and Napoleons reign.  Coming to fulfillment in strife against French 
Zivilisation, German Kultur was propelled into its own essence, which manifests in many 
ways as a deeply entrenched anti-modernism.  Carrying with it a stark ‘apoliticism,’ 
Germany turn to Kultur in opposition to the French Zivilisation meant a rejection of Western 
political values wholesale.  Moreover, they were considered decidedly ‘undeutsch.’27  With 
the birth of modern nationalism largely characterizing the end of the French Revolution, 
however, there is more at play than first meets the eyes.  
In the wake of 1789, French politics marks the thesis of a new dialectic process.  
Founded in 1889, the Action Française became a Catholic, monarchist, counter-revolutionary 
political movement under the leadership of its principle ideologist, Charles Maurras.  
Founded originally to support the anti-Dreyfusard cause, the movement garnered Catholic 
support and quickly became regarded by and large as a social rampart of religion, the 
spiritual welling up from within the realm of the political.  By 1914, the Action Française 
was the most vital nationalist movement in France.28  From our standpoint, we regard them 
as the first fascists.  
For the thesis of this soon to be fascist dialectic, the blossoming of the state is akin to 
the consciousness of the human soul.  The nation brought itself into being, remembers itself 
and asserts its existence.  Yet the human soul, Da-sein, realizes himself in the first sight of 
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Being—as such we begin to make our landing.  From the fascist thesis, Maurras advances the 
“fear for what is beautiful and fear of its destruction.”29  Notions of fear, the enemy, the 
beautiful, and the “goddess” of the nation culminate in the Action Française idea of 
democracy as “anti-human,” resulting in the saying “democracy is forgetting.”30  (Around 
149).  Planning and proposing, Da-sein forgets the mystery. 
 As with all dialectic systems, the thesis, or the proposition of the idea, moves through 
an alienating antithesis before learning and synthesizing in concrete representation.  In our 
fascist dialectic, we posit Italian Fascism as this antithesis.  A seemingly strange place for El 
Duce, Italian Fascism is still, however, a vital stage in fascist learning.  (Let me pause and 
make it very clear here that this dialectic process of fascism’s development belongs to the 
Heidegger student, Ernst Nolte.  His dialectic of fascism is inspired, yet hinges on definitions 
of “transcendence” and “immanence” dependent on modernity as a driving force as opposed 
to Geist.)31 
 Where Maurras and the Action Française have a well-developed notion of the state 
(ontic knowledge and Apollonian sentiments) while a doctrine of social life is lacking, 
Mussolini and Italian Fascism foster a strong mysticism (ontological knowledge and 
Dionysian sentiments), while the “form” of the state is left in disconnect.32  As such, Italian 
Fascism can be seen as a “spiritualistic antithesis.”33  Between the thesis and the antithesis, 
we begin to see the real growth of political and social knowledge towards a synthetic, even 
aesthetic, whole.  So too is it clear that in this dialectic process the ontic and the ontological 
struggle with one another towards ultimate realization (a force critical to all dialectics—be 
they Hegelian or Marxist) in a manner calling back to our minds the thunder of the gods of 
tragedy.  
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For Mussolini, the progress and technologization of the modern age is unavoidable.  
As such, fascism has the task of sinking the essence of technology into the nation—a 
purifying process in which the nation as an artwork acts as Poiēsis, retaking technē.  
Conceived as a “will to power,” the state itself becomes a “mystical body,” in which a “life 
force” flows.34  With the nation as a living, breathing handiwork of authentic Da-sein, 
imperialistic, dynamic “growth” becomes proof of vitality, and fascism is “challenged forth” 
from the depths of myth and legend.  For Mussolini, “There is no going back.”35 
 While there is a deep need in fascist thought to reach much further back in history 
than the birth of modernity, even as far as to myth and legend, this idea of “There is no going 
back” remains starkly characteristic of fascist thought—it is a resolution to return to essential 
essences and beyond in strife.  Here in our dialectic it becomes the clearest that fascism must 
be raised to its essential essence in conflict with modernity, as art and technology draw past 
each other in the course of the cosmos.   
From the Action Française, seeking a political return to monarchic rule in concrete 
history, to Italian Fascism, seeking a spiritual return to the glory of Rome, we have found 
that a fear of democratization meets with a resolution to incorporate progress in a mythic 
vision.  As such, we have come to the contemporary (modernized) image of fascism as: 
“political opposition to Marxism, sociological opposition to bourgeois values, and 
‘Metapolitical’ resistance to transcendence.”36 
 Earlier, we introduced the idea of modern transcendence as a political one, split 
between practical transcendence and theoretical transcendence.  Now we have posited 
fascism as “resistance to transcendence” and know that from this modern political definition, 
that transcendence here means not the distance between God and man, or man and Reason, 
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but the spirit of modernity, technology, itself.  Belonging originally to technē, art and 
technology affect an opening of the open region.  Yet, where the original technē once 
“brought forth,” technology challenges and enframes, dominating the essence of the Rhine—
damming it up, so that man no longer sees into the Being of its being, its beauty—and 
through this realization he is never free.  Knowing that there is no going back, no cowering 
from the pains of progress, fascism must indeed go back further into history, to myth and 
legend, in order to assert the original definition of transcendence, and “fetch back” truth and 
freedom.  Thus: “Fascism does not face liberalism as the system of authority faces the system 
of liberty, but rather as the system of true and concrete liberty faces the system of abstract 
and false liberty.”37  Fascism is hunting for the Acolytes; it seeks to fetch them back.   
In order to think more critically about a political definition of transcendence, as well 
as the status of art in an aesthetic politics mediating modernity through the nation, we seek a 
new perspective on the foundations of the modern nation-state in Europe.  We are speaking, 
of course, of the French Revolution.   
The vast majority of scholars, of France, of political ideology or otherwise, see the 
French Revolution by and large as the birth of modern liberalism.  Putting a decisive end to 
monarchy, the estate system and privilege, the French revolution touted the famous motto: 
liberté, égalité, fraternité.  Founding democratic ideals in Europe, the tenants of 1789 held up 
the “general will” of the people, a social contract signed in blood.  Thus man “transcended” 
(in the sense of the term we have sought to overtake) into society and, as such, was free in his 
property and speech and creed and so on.  In the famous words of Rousseau’s The Social 
Contract:  
So that the social pact not be a pointless device, it tacitly includes this engagement, 
which alone can give force to all others—that whoever refuses to obey the general 
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will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body; which means nothing else than 
that he shall be forced to be free...38	  	  
 
“He shall be forced to be free.”  Such a phrase strikes the ear as paradoxical at best.  This 
freedom, the freedom we’ve spoken of as positive and negative and so on, must then be the 
freedom of the spirit of modernity—as such, a freedom that is “challenged forth.”   
 From this place then, we can begin to think of transcendence in modern, political 
terms as related to what we have heretofore called freedom.  But the tradition of liberalism 
and abstract freedom isn’t all the French Revolution discovered.  As such, these definitions 
of freedom as abstract, negative or positive are not the only definitions born from this 
beautiful conflagration—just as the left is not the only wing with a claim.    
 So too did the French Revolution cultivate a novel view of the sacred as a civic 
religion, belonging to the very essence of the nation itself.39  Filtered almost entirely through 
the eyes of the Jacobin dictatorship, the French revolution lends a powerful portion of its 
legacy not simply to totalitarianism, but to fascist ideology more specifically.  Though 
political connections between fascism and the French revolution are ultimately of little 
consequence, it is the aesthetic of politics that brings us here.40  Rites, festivals, myths, 
symbols, the use of holy places, martyrs and the “drama of politics” effected a disciplined 
mass movement of passion for the nation, which, having brought itself into the world, was 
the vehicle by which a “new man” could come forth to assert his existence.41  
 Therefore: “Nationalism, wherever it took root, had little choice but to draw, however 
indirectly, on the only serviceable past within reach: The example of the Jacobins…”42 
Suggesting an equal distribution of the Jacobin legacy to all totalitarian or nationalist 
movements, the pieces of this past within reach are indeed extra-rational ones.  For the right, 
the mystical and spiritual elements offered to the idea of the nation by the French Revolution 
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center on notions of youth, beauty, war and death, with the idea of the nation as a god, but a 
god born of itself, in need of protection.  As such, both fascists and French revolutionaries 
struggled with death, positing it instead, in the case of the French Revolution, as simply an 
“eternal sleep.”  For fascism, however, death ceased to exist altogether.  “Thus fascism sough 
to abolish death, just as it attempted to make time stand still.”43  
 Though, unlike fascism, the French Revolution did not see death as accompanied by 
any form of resurrection, no dialectical renewal.  Seeking a “new man” to take up the 
challenge of modernity, fascism’s struggle to abolish death sought to propel man beyond the 
present into an unspoiled, uncharted future, where he will once again found all history in the 
poetry of a “national awakening.” 
 But does the absurd will to abolish time not recall the absurd notion of returning to 
the Greeks?  And the equivalent desire to destroy Being itself?  As art and technology draw 
past one another, Being and time themselves are brought to their most essential essences in 
strife—as the speed of technological time begins to eclipse the light of Being.  As such, the 
essence of the greatest work of art is brought into its most essential mode here in this rare 
Dionysiac twilight.  For Heidegger, the fascist synthesis found in Nazism effects the 
gathering of Da-sein in order for the “new man” to turn towards his historical task. 
 Easily considered by some to be the greatest philosophical mind of the twentieth 
century, Heidegger’s status as a staggering intellectual separates him for many from the 
spiritual impetus of Nazism—just as Nazism’s brutish façade severs its own essence from 
great works of art.  Nazism, in fact, (as with all fascisms) was no ant-intellectual movement, 
just as it can in no way be considered anti-artistic.  Intellectuals associated with the far right 
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“regarded themselves as guardians of ultimate values in society and saw fascism as a means 
to realize these values.”44  
 For fascist intellectuals, society was near irredeemably broken after 1918 and had to 
be “transcended” socially and economically as well as spiritually.45  As such, the more 
rationally ordered modern society became, the more fascism and its intellectuals pulled back 
towards the irrational needs of man.  Once again, Dionysus and Apollo come to the fore.  In 
the arms of an ideology that promised to bring the rain across Europe, totality was 
symbolized by cultural activity, thus, “if the arts were restored, then society as a whole would 
be able to transcend the present.”46  In this distinct, rejuvenating way, art and poetry became 
vital to the fascist project in order to express the irrational needs of modern man, necessary to 
combatting “bourgeois nihilism” and Zivilisation by sinking into the inward spirituality of 
Kultur, housed in the Volk.  
 “What seemed to remain constant, at least until 1933, was a theoretical nihilism 
which denied the possibility of metaphysical truth.”47  In a similar vein to the “chaos of the 
soul” of the Expressionist movement, fascist intellectuals came to see the fascist movement 
as a collective beauty.  A weapon against the menace of modernity, the irrational artistic 
expression of man is put forward by the fascist synthesis in National Socialism.  As such, an 
aesthetic politics replaced traditional morality, in much the same way as the “virtue of 
ferociousness”48 came about within the Volk.  With this new aesthetic politics as a moral 
impetus to rejuvenate the wasteland, art could no longer be accepted in any decadent form—
as if it were too significant, too sacred, to be tampered with.   
 For fascism, the hero, this “new man” who is “challenged forth” to do battle with 
technology as the champion of technē proper to Poiēsis, would rise to resolve all conflicts 
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and return the whole to itself.  For National Socialism, Expressionism and Futurism did not 
conform with, or could not be rooted in, the tradition of the Volk.49  Characteristic of a 
general anxiousness, inwardness and ludeness, “degenerate art” was symptomatic of the 
crisis and consequently not only of little value, but inherently hazardous.  With the Germans 
believing they had reached the “ultimate state of Nietzschean thought,”50 there was a sense of 
standing before the threshold of the end times, which characterizes the crisis of twentieth 
century thought, and the crisis of metaphysics. 
 Here we come before the great confrontation, that struggle which brings each 
combatant to its essential essence and beyond it.  In Heidegger’s philosophy, the ontological 
is contained within the ontic, towering up and held therein as the earth cradles the world.  For 
Nazism, the ontological degeneration and danger of the modern age is heaped into ontic 
subject.  As such, degenerate art is put on show and destroyed—and “a pleasure in killing the 
other is a ‘will-to-power’ attempting to overcome, or face, the ‘will-to-will’ of technology.”51  
In an effective inversion of both religion and the rationality project, “God” or “Reason” is 
replaced by kampf to effect truth as unhiddenness, in accordance with nothing other than the 
immediate release into “ultimate reality.”  This “ontological violence” is accomplished by 
thinkers and statesmen, as poets in their souls.52 
For the Nazis, the “beautiful” was thought of as the eternal, the immutable, in our 
words, that open place beyond beings themselves—the place we have also called the 
oblivion.  In seeking a myth that would rejuvenate the future as well as awaken a hero who 
could rise to combat the challenging of technology, fascism made a return to the so called 
“root of the word,” the essence of Alētheia.  But, as we have already said with regard to this 
hapless holding open, “Metaphysics regards such truth as the imperishable and the eternal, 
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which can never be founded on the transitoriness and fragility that belonged to man’s 
essence… How then can the essence of truth still have its substances and grounds in human 
freedom?”53  Ignorant of time in the face of ek-static Being, Nazism reached out into the 
oblivion with hopes of becoming the god man cried out for in the horror of World War I, by 
“holding out” and bringing back a sliver of eternity.   
 Holding open the open region, we recall that when speaking of great works of art we 
named this historical group of men “the coming preservers.”  For fascism, at its zenith 
Nazism, “The rawness of the movement, its apocalyptical tone, meant at once a search for 
tradition and an obsession with the speed of time.”54  Standing boldly on the frontier of 
“technocracy” with an aim to bridge the gap between history and the future, Nazism’s “new 
man,” at once stood opposed to bourgeois values and sought to save them all at once by 
maintaining an intense control in order to lead society resolutely into a post-liberal age.55  
For Nazism, the speed of time must not merely be combatted, but dominated.56  As such, 
fascism takes up its post as a violent avant-garde. 
  As I have mentioned, industrial components of technological modernity must be 
integrated into the glory of national myth in order to be “transcended” and taken up by the 
artistic domain of the nation.57  This “transcending” of technological modernity is not simply 
a dominating, however, but a “fetching back” to the aesthetic origins of Poiēsis—of poetry.  
At the turn of the twentieth century the closest things to man were the radio, motor cars, and 
airplanes.  Here too were the final things even closer: death and judgment. 
 In his struggle, the fascist was engaged in “a constant quest for mediation between the 
speed of the airplane and a harmonious universe where past and present met.”58  For this 
“new man,” the modern instrument, when grounded in the nation—when technē was returned 
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to Poiēsis—could raise man’s soul to the speed of the sky, the expanse of the mountains and 
he could meet with eternity.  For fascism, this attempt to sink technology into the glory of the 
nation raises the nation to the challenge of modernity.    
Indeed, the famous mass flights across the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, which he 
led, were supposed to educate a fascist élite and demonstrate to the world that it had 
conquered the challenge of modernity.  But this challenge was met by integrating past 
and present, setting the act of flying and the speed of time within eternity—the blue 
skies, the mountains.59 
 
For National Socialism, however, it was not simply the airplane or the sky within which it 
flew that appropriated modernity and held the speed of time therein, but the nation itself, as a 
living, breathing creature—a god, towering up within the nation, as the spirit of an historical 
Volk.  As such, the nation reaches out to retake technē and house it once again within the 
poetic. 
 Poised to take a controlled stand in the portico of the open region, the “chaos of the 
soul” of the Expressionist and Futurist movements, however attractive to many ideologically 
committed Nazis, could not be taken on.  Unlike with the Nazis, Italian fascists found a more 
amiable simpatico with not only Futurists and Expressionists, but Syndicalists as well.  Anti-
historical in many ways, Italian fascism achieved a kind of avant-garde status that was at 
once mythical and spiritual but could also stand opposed to tradition, propelling them into the 
post-liberal age through a new, raw art.60  Signaling Italy’s place at the antithetical piece of 
our fascist dialectic model, Mussolini assets that fascism must create a “new art.”61  Such art 
departed from the art of the “folk,” the people.  In Italy, however, this kind of art had always 
been on the outside, whereas in Germany the Volk and its mythical Geist were rooted at the 
very center of all German dreams, expressions, and romances.   
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 For the fascist antithesis, Futurist and Expressionism symbolized a new, untamed art, 
violent even in its possibilities of surging forward beyond the unknown.  National Socialism, 
however, could not follow.  We return to the romantic notion of these early pilots and know 
that, for National Socialism, “The pilot appropriates a piece of the eternity, of the sky, and it 
is this appropriation of immutability that enables him to keep control.”62  Raising himself to 
nature, National Socialism “reaches out” to the nihilating nothing of eternity, where Being 
and time devour one another at the tail.  Instead of throwing himself out into the oblivion in a 
blind leap, National Socialism must remain in control, steady of hand and heart and “hold 
open” the way for Being to make its appearance ontically. 
For Mussolini, the “new man,” which all of fascism was cultivating in different doses 
of art, myth, tradition, history, control, chaos, expression and violence, would “on the one 
hand transcend space and time,”63 while on the other remain restrained by tradition.  For the 
Nazis, however, this restraint by tradition not only created a “new man,” a hero to stand 
forward and challenge Fafnir, but opened the way for Being to arise from out of its history.  
Standing there, the Nazism roots in the rocky ground.  This rooting of their great work draws 
up out of the nation the obscurity of the spirits spontaneous support.  Standing there, it holds 
its ground “against the storm that rages above it and so first makes the storm itself manifest 
in its violence.”64  As the world towers up within the earth, first does the light of day begin to 
shine the clearer, flush against the darkness of the wasteland.  Here, standing at the edge of 
things, National Socialism struggles under the weight of Atlas’s burden.  Holding up the 
world from out of the earth, the open region is open, and National Socialism gazes long into 
the abyss.  “The steadfastness of the work contrasts with the surge of surf, and its own repose 
brings out the raging of the sea.”65 
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In this time of renewed crisis, the apparatus of modern technology will be raised to its 
essential essence when challenged anew by a reawakening of Poiēsis, who makes a resolute 
return within the power of Being itself.  A “chaos of the soul,” torn asunder in the cosmic 
strife of Titians released from Zeus’s bonds, the struggle to “hold open” commands courage 
as grace under pressure, as technē proper to Poiēsis.  No longer can the modern state wither 
in the wasteland, devoid of the grail, the question, the rain.  Here too do the gods walk among 
men.  We stand now before the breaking open of the earth, and can call National Socialism, 
truly, a katharsis unbound—eine Frühling ohne Ende…66 
 “All historical probing must ultimately encounter something elemental and 
primordial; sometimes this is called ‘man,’ sometimes ‘history,’ occasionally ‘God.’”67  To 
this end we have come.  But more truthfully, to an essential self-assertion, of a primordial 
place in the arms of history, moved by beauty—moved by the hand of God.  We began this 
journey by gathering around us the whole of metaphysics, and being thrown out into it, as the 
transcendental.  In the course of this chapter, I insisted that one truth be held the most dear: 
“Man does not possess freedom as a property.  At best, the converse holds: freedom, ek-
static, disclosive Da-sein, possesses man—so originally that only it secures for humanity that 
distinctive relatedness to beings as a whole…”68 This “being beyond beings” we have called, 
transcendence.  We have found it beautiful.  At the sight of beauty we have been set free.  
 In the modern age, we find that the opposite of transcendence in immanence—the 
“within worldly and the non-divine.”69  Still, however, there is no philosophical agreement 
that endures as to the interpretation of the term “transcendence.”70  In our own definition of 
transcendence, man made his assent in one of two distinct ways—to God, or to Reason.  Now 
we also have two new definitions of transcendence, split in an alienating dualism: the idea of 
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practical transcendence, and the idea of theoretical transcendence.  This is yet another 
“holding at bay,” of the finite and the eternal. 
 Transcendence, as with metaphysics, must rejoin history.  History, as such, must be 
founded anew.  For National Socialism, which has been labeled as resistance to practical 
transcendence and struggle with theoretical transcendence (at best), the first definition 
already contains within it the second, and the second definition is then always already 
propelled to a third—contained within it the splitting of the first two.  This is the moment 
where we know that by metaphysics, we means transcendence, and that when decreed by 
Being itself, man’s transcendence must turn towards the Metapolitical.   
For Heidegger: Another way in which truth occurs is in the act of founding a political 
state…in which truth comes to shine forth is the nearness of that which is not simply 
a being, but a being that is most in being….in which truth grounds itself is essential 
sacrifice.71 
 
 In the history of the West as the history of metaphysics, of metaphysics itself as a lost 
definition of transcendence (as we have defined it), man raises to “transcendence” through 
the powers of thought or prayer.  With fascism, and most potently thought its National 
Socialism, man does this as well, but not to God or to Reason but to the Volk.  Here, the ontic 
is contained within the ontological.  Within all the tradition of all the argumentation aimed at 
coming to some agreement about transcendence, three elements remain standing: time, place 
and “the One.”72  Be this “One” nature or God, it is not any finite creature; therefore, this 
idea alone fulfills the absolute meaning of pure existence as such, and the distinction that has 
grown up between the finite and the eternal breaks open for all to see.  In this breaking open 
of the ontological distinction, man reaches out with his thought, with his action, and, 
although he is a being among beings, the shackles of his finitude shatter, and he is free. 
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 Thus have we defined transcendence, as metaphysics, as the shadow history of the 
West.  Coming to presence over time, we know too that Being has a history 
[Seinsgeschichte]73 and that this history is wedded to transcendence, illusively in the same 
shadow.  And so we have named the Acolytes, as those at the origin of the great work of art, 
which holds opens the earth and wills the world to rush up to meet us.  The history and 
“becoming of Being” has, as we have said, been the handiwork of Da-sein, at the origin of 
the great work of art.  Yet, as art and technology draw past one another and come to their 
essential essence in strife, this individual impetus of Dasein is eclipsed as strife throws man 
beyond himself.74  All the more does the “fate” of Dasein begin to gather and turn towards 
some mysterious destiny—as decreed by Being itself.75  We stand now in the place we have 
sought, the place where the gods once more walk among men and thunder their will through 
the course of the highest heavens and the deepest seas.  We have come now before the 
Götterdämmerung—the twilight of the gods, who themselves must gaze with clear eyes into 
death.      
  As such, we ask: “if Being has a history, might it not too have a politics?”76  In our 
talk of transcendence, which, just previously, led us to the Metapolitical, we can truly begin 
to wonder what sort of politics acts as Acolyte of Being—holds out, and holds open.   
 For Heidegger, “‘Forsakenness’ has become the distinguishing feature of the modern 
age: an age that is irredeemably suspended in the no man’s land between ‘the no longer of 
the gods that have fled and the not yet of the god to come.’”77  Thus, Heidegger himself 
remarks, “The only possibility available to us is that by thinking and poeticizing we prepare a 
readiness for the appearance of a god.”78  Here we can see that, as suggested in Heidegger’s 
later work, the Seinsverlassenheit simultaneously signals the Götterverlassenheit.79  
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Therefore, politics as a puzzle of liberté, égalité, fraternité can no longer face the gravity of 
the Götterverlassenheit.  Thus the questions of standards, rights, polity and practice must all 
be aimed towards the frantic retrieval of the Seinsfrage itself.  For National Socialism, which 
refused to part with tradition and history, this retrieval is best understood in a circular 
motion.  “Heidegger described the ecstatic temporality structure of Dasein as the circular 
movement which goes from future…back to past.”80  
 At the outset of the twentieth century, Da-sein is no longer individual or self-
contained, but begins to gather, “challenged forth” by the augmented speed of time as 
effected by industrialization.  Even Heidegger himself begins to speak of our “Western-
Germanic historical Da-sein.”81  Here we know that Being has a history and a politics, but we 
also know even more immediately what we have been working to draw forth the whole 
time—that Being itself is historical.82 
 When speaking of history, of German history, and now of this history as the history 
of European-Germanic historical Da-sein, we know that Germany’s unique path—be it 
political, geographic or artistic—came to a profound crisis of culture, of values and of the 
spirit [Der Geist] itself.  In these regards, Heidegger can certainly be positioned in relation to 
German conservative revolutionaries who, by and large, take up the tradition of post-
Enlightenment Romanticism, and stood in active opposition to the bourgeois values of 
commerce, materialism, and democracy in order to reassert a new set of historic, heroic, life 
affirming values.  These values, dependent not only on history, must “break through” into a 
kind of Seinskönnen (future-oriented-potentiality-for-Being).83  For these conservative 
intellectual revolutionaries (Spengler, Schmitt and Jünger among them), Europe was paling 
before the horror of a Nietzschean prophecy fulfilled.  As such, these values associated with 
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“bourgeois nihilism” must needs be eradicated by the assertion of an active nihilism—will, 
power, and destiny on the move.84 
 These heroic values of the “new man” culminated in nothing less than that original 
strife of opposites bound together in intimacy, which raise opponents to their essential 
essence and beyond.  From the Romantics, both Heidegger and the conservative 
revolutionaries cared for an “aesthetic sensibility.”85  Such strife was only accessible through 
the violence and authenticity of war, as art an artistic, even existential, movement. Thus 
Kampf was all that remained.  The Nazis called this movement “Bewegungskrieg.” 
  Abstract modernity had tampered with the speed of time, and, stretching its hand 
across the world, so too disrupting the mystery of Being.  It is difficult to think of this 
disruption as something not perfectly analogous to the “virtue of ferociousness,” which had 
developed in Völkisch thought at the end of the nineteenth century.  For the conservative 
revolutionaries, the “flowers of evil” contained a deadly poison, the only antidote to which 
was poison again.  “Thus, the aesthetic influences of the artistic avant-garde—Baudelaire, 
futurism, expressionism—proved far reaching…”86 In this way, and only this way, art 
becomes the weapon, the only power potent enough to rise to challenge technocracy—but not 
only this—to overcome it—to fetch it back into its essence, as technē proper to Poiēsis.  The 
jaws of the earth unhinge, to devour the world and hold it once again therein, to preserve the 
mystery, that pre-essential essence.  
 We are reminded now of the famous words of Friedrich Nietzsche, “the world as a 
work of art giving birth to itself.”87  In Nietzsche’s aesthetic justification of the existential, 
long standing boundaries are defaced and the “holding at bay” that long placed itself between 
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fact and truth, between Being and beings, falls into itself in the manner of a dying star, a 
return to The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music. 
 In his Kehr of, broadly, the late 1920s and early 1930s, we have said that Heidegger’s 
most central concept—that of “Dasein”—undergoes a remarkable transformation to “Da-
sein.”  Written as Da-sein, this term for man, for existence, for “being in the world” now 
moreover means the thereness of Being itself.  In the thereness of Being itself, Da-sein 
gathers, bound together by a mysterious fate.  For individual Dasein, the decision to turn 
towards fate happens in the realization of beings, as beings, and not nothing.  When Da-sein 
gathers, however, this already essential vision of fate gathers too—and becomes a great 
destining.88  For authentic Da-sein, turning towards destiny means nothing less than to obey 
the power of Being itself, which is making its resolute return.   
 This idea of a “great destiny” in Heidegger’s thought, which also gathers, is closely 
linked with his idea of time (which almost entirely disappears in the Kehr).  As we know, 
Being and time define one another reciprocally—Being itself has a history, and comes to 
presence over time.  For Da-sein, the most beloved beast of Being, authenticity is most 
potently expressed by recognition of death, as seen with sober eyes.  Beyond death is the 
oblivion of Being and time, one eternally devouring the other at the tail.  Authentic Da-sein 
nihilates in an ek-static Vorlaufen-zum-Tod [anticipation towards death].89   
Pitted against the racing speed of modernity as the technocracy, we can easily 
understand that the temporality characteristic of bourgeois nihilism (a passive nihilism) is 
characterized by their attempt to detach themselves from that “profound anxiety,” of 
Vorlaufen-zum-Tod, “thereby essentially closing off the future,” rejecting any possibility of a 
Seinskönnen.90   
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It is precisely such ‘un-ecstatic’ immersion in the ‘present’ that characterizes the 
Being of non-humans.  Therefore, the Being of inauthentic Da-sein, in its 
renunciation of authentic temporality, comes to resemble the inert Being of things—it 
succumbs to the static allure of a timeless, undynamic present and gradually sinks 
into lifelessness.91 
 
In the years immediately following the publication of Being and Time (1927), Heidegger’s 
Kehr is characterized, im großen und ganzen, by this turn towards destiny, as decreed by 
Being itself.  Here, as with intellectual revolutionaries from Schmitt to Jünger, a nihilistic 
Nietzschean prophecy seemed to fulfill itself—“the decline of the West.”92  Thus it was with 
National Socialism that: the iron will of the Overman would kneel before the blinding light 
of Da-sein’s great destiny. 
 Standing there, in the open portico of Alētheia, European-Germanic historical Da-sein 
has gathered and surmounted individual fates to turn towards a collective, historical, destiny 
in authentic mitsein.93  Yet, contingent on time—ripped helplessly out of balance with the 
power of Being—the gathering of “fate” towards destiny accelerates ek-static Da-sein’s 
Vorlaufen-zum-Tod.  As such, “Being and Time simultaneously contains certain fatalistic 
tendencies.”94  Never reconciled in Being and Time, the ideas of “will” and “fate” remain 
locked in strife.95  And yet, “willing,” for Heidegger, must become a “knowing,” a gazing 
with clear eyes into the most extreme danger.  The acceptance of the path of destiny, 
authentic Da-sein heeding the call of Being, resolutely takes hold of the appointed task of the 
age.  We are beyond any wish to “reconcile,” only to become.  Recall that in Greek Alētheia 
means: unhiddenness, and that in German, unhiddenness or unclosedness is Entschlossenheit: 
resoluteness.  Resolutely, Da-sein races towards destiny.  For it is not in the will to justice or 
the will to freedom of slaves that the most courageous man finds true power—but in the will 
to self sacrificial love—of the people, of the truth and of God.96 
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 In turning resolutely to run head long into great destiny, the most extreme danger, 
Da-sein is affecting the thunder of struggle, under whose skies history rolls over and over 
again in the foam on seaward waves.  In this circular movement, which turns over from 
future back to past, we know that “To repeat an authentic possibility derived from the past 
means that ‘Dasein may choose its hero.’”97  These new heroes are quintessentially anti-
bourgeois and bring about a paroxysmal renewal of life-affirming, existential values on 
which to build a “new man” who alone can take up the challenge of the future and bring it 
under the sway of truth.  
 It was only after the publication of Heidegger’s masterwork Being and Time in 1927, 
that the gathering of authentic historical Da-sein began to move his new work in the Kehr.  
This character of movement was, for Heidegger, taken up by the guardian spirit of the 
German “National Awakening” affected by history, decreed by Being itself.98  With Being’s 
historicity in this landing, which assumes an ontic, ek-static form, we know too that Being 
has a politics.  In many ways it is completely understandable that Being and Time is a 
Völkisch work.  Towering up within itself, the Volk violently resists modernity and the fatal 
threat it presents to the Geist, an expression of Being in many ways.  “Idealized and 
transcendent, the Volk symbolized a desired unity beyond contemporary reality.”99  As Being 
gathered, that is, took the shape of its history, the resolute turn to a movement of ek-static, 
disclosive Da-sein arrived at the decision to choose its hero—this hero, would be National 
Socialism—the final Acolyte of Being—eine Frühling ohne ende…100  
 In the face of the contemporary historical crisis, the clash of art and technology, 
Poiēsis seeking to swallow technē once more and preserve the pre-essential mystery of 
Being, “inauthenticity incarnate” described the character of modern Europe—truly a 
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wasteland.101  Shock, disturbance, catastrophe, decay and confusion became the order of the 
day, only achieving in asserting the “impotence of science,” the “baselessness of 
philosophy,” and the “powerlessness of religion.”102   
 Death is the only certainty, and fear drains Da-sein as he slumps in a lifeless stupor.  
At this point it is clear that no one alone can escape from Moloch, and “autonomous-
individual Da-sein will fall short of existential fulfillment—will fall short of authenticity.”103  
Alone, Dasein will perish, in an empty repose.  His history has betrayed him and his science 
has dominated him.  Thus, “The politics solution, if one is to be found, must itself be of an 
eminently metaphysical character: it must establish an entirely new relationship between man 
and Being.”104 
For Heidegger and the conservative revolutionaries, the idea of the “extreme 
situation” simultaneously stood for “Active Nihilism: (represents the insights of superior 
characters who realize that ‘if something is falling, one should give it a shove)” as starkly 
opposed to the “Passive Nihilism: (Characterizes all those who cling futilely to the traditional 
Western values, already in an advanced stage of decomposition [Western humanism in 
general]),” which must be overcome.105  “Active Nihilism,” the “extreme situation” and 
Heidegger’s idea of the “most extreme danger” all insist that “…the essential will 
‘Wesenswille’ to knowledge requires that the Volk be subjected to ‘the greatest inner and 
outer danger.’”106  In this “greatest shattering of Da-sein” the Volk itself is “thrown” towards 
destiny, towards an authentic and resolute confrontation of the ontological difference and 
towards the “coming preservers” themselves—a great work of art. 
The “new man,” who will lead humanity into a post-nihilistic age, must not only 
assert new values of the future, but “fetch them back into their essences” from the depths of 
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legend, language and history.  This “new man” may in some artistic renditions, recall to the 
mind of some the figure of Volker from Das Nibelungenlied—slaying with the bow of his 
violin, the poet warrior.  Daring, cruelty and instinct as opposed to humility, mercy and 
reason must now be taken up by the new man as life affirming values.107   
Recalling, again, the “virtue of ferociousness” in the German Volk of the late 
nineteenth century, it is the German conservative revolutionaries (Jünger and Spengler, 
standing on the edge of Nietzsche’s understanding of metaphysics) who came to the 
conclusion that the only way for Germany to save himself was if he could rise to the 
challenge of modernity by cultivating a new “modern community.”108  Only in this way 
could the crisis be met head on.  Such a community would remain grounded in the Volk, in 
the nation, and through this relationship would be forged a “utilization of the most advanced 
technological means in all spheres of life.”109  To this point we have traveled, to stand now 
before the great doom of our time.  National Socialism has been given the task of taking up 
arms against a rising darkness, which threatens to sweep man away into planning and 
ordering, slavery and enfeeblement.  Here, beauty will suffocate and die, a wild rose rotting 
in an iron cage.   
This is their great historical task, but can these “coming preservers” “hold out” long 
enough?  At what point does the oblivion tear our souls apart?  “But what if there is a 
fundamental discord between the ontological and the ontic, so that, as Heidegger put it, those 
who reach ontological truth have to err in the ontic?  What if, if we are to see with the 
ontological eye, our ontic eye has to be blinded?”110  We are reminded of the leader of the 
gods, Wotan, who gave his own eye for the gift of total wisdom.  
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It has never been more clear that the nothing nihilates.  Therefore, the political 
solution, if politics can even remember the dream of rising to meet this epochal stand, must 
needs be not only a metaphysical one—but an aesthetic one, a beautiful one: “…thus all is 
not lost as long as Germany can reestablish its authentic, epochal-historical relation to the 
primordial powers of Being.”111  Here it is clear that:  
…though one does not discuss the ‘Really-Existing National Socialism’… Heidegger 
is nonetheless a philosopher who did engage in a kind of critique of ‘Really-Existing 
Nazism’ on behalf of its true potentials…betrayed by its racist-technological nihilistic 
reality.112   
 
In this way, the crisis of metaphysics itself, stretched from its origins for 2,500 years, 
holds in its sway the final catastrophe.  Here, we know that Heidegger sees a reenactment of 
the Greek beginning as no simple revival, but an “authentic repetition.”113  Thus the German 
Volk must turn towards an historical destiny, to reimagine the acropolis, the theater, the polis.  
Yet this is only possible if National Socialism can keep the control necessary to make this 
“founding leap” [Ursprung].114   
What is of paramount importance, the “really existing” of National Socialism is the 
relationship between the Volk and philosophy as it is properly established.  That is, 
the Volk itself must be led by a higher, ontological self-understanding—by a 
Seinsgeschichlichen Auftrag—which Heidegger identifies as “the guardianship of the 
truth of Being.”115  
 
“The guardianship of the truth of Being.”  Out of shadow and doubt, we now come to know 
the true face of the Acolytes of Being.  In all our searching to this point we have named a 
series of great works of art, at their origin great Dasein, who have opened Alētheia’s portico 
for a moment to glimpse her forgotten beauty.  For National Socialism, the guardians of the 
truth of Being, our final Acolyte, the great work of art gathers in European-Germanic 
historical Da-sein itself.  With National Socialism, Da-sein trembles with a great fear for the 
loss of what is beautiful, what is true.  In the astounding pressure of the gathering whole, 
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National Socialism lands on the ontic surface with ontological eye.  As such, this aesthetic 
politics places itself between man and the oblivion. 
In the aesthetic politics of the katharsis unbound, “Authentic Dasein leading towards 
destiny assumes a character of movement.”116  The land in the middle, a nation that has 
always undiluted through space and time, breathing in and out as it expands and contracts, 
throws existence furiously into the world—a life affirming relatedness to the Being of beings 
that rushes into the abyss.  As such, “Total mobilization is an exercise in active nihilism.”117  
With National Socialism, our “coming preservers,” “Dasein is ‘on the move.’”118 
 Most evident in Heidegger’s Rectoral Address of 1934, we recall the gathering of the 
“saving power” spoken of by the poet Hölderlin, which Heidegger sees reflected Nazism’s 
ek-static thrownness into the world.  Staadtswek, Denkwerk und Kunstwerk all dance to the 
beat of a total mobilization, which “with increasing autonomy” crescendos—a symphony 
conducted by Being itself.   
The openness of the world established by the work seems always under threat of 
slipping back into the unnamable, concealing embrace of the earth.  However, this 
manner of describing the polemos between world and earth is not intended to 
prejudice either term.  For the ontological structure of these two forces 
unquestionably issues forth in a fruitful tension.  In truth, the most fruitful tension.  
For it is by virtue of this conflict alone that the epochal encounter between Being and 
beings occurs.119 
 
This is the great destiny of the German Volk—whether it wants this destiny or not.  After 
having destroyed the bonds of Plato’s banishment to the realm of ideas, the abstract, the 
distant, Being returns to the dwelling of man.  “Poetically, man dwells on this earth.”120  
Here, in the open portico of Alētheia, Da-sein is transcending, Da-sein is free—and, rushing 
towards death, Germany lives. 
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 Holding open the open region, National Socialism struggled in ridged control and 
perilous danger—collapsing into the oblivion of Being.  And yet, for a fleeting moment, 
humanity gazed out into the Being of beings, and, glimpsing the twilight of the gods, 
returned with a sliver of eternity.   
Schwer Verlässt 




That which dwells near its origin departs 
 
-Friedrich Hölderlin, Die Wanderung121 
 
For Heidegger, National Socialism’s “inner truth and greatness” refers to what he calls the 
“encounter between planetary technology and modern man.”122  When this notion of “inner 
truth and greatness” is really investigated, we find that while Da-sein stands at the origin of 
the work of art, Being stands at the origin of Da-sein.  It was with this origin, when Being 
stands as the essence of Da-sein, that National Socialism as ein Gesamtkunstwerk, held the 
key to “metaphysical-historical transcendence.”123  Thus, when we know that Being stands at 
the origin of Da-sein, and Da-sein at the origin of the work of art, we know too that: “Art 
then is a becoming and happening of truth.”124 
We come, once again, to yet another iteration of our founding question.  Where does 
art stand when Being is rightfully at the origin of Da-sein?  We mean here that art is then a 
pre-essential origin itself.  What do we now mean by “Origin?”  All art is, in the broadest 
sense, poetry; poetry of all kinds is the art of language—housing Being.  In the naming of 
things, truly, in poetry, Da-sein thinks Being and in so doing, he houses the ontological 
within the ontic.  In the case of art as an origin, we can say this:  
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Art lets truth originate.  Art, founding preserving, is the spring that leaps to the truth 
of beings in a work.  To originate something by a leap, [Geworfenheit: thrownness], 
to bring something into being from out of its essential source in a founding leap—this 
is what the word “origin” [Ursprung, literally primal leap] means. 
The origin of the work of art—that is, the origin of both the creators and the 
preservers, which is to say of a people’s historical existence—is art.  This is so 
because art is in its essence an origin: a distinctive way in which truth comes into 
being, that is, becomes historical.125 
 
And so we have named the Acolytes of Being, as great works of art, with Da-sein at their 
origin.  In the twentieth century, Being itself makes a resolute return to the dwelling of 
man—as something poetic.  Hence, with National Socialism, art stands at the origin of Da-
sein, thinking the Being of beings.  And yet, as always, we turn to the poet to remember that 
as soon as we enfold the question in our hand it has always already slipped through our 
fingers.  Holding out and holding open, National Socialism was able to brush its fingers over 
the ephemeral, grasping the fabricated texture and weight of the intangible. 
 Thrown into the modern world, Poiēsis rose to the most essential strife in an attempt 
the overcome technology, and “fetch back” technē.  “Betrayed by its racist-technological 
nihilistic reality” the violence done did not go far enough.  In the words of Hannah Arendt, 
“The true problem of Nazism is not that it went ‘too far’ in its subjectivist-nihilistic hubris of 
exerting total power, but that it did not go far enough.”126  In essence, ontic violence must 
connect with ontological violence, making the effort to usher in a new mode of existence.  In 
endeavoring to think with Heidegger, and in so doing to made the effort to “think with” 
National Socialism we find the troubling answer to our original question:  “…Heidegger—in 
his Nazi engagement, was not ‘totally wrong’—the tragedy is that he was almost right.127”  
After the fall of National Socialism, Heidegger was never again political.  Under the leveling 
gaze of the great philosopher of Being: “Only a God can save us now.”128 
*** 
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Out of a primaeval place, man wrought from the beauty of technē technology, a Ring of 
power, wielded only by those who foreswear all love.  The essential message of Wagner’s 
Götterdämmerung is not so much one simply of the death of the gods, but of a restoration of 
their original innocence through the founding, preserving power of love—which “holds out” 
through the darkness of all storms.  As such, National Socialism stood resolutely in the open 
region, assuming a character of artistic movement, which set Da-sein forth into a world, at 
his origin, ein Gesamtkunstwerk, which only had to “hold out” long enough.   
	  
	  




“Du siehst, mein Sohn, zum Raum wird hier die Zeit.”1 
Gurnemanz, Parsifal von Richard Wagner 
 
 
Where are we now?  After the death of the gods?  At the origin of the great work of art we 
have great Da-sein, and the blinding light of his historical destiny.  At the origin of great Da-
sein, we know that we have Being, who comes to presence over time, who hides and shows 
itself in the great work of art, when Da-sein, as the keeper of the great mystery holds open 
the open region for all to see.  In thinking as poeticizing: we endeavored to take a founding 
leap [Ursprung]. 
 At the origin of each of our Acolytes, National Socialism most auspiciously, we know 
that we have Being.  This revelation, when we first sought the Acolytes, was always already 
with us—and yet always already an ephemeral glimpse.  In art, as its own origin, we are 
thrown towards destiny; we are thrown at the feet of Being and, as both creators and 
preservers, become historical.  With a primal leap, which lets truth originate as a founding as 
well as a preserving, we have made a return to the question, which first founds all history, 
once again.   
 Art is the becoming and happening of truth in history.  As such, those we have named 
the Acolytes of Being, who shine a light out of history.  This light is destiny.   
In our telling of Being’s journey from out of the depths of the West, we named four 
Acolytes, their art and their Da-sein: Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy out of the 
Spirit of Music, Richard Wagner and his Gesamtkunstwerk, T.S. Eliot and The Waste Land, 
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and, finally, Nazism, which stood within the portico of the open region as an aesthetic 
politics through which, Da-sein was “on the move.”  Each of our Acolytes moves history.  
The posing of the question moves history, and is itself an historical work of art. 
 With these Acolytes as our tutors, we have studied language, myth, legend, music and 
poetry.  In each of our Acolytes, we have observed different doses of each treatment.  
Making a case for the historicity of Being, we have observed a landing of Being within 
beings—a return of the ontological to the ontic—which was, for so long, “held at bay.”  In 
breaking this ontological difference and releasing the oblivion of Being into the world of 
man, we know now that we were transcending, and we know that Da-sein was free unto the 
oblivion. 
 In coming to know these Acolytes as they gather at the breaking and bracing of 
metaphysics in the twentieth century, our story was told as a legendary history.  Taking its 
orient in Greece and moving antithetically through Rome, the spirit that moves world history 
made its home in the founding of modern Germany.  Following this trail, with the Angelus 
Novus as a guide, we have told this story as the story of Der Ring des Nibelungens.  Out of 
the depths of the river Rhine was wrought from a magical treasure the Ring of the 
Nibelungs—thus was technē first stolen from Poiēsis.     
In the end, at the great precipice of the Götterdämmerung, we remember from 
Wagner’s telling of the legend, in a romantic key, that this fall of the gods is no death; rather, 
it is a restoration of original innocence.  We remember too that a chief comportment of Da-
sein is found in his care, that is, in his compassion.  At the end of Wagner’s Ring cycle, 
though she was betrayed by the power of the Ring, Brünnhilde’s love for Siegfried returns 
the talisman to the Rhine Maidens.  Reaching up from the depths, as Siegfried and 
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Brünnhilde die together, they retrieve the Ring from Siegfried’s lifeless hand.2  This retrieval 
is one that restarts the wheel of history, one that returns evil to the depths.   
         As such, we find ourselves standing out on the bloodstained moors of the wasteland, 
waiting, once again, for the appearance of a god.  In the writing of The Waste Land, T.S. 
Eliot drew together the harmonious legends of European history.  At the end of the poem, the 
fisher King—an expression of both Arthur and his metaphysical foil Amfortas—capitulates 
and dies, with no rain to heal his kingdom, no katharsis to wring out the polis.  Only 
together, as irrationality put to form, can Dionysus and Apollo propel the audience to the 
height of their suffering, and in so doing, purify them.  We remember Dionysus too as the 
only god to die and be reborn. 
 I want to say that as this history of Being has revealed itself as an artistic history of 
Da-sein’s thownness towards a great destiny, we are making history itself artistic.  In the 
breaking of the ontological difference in the twentieth century, legend too makes a landing.  
As such, we have told the story of Der Ring des Nibelungens.  Here, in the wasteland, in the 
twilight of the gods, we find ourselves waiting for a new “great work of art” to once again 
lead the way, by posing the question anew.  We are waiting for Parsifal—the pure fool, 
enlightened by compassion. 
 Written first as part of the Arthurian romances as Perceval by Chrétien de Troyes, 
then as Parzival by Wolfram von Eschenbach, the story of the grail knight acts as a critical 
thread, weaving European legend into history.  In a similar vein to Faust, Parsifal’s rewriting 
in each appointed age shines a light out of history in an acetylic way.  Upon its arrival to 
Germany with the author Wolfram von Eschenbach, the knight Parzival travels through space 
and time between the court of Arthur and the dwelling of the fisher king, Anfortas, in the 
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castle of Monsalvat.  In so doing, Parzival makes the journey between the grail castle and the 
kingdom of men—the great distance between Being and beings.   
First conceiving of his opera Parsifal in 1845, while taking the waters at Marienbad, 
it wouldn’t be until 1882 that the public would see Wagner’s “journey of the soul” achieved 
on stage.  With Der Ring des Nibelungens first performed in the 1870’s, we can very well 
assume that Wagner had Parsifal in mind during his writing of the Ring Cycle, which we 
have used thus far to detail European-Germanic historical Da-sein.  With Eliot making nods 
to Parzival in his The Waste Land, we remember that no hero comes to presence, and the last 
king of the grail prepares his lands for death. 
A Bühnenweifestspeil [“A Festival Play for the Consecration of the Stage”], Wagner’s 
opera Parsifal tells the story of the legendary knight Parsifal on his quest for the grail castle, 
Monsalvat.  Traveling outside of space and time, it is Parsifal’s destiny to fulfill the prophecy 
of the grail: to heal the wounded King, Amfortas, and himself becomes king of the grail.  
With Amfortas wounded by the holy spear, the castle and the knights of the grail diminish, 
for in his pain the king is not able to stand before the relic.  For the young Parsifal, he must 
only ask the wounded King a simple question to absolve him of his agony and reveal the 
grail once more.  In each retelling of the story, this question varies in its iterations, yet what 
remains is that asking of the question itself heals the wasteland and replenishes the life force 
of the grail—bringing the rain.   
In Wagner’s unique concept of the Gesamtkunstwerk, the German language was 
rejuvenated through the beauty of the spirit of music, to forge anew these founding 
European-Germanic myths.  We can understand that in T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land, the 
music is lost—as with the Tragedies of Euripides, writing after Aeschylus.  In intimate 
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connection to Germany’s Romantic period, Parsifal itself enjoyed a mystical connection to 
“place,” and the theater at Bayreuth acted as a sight of holy pilgrimage.  Recalling to mind 
the mystical relationship of the Volk and the Geist, we can easily comprehend the 
significance of Parsifal’s “rooting” in the soil of Bayreuth.   
“Never!” Wagner had announced to King Ludwig II in 1880, “…Should Parsifal ever 
be presented for the public’s amusement on another stage.”3  At the turn of the century, 
however, the Wagner families claim on the production rights to the Bühnenweifestspeil, 
Parsifal were democratized, and the sacred opera was released to theaters across the world.  
Contrary to Wagner’s wishes (for he had no written will), Parsifal was “uprooted” from the 
theater at Bayreuth by the Reichstag, hauntingly, in the year 1914. 
The release of Parsifal from Bayreuth results in accusation of “nothing less than Grail 
robbery” from those Germans who affiliated with the “Protect Parsifal” camp and fought the 
passing of the legislation.4  It was on 2 May 1901 that Cosima Wagner endeavored to speak 
out, imploring the Reichstag to act in favor of her husband’s dying wish.  Naming Parsifal as 
Wagner’s “bequest to the German nation”—even more so than Der Ring des Nibelungens—
she asked that his memory be honored by carrying out his will with respect to the protection 
of Parsifal.5  The Bayreuth Circle, those in favor of “Parsifal Protection,” and the Wagner 
family themselves insisted: “Protect Parsifal, protect Germany.”6 
As such, “Parsifal was more than just a Wagnerian ritual practice.  It also served as a 
Wagnerian gospel that cloaked notions of German ideology and cultural regeneration in a 
mystical religiosity.”7  As modernity converged on the still young Germany nation, Parsifal 
was released, torn away—and the grail was once again shrouded in the castle of Monsalvat.  
When Parsifal was uprooted from his landscape, from Bayreuth, he lost his connection to the 
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Geist—to the Volk.  His grail is shrouded, meaning, from the legend, that the question has yet 
to be asked.  As World War I begins to stir in European soil Parsifal too becomes 
modernized, industrialized, globalized… and he, and his beloved Volk, are in grave danger of 
losing their human souls.   
Proponents of the ‘protect Parsifal’ camp argued that in an increasingly materialistic 
age, Germany had to maintain Wagner’s noble, idealistic experiment—where art was 
pursued solely for its own sake—by keeping Parsifal safe from pecuniary, market 
influences.8   
 
Broadly characterizing a much deeper critique, this artistic debate makes a turn towards the 
political—severely symptomatic of a broader crisis.  Ultimately, the protection of Parsifal 
could not be reconciled, as modernity and technologization began to challenge the young 
nation.  In the “challenging forth” of technological modernity Parsifal is expelled from 
Monsalvat.  As told in both Wagner and Wolfram von Eschenbach’s accounts of the legend, 
it is not in his primary visit to the grail castle that Parsifal has the courage to pose his healing 
question, and the grail is not revealed.   
 When realizing that we have detailed the aesthetic history of Being in the West as a 
coming to presence of a poetic politics, through which Heidegger sought to combat 
modernity and return technē to Poiēsis, we know that after the Götterdämmerung, we are 
waiting for Parsifal.  For it is only in the power of the compassionate question that the pure 
fool, enlightened by compassion, can restore original innocence and truly begin anew.  As 
such, we must now make the attempt to direct the oblivion of Being towards Parsifal and in 
so doing, restore the innocence of the god.
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Appendix	  I:	  Das	  Rheingold	  
	  
	  
The Rhein-gold, hidden ‘neath the waters of the river, is watched by three Rhine 
maidens—Woglinde, Wellgunde, and Flosshilde.  Wrought into a ring, the gold 
would bring universal domination to its possessor; but none, save one who despises 
and forswears love, can wield it.  The magic gold is stolen by force from the maidens 
by the Nibelung, Alberich, who has wooed them in vain, and they cry for help to 
Wotan. 
But the gods themselves are in danger.  Desirous of building a palace, they 
have called their foes, the giants, to their aid; and as reward for their labor Wotan, 
trusting to Loge’s cunning to enable him to evade the promise, has agreed to deliver 
up Freia, the goddess of youth, whose loss will bring old age and decay on the gods.  
The palace built, Fafner and Fasholt, the giants, demand their payment; and Loge, 
called upon for his promised aid, avows that thought he has sought through both 
Heaven and Earth, he can find naught that may be held as equivalent for woman’s 
worth and beauty.  Then while the gods are in suspense, seeing no way out of the 
difficulty, he tells of the rape of the Rhine-gold, and how the magic ring has been 
wrought by Alberich, who hopes by its means to subdue all Earth and Heaven to his 
will.  The giants, between whom and the Nibelungs a feud has long existed, are 
greatly disturbed by the tidings, and finally announce that if the gods will win for 
them the Hoard of the Nibelungs, they will accept that as ransom for Freia, whom 
they hold as pledge in the meantime. 
Wotan and Loge therefore descend to Nibelheim, where, by the ais of the 
magic ring, Alberich is accumulating a vast hoard of treasure, and has further 
employed the skill of Mime to make for him a helmet, by the magic power of which 
he can change his shape, or become invisible at will.  By Loge’s cunning the gods 
succeed in binding the Nibelung, and refuse to lose him till he has paid over the 
ransom of the entire Nibelung Hoard, together with the helmet and ring.  Deprived of 
this last, Alberich utters a curse upon all its future possessors; it shall bring death and 
destruction to all alike, till it return once more to his keeping. 
The giants, with Freia in their power, return to claim the promised ransom, and, 
thrusting their staves, into the earth before the goddess, demand that the gold shall 
reach a height sufficient to conceal her from view; the helmet of magic is added to the 
pile; but when all the gold has been heaped together, there is still a chink through 
which the eye of the goddess can be seen.  To fill this the giants demand the ring, 
which is now on Wotan’s hand; he at first refuses to part with it; but at the 
interference of the goddess Erda, who rises from the earth to warn him against 
incurring the curse invoked on the possessor of the ring, he adds it to the pile, and the 
ransom is complete.  Freia is delivered up to the gods, and the curse of the ring 
forewith brings to work; Fafner claims the greater part of the Hoard for himself, and, 
on Fasholt’s resistance, slays him. 
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Donner and Froh call the spirits of the clouds together, and a rainbow bridge 
spans the valley, passing over which the gods enter Walhalla, while the wail of the 
Rhine maidens for their lost gold rises from the depths beneath.1  
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Sieglinde, daughter of Wälsing, has been carried off by robbers, her father and 
brother, she believes, slain, and she herself married against her will to Hunding. 
To the forest-dwelling of Hunding and Sieglinde there comes a fugitive 
outlaw, overcome by conflict and weariness, in whom Sieglinde finally recognizes 
Siegmund, her twin-brother, and the predestined winner of the sword, Nothung, 
which at her wedding-feast, a mysterious stranger had thrust up to the hilt in the trunk 
of the tree which supports their dwelling, and which can only be withdrawn by the 
bravest of men.  Siegmund withdraws the sword with ease, claims Sieglinde alike as 
sister and bride, and the two fly together. 
Wotan, in view of the inevitable conflict between Hunding and Siegmund, 
summons Brünnhilde, the Valkyrie, and bids her give victory to Siegmund; but Fricka 
demands vengeance on the Wälsing, who had outraged the sanctity of the marriage 
vow, and, when Wotan resists, upbraids him with his infidelity, Siegmund being, in 
truth, Wotan’s son; against his will Wotan yields, and revokes his commands to 
Brünnhilde.  The Valkyrie adjures him to give the reason for this change of purpose, 
and Wotan tells her of the fatal spell of the Nibelung Ring, which, till it is restored to 
its original owners, the Rhinemaidens, must be a source of danger to the gods.  
Should Alberich recover possession of it, he, who by cursing Love had succeeded in 
welding the Ring, can use its magic runes with fatal effects against the gods, and so 
bring about their total ruin. 
Wotan himself is powerless to recover the talisman, having given it as 
payment for service to the giants, of whom the survivor, Fafnir, holds it.  It can only 
be won by a hero, who unconscious of the spell and unaided by the gods, to whose 
law and favor he is a stranger, is driven by his own necessity to the task.   
Such a hero Wotan had thought to find in Siegmund, the outlaw, defiant alike 
of the laws of gods and men; but Fricka had detected the truth that Siegmund is, in 
fact, no free agent, Wotan’s will having been the motivating power of his actions.  It 
was Wotan who was his father, Wotan who prepared the magic sword, Nothung, and 
Wotan who had led Siegmund to the dwelling of Sieglinde.  Therefore Siegmund is 
ineligible for the task which the gods had assigned to him, and Wotan, his purpose 
penetrated by Fricka, must yield him up to her will.  Brünnhilde, moved by 
admiration for Siegmund’s dauntless bearing of love for Sieglinde, resolves to defy 
Wotan’s expressed will and fulfill his hidden wish, by shielding Siegmund in the 
conflict.  Wotan, however, interposes his wrath at her disobedience, the sword, 
Nothung, shivers on the spear of the god, and Siegmund falls, slain by Hunding.  
Brünnhilde flies with Sieglinde, who saves herself and her unborn child by taking 
refuge in the wood where Fafnir, in dragon form, watches over the Nibelungen 
Hoard. 
The Valkyrie remains to brave the wrath of Wotan.  In punishment for her 
disobedience the god banishes her from Walhalla, deprived of her divinity, and 
condemns her to wed the mortal who shall rouse her form the magic slumber into 
which he will cast her.  Brünnhilde beseeches that none save the bravest hero on earth 
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(whom she foresees will be the son of Siegmund) shall wake her, and with this view 
entreats Wotan to defend her slumber by surrounding her with fire which none but the 
bravest may pass.  Wotan yields, and, kissing her on the brow, he robes her of her 
divinity and casts her into a slumber; then, striking his staff on the rock, flames spring 
up around the Valkyrie, amid which Wotan vanishes.2  
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Appendix	  III:	  Siegfried	  
	  
	  
Siegfried, the son of Siegmund and Sieglinde, has been brought up in the forest by the 
dwarf Mime, who intends to use Siegfried as his instrument in recovering for him the 
Nibelung Hoard and the Ring.  The great obstacle in the way of his carrying out his 
plan is his failure to forge a suitable weapon, Siegfried at once breaking into pieces 
every sword Mime con forge.  Indignant at these repeated failures, Siegfried at last 
wring from Mime the confession that his mother, dying, had entrusted him with the 
fragments of Nothung, Siegmund’s sword, and Siegfried bids wield these fragments 
anew; Mime knows himself to be unequal for the task, and yet knows that no other 
weapon will serve for the slaying of Fafnir. 
Wotan, in the guise of the Wanderer, appears to Mime; and in a riddling 
contest, in which each stakes his head on the successful solving of three questions, 
forces from Mime the confession of his failure, and then reveals to him that Nothung 
can only be forged anew by one to whom fear is unknown. 
On Siegfried’s return, Mime admits his inability to fulfill the task, and bids 
the lad attempt it himself, which he does with success.  Mime, having vainly 
endeavored to extort a confession of fear from Siegfried, promises to lead him to 
Fafnir, in whose presence he will surely learn it. 
Alberich, who watches Fafnir’s retreat in the hope of regaining the ring 
himself, is warned by Wotan (the Wanderer) of Mime’s intentions of winning the 
Hoard through the instrumentality of Siegfried, and both endeavor, but vainly, to put 
Fafnir on his guard. 
Siegfried, led by Mime to the neighbourhood of the dragon’s cave, attempts to 
imitate the song of the birds, and awakens Fafnir by his horn; but, far from feeling 
fear at the monster’s appearance, he is only roused to wrath by his threats, and attacks 
him, finally piercing him to the heart with Nothung.  His hand being scorched by the 
fiery blood of the dragon, the lad places it to his lips to cool it; and as soon as he 
tastes the blood, he understands the song of the bird, warning him to take possession 
both of Ring and Tarn-helmet, and to be on his guard against Mime’s treachery.  
Consequently, when Mime approaches him with flattering words, Siegfried 
detects the thought beneath; and on the dwarf offering him a poison drink, he slays 
him and casts his body into the cave, the entrance to which he closes with the corpse 
of the dragon.  Resting under a tree, the bird sings of Brünnhilde the sleeping 
Valkyrie, who can only be awakened from her fire-girdled slumber by one who 
knows no fear; Siegfried announces that he has never learned that lesson, and bids the 
bird lead him to Brünnhilde.  
Wotan awakes the goddess Erda to tell her that her wisdom is now baffled, for 
his will accepts what her knowledge foretold.  The Ring has been won by Siegfried, 
and Brünnhilde, the daughter of Wotan and Erda, shall work out its curse, and, having 
learned to know, shall carry through the deed which shall free the world.  There is not 
further need for Erda’s wisdom, and Wotan bids her to everlasting slumber. 
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Siegfried, led by the bird, arrives at the foot of Brünnhilde’s mountain, where 
he is confronted by the Wanderer, who would bar the way with his spear; Siegfried 
hews the weapon asunder with his sword, and makes his way through the flames to 
the summit of the mountain, where he finds the Valkyrie sleeping under a fir tree.  He 
removes her helmet, and cuts off her corset with Nothung, and, at the sight of the first 
woman he has ever seen, feels at last the touch of fear.  Brünnhilde, awakened by 
Siegfried’s kiss, at first shrinks in terror from her fate; then, recognizing the hero as 
the son of Siegmund, whose coming she had herself foretold, confesses her love and 
yields in ecstasy to his embrace.3     
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Appendix	  IV:	  Götterdämmerung	  
	  
	  
The drama opens with a scene between three Norns, who indicate by their dark 
prophecies, and the breaking of the chord they weave, the fate of the hero, and the 
approaching fall of Walhalla. 
Siegfried leaves Brünnhilde, having pledged himself to her, and given her the 
Ring as a love-token, and arrives at the hall of Gibichungs, Gunther and Gutrune, 
with their half-brother Hagen, who is really the son of Alberich. 
Hagen, well aware of the task which his father has imposed upon him of 
regaining the Ring, urges Guther and Gutrune to marriage, telling them that in 
Brünnhilde and Siegfried they will find their fitting mates. 
On Siegfrieds arrival, Gutrune, acting under Hagen’s advice, presents him 
with a magic drink, the effect of which is not only to inspire him with a sudden 
passion for the Gibichung Princess, but to make him entirely forget Brünnhilde; 
whom he offers to assist Gunther in winning as his wife, claiming the hand of 
Gutrune as his reward, and the two heroes swear an oath of blood-brotherhood. 
Brünnhilde, awaiting the return of Siegfried, is visited by the Valkyrie, 
Waltraute, who tells her of the dismay in Walhalla, caused by Wotan’s acceptance of 
the coming Götterdämmerung, and refusal to make any effort to avert it.  Nothing can 
save the gods except the return of the fatal Ring to its original guardians, the Rhine 
Maidens.  Brünnhilde, who has now fully accepted the fate Wotan has prepared for 
her, and accounts Siegfried’s love a greater treasure than her lost divinity, refuses to 
part with the Ring, Siegfried’s ;ove-token, and Waltraute leaves her indignation.  
Siegfried, in the shape of Gunther, which he has assumed by means of the Tarn-helm. 
Penetrates again through the flame to Brünnhilde, and, in spite of her struggles, forces 
the Ring from her, and compels her to accept him as her husband, keeping faith with 
Gunther by placing the sword, Nothung, between them. 
In the mist of the morning, Siegfried and Gunther change places, and 
Brünnhilde follows the latter to the hall of the Gibichungs, where she is met by 
Siegfried and Gutrune.  She at once accuses Siegfried of having betrayed both herself 
and Gunther, and he swears his innocence on Hagen’s’ spear.  Hagen offers to avenge 
Brünnhilde and Siegfried’s death is determined upon. 
A hunting party is arranged, and Siegfried, who has become separated from 
the others, is confronted by the three Rhine Maidens, who entreat him to give them 
back the Ring, and on his refusal foretell that he will die that day.  Siegfried refuses to 
give them through fear what he would not yield freely, and the maidens vanish. 
Siegfried is joined by the others. And during the following meal, under the 
influence of a drink given by Hagen, he relates the story of his slaying of the dragon 
and winning Brünnhilde.  Two ravens fly out of the thicket behind him, and Siegfried, 
turning to look at them, is struck to the heart by Hagen. 
The body is borne to the hall, where Hagen claims the Ring as his property, 
both as avenger of perjury and heir to the rightful owner, Alberich, but is opposed by 
Gunther.  The two fight, and Gunther falls. 
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At Brünnhilde’s command a funeral pyre is raised on which the body of 
Siegfried is laid, and Brünnhilde, after proclaiming love alone, not gold or glory, to 
be the enduring good, mounts her horse, Grane, and spurs it into the flames. 
The waves of the Rhine rise, and the maidens summoned by Brünnhilde’s last 
words, draw the Ring from Siegfried’s hand and disappear into the waves, dragging 
with them Hagen, who has endeavored to frustrate them.  A glow in the northern sky 
tells of the fall of Walhalla and the ‘twilight of the gods.’4  
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In the castle of Monsalvat, in the mountains of Northern Spain, the Holy Grail, the 
Cup of the Last Supper, and the Spear with which the side of the Savior was pierced 
on the Cross, are guarded by the Order of the Grail Knights, ruled by their king 
Amfortas, son of Titurel, to whose care in the first instance the scared relics were 
committed.  In the valley beneath Monsalvat the enchanter, Klingsor, has erected a 
magic castle and garden, and furious at the refusal of Amfortas to admit him as one of 
the Order, devotes himself to the task of corrupting and ensnaring the Grail Knights.  
Amfortas himself has been seduced by the charms of an unnamed sorceress, and not 
only robbed of the Holy Spear, but in the struggle wounded by the weapon.  The 
wound will yield to no know remedy, but the Grail oracle has declared that healing 
shall come through ‘a pure Fool’ wise through fellow suffering. 
Such is the explanatory account given by Gurnemanz, a knight of the grail, to 
his attendant squires, at the commencement of the drama.  Kundry, the self-appointed 
messenger of the Grail, a wild and fantastic figure, breaks in upon the scene with a 
flask of healing balsam from Arabia; but the king and knights are alike aware that no 
means of healing, save that foretold by the Grail, will be of any avail. 
The knights bear Amfortas to the lake for refreshment; and while the king 
watches with interest the flight of a wild swan, the bird falls, transfixed by an arrow 
from the bow of Parsifal.  Taxed with the deed, the lad avows it gleefully, but when 
Gurnemanz’ remonstrance convinces him of the cruelty of his action, he is struck 
with remorse, and, breaking his bow, throws it and the quiver from him.  Asked who 
he is, and whence he comes, Parsifal can give no satisfactory answer; but Kundry 
declares her knowledge of his parentage: he has been brought up in the woods ‘as a 
fool’ by his widowed mother, who has died of grief at his desertion.  The lad, 
overcome with rage at Kundry’s mocking tone, makes a furious attack upon her, but 
is checked by Gurnemanz.  The knight, thinking he recognizes the new-comer the 
Fool of the prophecy, bids him accompany him to the Grail Feast.  Kundry sinks 
down, overcome by heavy slumber, against which she struggles in vain.  The scene 
changes to the temple of the Grail, where the mystic relic is to be unveiled, in the 
presence of the knights, by the king. 
Amfortas, to whom the sight of the grail brings renewed suffering, at first 
shrinks from his task, but, urged by the voice of his father, Titurel, who is himself 
preserved in life by the sight of the Grail, he unveils the cup, blessing with it the 
bread and wine, which thus becomes possessed of a miraculously sustaining power, 
and, as such, are partaken of with reverence by the Brotherhood.  Parsifal remains a 
spectator of the solemn Feast, but when questioned by Gurnemanz at the conclusion, 
shows no sign of comprehension of what has passed, and is driven by him with 
contempt from the temple. 
Klingsor, aware that in Parsifal he has a foe whom it is essential to his plans to 
disarm and render powerless, summons to his aid Kundry (who having once vainly 
tempted Klingsor is now in his power, compelled to work his will), and bids her 
exercise on Parsifal the charms which have proved to fatal to Amfortas.  Parsifal, 
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drawn by Klingsor’s spell to the castle, and having overcome by his valor the recreant 
of the knights of the Grail who guard it, enters the magic garden, and is at first 
enchanted, and afterwards repelled, by the fascinations of the Flower Maidens who 
inhabit it.  Kundry’s entrance puts them to flight, and by recalling to memory the lads 
name, and working upon his affection for his mother, almost bends him to her will.  
But her kiss awakens in Parsifal a comprehension of Amfortas’ sin and his own 
danger, and he steadfastly repels the temptress; Kundry summons Klingsor to her aid, 
and with the intention of slaying Parsifal he flings the Holy Spear at the lad; but the 
weapon hovers in the air above his head, and Parsifal seizing it in his hand, and 
making the sign of the cross, Klingsor’s castle falls in ruins to the ground. 
Amfortas, shrinking from the agony of his wound, refuses to unveil the Grail; 
the Brotherhood, deprived of their mystic food, become weakened and demoralized; 
Titurel dies; and Gurnemanz seeks refuge in a hermitage from the impending ruin of 
the Order.  To him, on Good Friday morning, arrive, first Kundry, in the garb of a 
penitent, silent, but desirious as ever of serving the Grail; then Parsifal, grown to 
manhood, fully armed, and bearing the Spear, which through tall his wandering he 
has preserved unharmed.  Cursed by Kundry in the previous act, he has till now been 
unable to find the Grail Castle, and is overcome with grief on learning the straight to 
which the Brotherhood is reduced.  Gurnemanz assures him that he has conquered the 
curse, and anoints him king of the Grail.  In his kingly office Parsifal first baptizes 
Kundry, and then, assuring her of redemption, gives her the kiss of absolution.  The 
three repair to the Grail Temple, where, at the funeral of his father, Amfortas has 
promised to unveil the Grail; but when the moment arrives he refuses to fulfill his 
promise, renounces his royal office, and demands death at the hands of the indignant 
knights.  Gurnemanz and Parsifal enter; and Parsifal with a touch of the Spear heals 
Amfortas, and, assuming the office the later has renounced, unveils the Grail, while 
the knights kneel in silent adoration, and Kundry falls dead at his feet.5 
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